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1 8 AUS 1992 
Esther D. Reed 
Salvation in a Social Context: The Impact of Hegelian Social 
Theory on Modern Understanding of Soteriology, with 
particular reference to The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
The study is an exercise in interdisciplinary practice. It 
concerns the relationship between theology and socio-philosophy 
and considers the type of dialogical theory that is required in 
order to articulate the meaning of salvation socially. The 
intention is mediate a theological understanding of salvation 
through issues raised by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit 
and which continue as matters of concern to his interpreters. 
The study is divided into three main /arts, Identity, 
Alienation and Community. Each part reP1.sents interrelated 
areas of human experience which bear upon Christian and non-
Christian social theory. The Introduction and Part 1 outline 
difficulties on the side of faith in articulating an idea of God's 
salvation for the contemporary needs and goals of society. I 
paint in broad brush strokes the shape of the contention over how 
to speak about salvation in a social context, in particular, the 
dualism between talking of 'the social' either terms of the 
functions of collected individuals or as a single entity. 
Part 2 introduces critical interpretations of Hegel and his 
treatment of various social forms of alienation. Relevant 
contributions from contemporary non-Christian social theorists, 
Jurgen Habermas, in particular, are summarized and discussed. 
1 
In Part 3 I consider what is inadequate in Hegel's own 
superseding of the Christian understanding of community and 
ask: -What kind of thought is able to sublate Hegel's own 
inadequate notion of community?- Using analogical reasoning, I 
suggest that it is possible for theology both to learn from Hegel 
and his interpreters, and to criticize them. I look at some 
implications for Christian social theory today. 
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SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE IMPACT OF 
HEGELlAN SOCIAL THEORY ON MODERN UNDERSTANDING 
OF SOTERIOLOGY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT. 
My theme is salvation in a social context, the context in 
which we locate our individual projects and have things in 
common; the context for the economy, polity, culture and 
societal community. My theme is salvation in a social context 
- that healing (l. salvus) wrought in Christ which has eftect 
more widely than in the life of the individual. And my theme, 
finally, is salvation in a social context considered analogically 
through dialogue between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory. The basic form of questioning arises upon asking, can 
one say anything of what God's salvation is like in dialogue with 
non-Christian social theory, especially Hegel's science of 
consciousness but also Habermas's communicative action theory. 
In introducing this theme I acknowledge the influence on my 
work of the contemporary Latin American Liberation theologian 
Clodovis Boft. The name of Clodovis Boft is a by-word for the 
theology of liberation and it may seem curious to link him into a 
study of Hegel, of whom he is deeply critical. 1 Both struggle, 
however, towards a better understanding of community in the 
seemingly inevitable tension between the single 'I' and the 
universal 'We', and I draw on their work together. 
The charge against much modern Christianity is that it has 
fostered the alienation of individual salvation from the social 
1 c. Boft (1987) pp. 12; 39; 1n; 203; 219. 
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context. It is not a new charge. Hegel came close to denying 
that Christianity has critical social importance when he said 
that it was a mutation of free self-consciousness; "agonizingly 
self-divided, the movement of an infinite yearning .. .in antithesis 
to the Unchangeable" (217). 2 His charge, like that of 'post-
Christians' today, is that the Christian faith has not and perhaps 
cannot attend to social matters because it is about the infinite 
yearning of the individual for release from the present order. 
This means that one of the most controversial issues of our time 
is how to deal theologically with sin and salvation not only with 
regard to the individual but in socio-political spheres. 3 
It is generally agreed amongst theologians of all persuasions 
that salvation takes effect in the life of the individual through 
faith in Christ. It is also commonly confessed that God's act in 
Christ constitutes a universal, cosmic event of renewal. Vemon 
White's 1991 essay Atonement and Incarnation: Universality 
and Particularity addresses precisely this claim of its 
universal scope. 4 There are difficulties, however, on the side 
of faith in articulating an idea of God's salvation for the 
contemporary needs & goals of society. E. Dussel, a Latin 
American theologian, writes, "historical, social sin is 
transmitted by institutions - by cultural, political, economic, 
2 Quotations are from A. V. Miller's translation, 1977, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, and section numbers are given in brackets after the quote. 
3 A. O. Dyson explains why salvation is a volatile concept in theology today. 
Uberation Theologians, he says, are accused of reducing discussion about 
salvation to politics. -Freedom in Christian and Contemporary Concepts of 
Freedom-. Studia The%gica, vol. 39, no. 1., 1985. 
4 V. White (1991). See Ch. 8 for an ethical discussion of the imperialistic 
associations of Christianity'S claim for universal significance. 
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religious, and so on structures. W 5 Sin, says Dussel, is part of 
the texture of society. But in what sense? How do we identify 
the social character of sin? We might well agree with Dussel 
about the social character of sin in the sense that one offence 
affects the lives of many. But does this still tie us to a 
perspective from the individual and meet the challenge of 
attending to social matters? 
What other available options do we have for thinking about 
salvation socially? Some of the early 1970s Liberation 
theologians tried relocating the ordo salutis from the individual 
to 'society', thinking of 'society' as a thing or subject with a 
history. They used Marx's idea of the collective subject. In the 
Grundrisse (G. Groundplan) Marx writes; Wit is always a certain 
social body, a social subject, which is active ... w. 6 J. Miranda, 
for instance, uses his ideas of 'the collective labourer' and 
'general social knowledge'. 7 There are big questions here, but 
I suggest at the outset that we must be very careful about 
developing an idea of salvation in a social context which enables 
us to say that a particular group, class, nation, collectively 
experiences salvation or is guilty. I need only recall the work of 
Horkheimer and Adorno on the logic of collective responsibility 
for sin to be reminded not only of the loss of a sense of common 
responsibility, but the identification of a people - the Jews -
with sin, and its horrendous holocaust consequences. 8 
5 E. Dussel (1988) p. 22. 
6 K. Mane Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political economy. 
Vintage Books, N.V. 1973. p. 8. 
7 J . Miranda (1978) pp. 42 f. 
8 M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno (1972) Dialectic of Enlightenment, Orig. Ed. 
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This is to paint in broad strokes the shape of how I shall 
consider the contention over how to speak about salvation 
socially - namely, how we are caught in the dualism of talking 
about 'the social' either in terms of collected individuals or as a 
single, unified entity. Now I want to introduce how I use 
Clodovis Boff as a theological resource, and Hegel and Jurgen 
Habermas as resources from non-Christian socio-philosophy, to 
establish what is intended as a more adequate way of thinking 
about salvation in a social context. Concisely, what I propose is 
an approach to these theological questions through dialogue 
between Christian and non-Christian social theory in order to 
relearn what we understand by 'the social'. What I take from 
Boff are some of the analogical tools developed in his 
explication of salvation through a reading of Aquinas - the 
distinction between the content and meaning (L. res significata 
- thing signified) of salvation within Christian theology and 
different modes of expression (modus significandi - mode of 
signification). This distinction allows contemporary questions 
about salvation to be worked out through the medium of 
philosophy or, in my case, socio-philosophy, without identifying 
Christian faith with socio-philosophy. 9 
1944. 
9 C. Boft does not clearly distinguish between Aquinas's conception of analogy 
given In De Veritate (q. 2 a. 11) which assumes the relation between God and the 
world only as an analogy of proportionality (convenientia proportionalitatis) 
and the analogy of attnbution (convenientia proportionis) found in his later 
works especially Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica, 1. (See T. 
McDermott's translation (1989) pp. 30 - 34). The question surrounds the 
distance fixed In the analogy. His repudiation of the analogy of proportion leaves 
the thing signified as uncomprehended and e.xceeding its signification. S. T. pt. 1, 
quest. 13, arts 5 - 12. 
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The intention is to attain a better understanding of the order 
of God's salvation socially, the ongoing mystery or economy of 
salvation that is God's continuing work in the world. The manner 
of procedure involves a formal discussion of the relation 
between theology and socio-philosophy. The use of Aquinas' 
distinction is important because it allows me to relate two 
dimensions in the theological task that constantly intersect, 
doctrine and dialogue with other disciplines. 10 Clodovis Boft 
develops this distinction throughout Theology and Praxis in 
terms of what he calls 'first' & 'second' theology. 'First' theology 
corresponds to the confessional doctrines of God, creation, 
incarnation etc. 'Second' theology is an outworking of the 
content of these doctrines through socio-analytical mediation. 
The former is the heartland from which to derive theoretical 
understanding of salvation. The latter is the going through 
socio-analytical mediation to derive contemporary understanding 
of 'the social'. We must know both what God's salvation is 
('first' theology) and know what it is like in terms of human 
liberation ('second' theology). 
The study of this relation is the theme of the thesis. The 
general intention of the study is to open up a space for dialogue 
between the two realms of discourse. Most of our problems 
10 C. Boff quotes S. T. 1, quest. 1, a. 2, ad 2 where Aquinas says two kinds of 
science comprise doctrine, the one being sacra doctrins established on 
principles revealed by God and the other being pars philosophise. (1987) p. 
270 n. 46. See also S. T. 1 a 4 ad 2: "Sacred Doctrine, being one, extends to 
things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in 
each, the same formal aspect (ratio)". Other 20th C. retrievals of philosophical 
analogy to the content of sacred doctrine include D. Burrell's (1973) linguistic 
and K. Rahner's transcendental work. (197~ pp. 711. 
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about their relation stem, I argue, either from too close an 
identification between the two or too sharp a distinction. Either 
non-Christian social theory is assumed to be concerned with 
issues identical to those of Christianity in its identifying of 
social forms of alienation, with the result that priority is given 
to action for justice and peace; or else Christian social theory is 
regarded as concerned only with the Church, allowing little if 
any contact with non-Christian social theory. This produces an 
equal and opposite distortion, Christian social theory in which 
the questions of action for justice and peace are marginal or 
irrelevant. It leads very quickly to an introverted ecclesiology. 
I try to counter the dangers either of too close an identification 
or of an implied separation of the doctrine of salvation and 
socio-economic and political concerns by reconsidering this 
relation with reference to the notion of analogy. 
It is no easy matter to engage critically with ideas of analogy 
because generations of theologians have subjected analogical 
discourse to careful attention. 11 What I hope to do is not to 
define rules or a strict framework for employing analogy as a 
device that guarantees a fruitful relation between Christianity 
and socio-philosophy. Rather, I hope to open up the different 
elements for debate and to disentangle the elements involved in 
interdisciplinary practice. I do not intend to put together a logic 
for analogy in the sense of providing a theory of the parallels 
operating in the different spheres of Christian and non-Christian 
social theory. My argument will more properly be understood as 
an inquiry into how to speak of both God and the world while 
11 See D. Burrell (1973) for analogical forms of discourse as developed by 
Classical & Medieval proponents; Plato, Aristotle, John Duns Scotus and Aquinas. 
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engaging in interdisciplinary practice. 
This involves consideration of the question of why salvation 
is properly an analogical term; how can it be used to speak of 
God's salvation to say what it is like in socio-economic and 
political terms? How is it to be distinguished from 
metaphorical use? 12 In addressing these questions I draw upon 
the framework for analogy from language that Aquinas offers 
where it proves helpful. I do not intend to make a study of 
Aquinas but I do employ the resources from philosophical 
grammar that he uses to attain a systemic grasp of the notion of 
analogy. He speaks of putting together different realms of 
discourse with the intention of perceiving something of God: 
In every true affirmative statement, although the subject and predicate signify 
what is in fact in some way the same thing, they do so from different points 
of view... while the fact that they are put together affirmatively indicates 
that it is one thing that is being looked at. 13 
Making a statement about God cannot be vaccinated against 
mistake, he seems to imply, except that its intent to speak of 
God allows language to signify an affirmative statement by the 
subject about him. This is what David Burrell calls an "inner 
word", an interior or spiritual element which both permits and 
conveys information about God. 14 
12 I understand metaphor to mean a figure of speech or descriptive term that is 
transferred to some object to which it is not immediately applicable. 
13 T. Aquinas S. Th. 1.13.12. 
14 "When Aquinas speaks of the act of understanding as expressing an 'inner 
word' or 'species', the first analogy borrows from language, the second from 
vision-. D. Burrell (1973) p. 152. 
SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT 
16 
INTRODUCTION 
There are two issues here. First, there is the fundamental 
issue of what kind of logical space and relation between 
theology and socio-philosophy is to be conceived in this 
discussion. Second, once this issue has been considered, there 
are the detailed questions that arise in working towards an 
account of this logical space and relation with reference to 
Hegel and Habermas. The former is the background question of 
the type of relation envisaged and the main issue is between a 
closed and an open, a static and a dynamic perspective. If the 
perspective is closed or static, then from the beginning the type 
of relation is more or less decided. Each realm of discourse is 
self-contained and little or no point of contact is either 
necessary or desired. 15 The open or dynamic perspective, by 
contrast, is a moving, dialogical type of relation. No limits are 
placed in advance on what might be discovered through 
interdisciplinary dialogue. 
In this study I stress what I have been calling the logical 
space between Christian and non-Christian social theory because 
I believe that anything less than a perspective which conceives 
of their more fundamental relation risks limiting the question of 
how we might understand God's salvation. So, what kind of space 
and what kind of relation? The bare outline of an answer might 
run as follows. The logical space between Christianity and 
socio-philosophy is not just incidental or occasional but belongs 
essentially and integrally to the Christian gospel of creation, 
redemption and ongoing recreation. These are the three primary 
characteristics of God's relation with the world. And the logical 
15 Ch. 7 takes up these issues in more detail with reference to the Augustinian 
notion of the two Kingdoms. 
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space that exists for dialogue between Christian and non-
Christian social theory is, I suggest, integrally part of the 
relation between these different dispensations of God's work in 
the world as Creator, Redeemer and Sustainer. 
This is the theological ground for considering the relation 
between Christian and non-Christian social theory. It may be 
summarized by saying that some connexion between God and the 
whole world is essential. This connexion affects our compre-
hension not only of God and the Church, but also more widely of 
humankind's social situation and possibilities. It presumes a 
certain concept of God and views of creation which cannot be 
considered here as fully as they ought. However, we can say that 
Christian and non-Christian social theory share a commonality 
on this basis of a shared relation to the Creator. And it is this 
relative commonality, implying a relationship of all things to 
God, which motivates analogical discourse. "Reasonable 
analogies" are found, Aquinas says, by virtue of the likeness that 
creation bears to its creator: "This is common to every 
creature". 16 This is not to say what type of analogy is to be 
employed. That is a more detailed question to which I shall refer 
shortly and for which Aquinas used various types of analogy. 17 
The nub of the matter, however, is the ontological ground for 
analogy based on the intrinsic likeness of created effect to 
cause. 
16 T. Aquinas x Quod/ibets, viii. 1. Quotation from T. Gilby (1955) p. 112. 
17 On the types of analogy in 81. Thomas see H. Lyttkens (1953) Ch.s IV-VI. This 
is a useful account of analogy based on attribution and proportion presented in 
relation to 81. Thomas's conception of God and creation. 
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The idea of logical space between Christian and non-Christian 
social theory depends on this likeness of effect to cause. As 
some commentators on Aquinas note, his analogical theology 
presumes a "metaphysics" of likeness, that is, a theoretical 
support for the contingency and possibility of God's creation of 
the world to be ultimately like himself. 18 The basic causal 
analogy is used accordingly to explain the need and longing for 
community existence that is expressed, somewhat differently, in 
Christian and non-Christian social theory. The consequent need 
for better human relations can be expressed both positively and 
negatively. Positively it is due to the longing of humankind made 
in God's image to become like its maker. Negatively it is due to 
the imperfection and deficiency that increases the distance from 
the divine prototype. The logical space for dialogue between 
theology and socio-philosophy thus exists in the potential and 
the need for the human likeness to its creator to be realized. 
The logical space between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory is therefore not a problematic gap between the different 
dispensations of the providence of God. Otherwise, the work of 
God the Redeemer is separated from that of God the Creator, 
Sustainer and Sanctifier. It is part of the gospel message from 
the beginning. This seems at first glance just what we should 
expect from a Christian soteriology, tackling the question of 
salvation in the modern world in terms of a trinitarian theology. 
And yet the surprising thing is that the implications of such an 
approach are so under developed. My perception of the current 
trend in theological thinking is that we could well be moving 
18 H. Lyttkens (1953) p. 482. 
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into an Augustinian phase where the plea is for Christian social 
theory to be a 'counter-history', 'counter-ethics' and 'counter-
ontology'. 19 John Milbank suggests in his recent publication 
Theology and Social Theory that we should adopt an ecclesially 
centred Christian social theory. Advocating the distinctiveness 
of Christian social theory he tends to separate, not merely 
distinguish, the theatre of God's Holy Spirit in the Church from 
secondary, proximate forms of social relation conducive to 
community: "What theology has forgotten", he writes, "is that it 
cannot either contest or learn from this understanding as such, 
but has either to accept or deny its object.". 20 It is important, 
he says, to reassert theology as a meta discourse because 
theology, alone, is a discourse for everyone, supposedly without 
the dialogue of mastery. 21 
Consider Milbank's statement: "The Church ... should seek to be 
an asylum ... a social space where a different, forgiving and 
restitutio nary practice is pursued". 22 The heart of Christian 
social theory is ecclesially centred and should concentrate, he 
says, on its own practice of proper relations. The idea of a 
logical space between Christian and non-Christian social theory 
tends to be conceived by him more as a gulf between the 
redeemed and the unredeemed than as something that is at the 
heart of the gospel, the different dispensations in the providence 
of God. Contrast and difference there is indeed. But there can be 
a contrast only if each of the characteristics of God's relation 
19 J. Milbank (1990) p. 381. 
20 J. Milbank (1990) p. 10. 
21 J. Milbank (1990) p. 6. 
22 J. Milbank (1990) p. 422. 
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with the world remain in existence after God's work of salvation 
in Christ. No talk of salvation is complete without bringing it 
together with the truth of creation and the ongoing work of the 
Holy Spirit. 23 
I mention Milbank's work because the overall aim of his 
project is to challenge the secular reason of Western philosophy, 
targeting Hegel in particular as offering an heretical and anti-
theistic basis for Christian social theory. Hegel's ambitions, he 
says, "are intimately linked with 'heretical' and 'pagan' currents 
... within secular social theory itself". 24 His significant and 
demanding book attempts to construct an Augustinian basis for 
Christian social theory as ecc/esi%gy, breaking with all 
dialectical reason that would go through (dia Gr. 'through') non-
Christian socio-analytic mediation. 25 His work is cited here 
partly as a justifiable warning against Hegel's quasi-soteriology 
which appeals to something more basic than the truth of the 
gospel. It alerts us to the question of the legitimacy of 
regarding dialogue with Hegel and the whole issue of the nature 
of Christian social theory and its mediation through socio-
philosophy. More than this, it raises significant methodological 
questions about what is often presented as the narrow choice 
between a social theory which is ecclesio-centric and that 
known through principles of practical reasonableness. 26 
23 This is one of the central claims of C.E. Gunton's The Promise of Trinitarian 
Theology (1991); "because the theology of the Trinity has so much to teach about 
the nature of our world and life within it, it is or could be the centre of 
Christianity's appeal to the unbeliever, as the good news of a God who enters into 
free relations of creation and redemption with his world". p. 7. 
24 J. Milbank (1990) p. 147. 
25 J. Milbank (1990) pp. 380; 389. 
SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT 
21 
INTRODUCTION 
He makes plain that questions about the propriety and method 
of dialogue with non-Christian socio-philosophy are consequent 
upon various understandings of the fruits of God's salvation in 
Christ for the whole world, the ontological bonding of Christ and 
the Church with the world. The problem as I see it, is whether 
the realities of Christian social theory; faith, scripture, the 
sacraments and the rest, are regarded as within bounds defined 
by sin. Is Christian social theory to be regarded primarily as 
about an escape from the realm of sin, or as the realization of 
God's creative purposes and relation with him? The danger is 
that when the former is emphasized Christian social theory can 
easily forget its created oneness, its ontological bond with the 
world, and so neglect positive aspects within non-Christian 
socio-philosophy. 27 The question is not a new one. Compare K. 
Barth's conviction that there can be no philosophical substitute 
for theology's presenting of the word of God with _ H.JPaton's 
stressing in the 1950s that theological truths are inevitably 
expressed, in part at least, in the language of philosophy. 28 It 
is, however, an urgent one if we are to practice what P. Nellas 
calls a discernment of spirits in any dialogue with socio-
philosophy from the perspective of trinitarian theology. 29 
26 o. O'Oonovan described this with regard to ethics as the false polarity between 
the 'ethics of the kingdom' and 'ethics of creation', the gulf between those advocating 
a -faith- ethic and those urging a more autonomous rationality. (1986) p. 15. 
27 I take the phrase -ontological bond- from Panayiotis Nellas (1987) who offers 
an excellent consideration of the relationship between the Church and the World in 
Part One, 111, pp. 93-102. 
28 -Philosophy cannot go beyond ... the Word of God itself, if it is to be true to its 
own task, if it is not to become theology-. K. Barth's Ethics p. 44. Cf. H.J. Paton 
(1955) pp. 373 f. 
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It is perhaps helpful to make clear at this early stage that 
see some convin"cing reasons for the strong reaction against 
post-Enlightenment secular social theory expressed by Milbank. 
These will be discussed in due course, not least that Hegel 
makes speculative reason the answer to the alienation between 
human consciousness and the Christian God as absolute and self-
sufficient: "The Good ... the Holy, Creator of Heaven and Earth" 
(759). Hegel's answer to this alienation is the speculative 
sUbsumption of the Christian faith within "Absolute Knowing". 
Hegel makes Christianity the same as the philosophy of 
"Absolute Knowing", affirming Christian revelation within 
speculative reason. W. Jaeschke describes how, at the beginning 
of his years in Jena, Hegel determined to recover the concept of 
God more satisfactorily than Kant's notion of the Absolute: 
"Remoteness in time and space" (764). 30 Hegel's own answers, 
I suggest, provide an unacceptable basis for Christian social 
theory, but it is necessary to face the challenges posed by him if 
theology is not justifiably to be accused of failing to give 
effective help to the modern world. This means asking: Should 
Christian social theory reverse Hegel's subsuming of theology 
within philosophy by reasserting itself as a "meta discourse"? 
How and when should theology affirm human capacity and 
responsibility within secular disciplines? 31 Is the only 
alternative to Hegel's certainty of reason's oneness with God 
(which Jaeschke calls the Easter of speculation), Milbank's 
29 P. Nellas (1987) p. 103. 
30 W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 128 - 145. 
31 On the biblical tradition of wisdom as the solid foundation for human rationality 
in tension with Augustinian concern for the purity of wisdom see D.W. Hardy in G. 
Wainwright Ed. (1989) Ch. 12 -Rationality, the Sciences and Theology-. On the 
wisdom tradition as the neglected side of biblical faith see W. Brueggemann (1972). 
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mistrust of post-Enlightenment secular reason? 32 
It is all too easy to beat a retreat from human rationality per 
se, allowing little or no possibility for conceptualizing a 
critical framework of dialogue on the frontiers between 
Christian and non-Christian social theory. However, dialogue 
with non-Christian theorists is, I suggest, not necessarily to 
capitulate to methodological atheism and secular answers to the 
control and regulation of power. Hegel's enterprise is a rational 
reconstruction of the universal presuppositions of human 
consciousness and self-reflection. Dialogue with his phenomen-
ological analysis of the experience of consciousness and self-
reflection is not, however, to presuppose his unity of logic and 
history, his assumed Absolute Spirit or self-determining 
dialectic of the human spirit, in order to perceive Christian 
social theory as including God's extra-ecclesial operation. 33 
Instead of the attitude of a division between Christian and 
non-Christian social theory what I am suggesting is that we 
build on the premise that, being created, humankind already has 
some likeness to God. This is the fundamental, background for 
the type of relation envisaged. The logical space for dialogue 
between Christian and non-Christian social theory is not a gap 
32 w. Jaeschke (1990) p. 131 emphasizes Hegel's faithfulness to eliminating this 
disharmony in the Berlin Lectures, e.g., L.P.R. 1 §§ 23 - 38 on the rift between a 
positivst theology the ·so-called [pure] thinking of the Enlightenmenr. C. Taylor 
(1975) says Hegel's unifying vision is a ·self authenticating dialectic·. p. 216. 
33 ·Hegel only distinguishes finite from infinite in a highly unchristian fashion, 
by placing a certain level of finite reality totally outside the reach of divine 
providence: J. Milbank (1990) pp. 159; 380 f. 
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between creation and redemption but is found in God's continuing 
work, presence and power in the world. And the type of relation 
possible between Christian and non-Christian social theory will 
be deeply influenced by this sense of the different stages in 
God's dealings with the world. I suggest that Aquinas's 
distinction between God's gracious activity in the world as 
operative and cooperative [L operans et co opera ns] might be 
considered in this. 34 In Aquinas's words, we are talking about 
how analogy as a real likeness between God and creation affects 
the possibility of obtaining knowledge of God's operation in the 
world; Wthe known is in the knower through the likenessw. 35 For 
our purposes, this involves the different kinds of knowledge and 
relation possible between theology and socio-philosophy given 
the agendas and presuppositions in both. 
The basic idea governing Aquinas's treatment of God's 
operative grace is that salvation is not human but divine and 
must relate the whole universe, not just the Church, dynamically 
to the sole author of created perfection: wChrist's passion is the 
cause of our salvation ... in that it reconciles us with Godw. 36 
The initiative lies with God who is operative in the world 
according to the different dispensations of his work. We have 
here what might be called the basis for an operative relation 
between sodo-philosophy and theology. God is operative in all 
creation to convey his divine presence and power, suggesting 
what might be called a first-order relation of human society to 
34 T. Aquinas S. rh. 1-2,1.111, a. 2c. See B. Lonergan (1971) Ch. 6, ·Actual 
Grace as Operans et Cooperans·. He gives a particularty clear exposition of grace 
in terms of divine and human connaturality. 
35 T. Aquinas S. rh. 1a. \xxxv. 2, ad 1 
36 T. Aquinas S. Th. 3a. Xlviii. 6, ad. 3. 
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divine social intent. 37 
In this reference to a first-order relation of human society to 
divine social intent I have taken a step forward toward the goal 
of specifying the type of relation possible between theology and 
socio-philosophy. In a sense, the above has been preparing the 
way for an answer to the question: How do we conceive the 
analogy between the creative sociality of God and that of 
humankind? It is an important question and an approach to an 
answer, I have said, is grounded in the certitude of God's 
providence. 38 This is the fundamental presumption of the 
likeness of the created to the Creator, cause to effect and gives 
the basis on which analogy is built. Divine presence and power is 
conveyed through aspects of the created order that evidence his 
likeness. God is immediately related to the created order, 
requiring no mediation of his presence. This I call the first-
order relation of God in the world. It is the immediate relation 
of all human society to divine providence. 
The first-order relation is easy to grasp because its basic 
affirmation is the unity of the different dispensations of God's 
activity in the world within the certainty of divine providence. 
37 God's gracious relation with the world is cooperative also inasmuch as the 
human will is both pasSive and active and can work together with him: -God works 
in every nature and purpose; all the same, we can think of ourselves as acting by 
our own powers and abilities-. T. Aquinas S. Th. 1 a-2ae. lxviii, 2, ad 1. Every 
person endowed with the ability to live cooperatively with God becomes his worker 
or -familiar-. Ibid. 1 a-2ae. Ixiii. 3, 4. 
38 On Aquinas's notion of providence as enabling his use of Aristotelian 
philosophy whenever compatible with Christian doctrine, see See B. Longeran 
(1971) pp. 76-84. 
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Any progress, however, toward more detailed understanding of 
the analogy between the Creator and the created would seem to 
require exposition of the implicit distinction between a first and 
a second-order relation. The latter involves the detailed 
questions that arise in working towards an account of the 
relation between Christian and non-Christian social theory, and 
which I hope to consider with reference to Hegel and Habermas. 
The matter is not easy. What is the manner of this relation? 
What types of analogy are to be employed? 
Let us approach the problem by getting hold of a distinction 
that helps us to be aware of the role of analogy in theology 
generally. I refer to the general distinction between analogical 
discourse as either an art or a science. This distinction is 
vague, but it indicates the two basic ways that analogy is 
commonly employed to speak of the relation between God and the 
world. On the one hand, analogy is perceived as belonging to the 
realm of artistic discourse with its fields of simile and 
metaphor. 39 On the other hand, analogy can be conceived as a 
schematic type of order which specifies degrees of 
proportionality. The passages where Aquinas sets forth his 
ideas of analogy frequently use the word prop ° rtio , in the sense 
of a definite, specifiable relation between God and creation. 40 
39 On the history of this debate from Cajetan to C.S. Lewis see R. Mclnemy 
(1968) Ch. 11. Note that Aquin~s opposes metaphor to analogy because the former 
involves a reduction of what is signified to the sense of the word in question: 
"The metaphorical sense is contained in the literal sense, for words bear 
imaginative suggestions as well as their plain and proximate sense". 
S. Th. 1a. i. 10, ad 3. 
40 De Veritate 23.7 ad 9; 23.1. ad 1; S. Th. 1a 14. 1 ad 3. On this see H. 
lyttkens (1953) pp. 436 1. Also D. Burrell (1973) Ch. 10. 
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Theology should resort to all the sciences, since they are its familiars, and its 
precursors in time though its followers in dignity. 4 1 
Aquinas looks for some kind of logic by which to order 
theological discourse about God. He does not identify theology as 
a science because the former deals with matters of faith which 
are not seen. 42 Nevertheless, he attends to formal likenesses 
in respect of the properties appertaining to God and creation. 
There is no need to illustrate this distinction between 
different types of analogy except to say that the temptation to 
divide analogical discourse into either an idiosyncratic affair or 
a technical discourse governed by a body of rules is not easy to 
resist. David Burrell is one writer who has sought to recognise 
and to resolve this difficulty through a linguistic mediation of 
the different types of analogy: "That capacity (for language to 
reach beyond logic) is shared by poets, scientists, some 
philosophers, and nearly all ordinary men". 43 He considers the 
context, grammar and 'similarity-in-dissimilarity' features of 
language to expose a range of analogical uses. 44 Reference to 
Burrell is a reminder that there simply cannot be a complete 
consensus on how analogical discourse should be. Hence the need 
to opt for a particular approach to analogical mediation of the 
supernatural character of Christian faith with knowledge in 
other fields. I opt for a socio-philosophic mediation of the 
41 T. Aquinas, Exposition, de Trinltate, ii. 3, ad 7. Quotation from T. Gilby 
(1953) p. 29. 
42 Ibid. p. 28. 
43 D. Burrell (1973) p. 242. 
44 "My strategy has been to expose the attitudes and convictions embedded in our 
ordinary usage, including the uncanny sense for similarity-in-dissimilarity we 
display in our frequent recourse to metaphor". Ibid. p. 243. 
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imperceptible operations of God in human society and the 
following indicates how I intend to proceed. 
As an exercise in 'second' theology this thesis aims to allow 
Hegel and Habermas to become dialogue partners in considering 
the themes of Identity, Alienation and Community. Each theme 
represents interrelated areas of human experience in its deepest 
dimensions and which pervade both Hegel and much contemporary 
social theory. As I show in reflections on several of Hegel's 
major interpreters, these have been central and foundational 
notions for him and modern day thought. The thesis broadly 
follows the journey in the Phenomenology from the earliest 
shapes of consciousness and self-consciousness to the self-
manifestation of Absolute Knowing. TraCing Hegel's journey does 
not mean that I find in the Phenomenology the potential for 
expressing a Christian understanding of the themes, much less 
that I intend to reargue his position. It does mean that I find 
aspects of Hegel's description of the inner dynamics of 
consciousness and the search for community to be surprisingly 
pertinent to the contemporary struggle with the crucial problem 
of a better understanding of God's salvation in a social context. 
This must be explained more precisely. The very word analogy 
suggests something beyond logic (ano Gr., beyond or higher). 
The immediate sense is that human logic is not enough to speak 
of God's salvation. Analogical theology is thus meant to allow 
the development of new ways of perceiving and conveying God's 
presence and power. It opens human discourse up to the 
metaphysical sphere, referring us beyond socio-philosophy. 
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God's salvation mobilizes the proc~ss. This is why I have 
referred to Clodovis 80ft'S notion of 'first' theology as the 
heartland from which to derive theoretical understanding of 
salvation, and spoken of the first-order or immediate relation of 
human society to divine social intent. 'First' theology must, 
however, have a readily understandable human content if it is to 
do the work proposed for it. Hence, the object of this study to 
consider a socio-philosophic mediation of soteriology. This is 
the second-order discussion of the form of various theories of 
analogy, what 80ff calls 'second' theology. 
'Second' theology, or a second-order discussion of the forms 
of theories of analogy, must be practical and analytically 
critical on the level of a textual reading of Hegel and his 
interpreters. A first-order discussion of theological discourse 
about salvation is not sufficient for analogy. Specific dialogue 
with particular philosophers and theorists is the essential 
constitution of constructive analogy. It is to preserve its 
integrity. In this study I do not attempt a systematic account of 
the relationship between theology and socio-philosophy but I do 
attend to the attitudes and consider the 'moves' or actions that 
are involved in what is primarily a dialogical and an 
interpretative process. I do not intend to define rules or a strict 
framework for debate but to consider certain attitudes that 
might be called 'moves' or actions and which enable the dynamics 
of interdisciplinary discourse required. 
Four moments or stages can be identified. The first is the 
attitude of openness or willingness to engage in dialogue. It 
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requires an act of commitment towards the dialogical partner 
together with the charitable supposition that there is something 
to be received from the debate. Given that an initial openness 
provides prima facie reasons for debate, 45 there follows a 
second stage which is the task of investigation. This is the work 
of identifying the crux issues, noting where problems arise and 
enabling a tracing of their history and causes. The issue which 
determines this study is that of why and how Christian theology 
must speak more adequately of salvation in a social context and I 
address it in the light of difficulties remaining since Hegel's 
representation of early nineteenth century idealist German 
philosophy. 
Hegel functions in the study to represent a certain lineage of 
discussion. He is the progenitor of a particular kind of 
discussion who provides a backdrop for, and focuses discussion 
on, the themes of Identity, Alienation and Community. The fact 
that Hegel puts his finger on important post-Enlightenment 
questions about identity, alienation and community can readily 
be seen. Since 1970, several social theorists have taken Hegel 
as a major philosophical figure. 46 Gillian Rose's 1971 Hegel 
Contra Sociology reclaims Hegelian speculative philosophy, 
aiming to retrieve his 'eschatological' reading of the present as a 
critical, rational tool. 47 Charles Taylor's 1979 reconstruction 
45 . D. W. Hardy in Geoffrey Wainwright, Ed. (1989), pp. nCtf-
46 By Enlightenment understand the atmosphere of devotion to freedom and 
scientifIC knowledge predominant amongst philosophies after the early to mid 
170OS. See P. Gay (197Ob) Bk. 3, Ch. 1, §. 3 where Enlightenment is defined in 
terms of reason, humanitarianism and industry. On Hegel's failure to recognize 
these as elements comprising 'the Enlightenmenr see R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 552 
- 559. 
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of the social design of Hegel's philosophy is a notable treatment 
of Hegel's development of modern notions of the individual by 
relating individual subjectivity to the individual's life as a 
social being. 48 His 1989 Sources of the Self. The Making of 
Modern Identity indicates the continuing need for studies in the 
meaning of identity left to us from philosophical constructs in 
the post-Reformation period. 49 Alien W. Wood's 1991 Hegel's 
Ethical Thought is an indication of a revival in analytical 
Hegelian ethics. Wood strips Hegel's ethical writings of their 
speculative content to what they say of a universal, objective 
standard for assessing social relations. 50 Hegelian social 
theory is ignored to our loss and peril. His science of 
consciousness forms the backdrop for much contemporary debate 
about self-actualization, freedom and mutual recognition in a 
rational social order. 
The first and second 'moves' or stages in the analogical task 
of theology developed in this study are thus an attitude of 
openness to debate and the task of investigation. In pursuing 
47 Gillian Rose (1971) pp. 3 - 6 and 136 f. for her reaction to Hegel's 
attributing speculative authority to reason. 
48 C. Taylor (1979) pp. 127-30 thinks Hegel to provide essential insight 
regarding the development of modem society by posing problems inherent in the 
individual's drive for freedom independent of community. On this see also R. Plant 
(1973) pp. 144 f. 
49 C. Taylor (1989) esp. pp. 495 - 502 traces the emergence of a modem sense 
of identity in the three loosely termed domains of theism, scientism and 
romanticism, including reference to the Hegelian notion of 'the spirit' of human 
intuition (p. 520) 
50 Alien W. Wood (1991) -Speculative logic is dead; but Hegel's thought is not-
pp. 4 - 6. On the tendency in Hegel's vision to smother the individual see pp. 256 
- 60. 
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this task I accept the perspectives that Hegel sets in these 
concerns. My concern is with the Hegel who is alive today not 
merely the residual Hegel in the texts alone. This leads to the 
third 'move' or stage in the analogical task of theology which is 
that of making specific points of contact between Christian and 
non-Christian social theory. The important point here is to 
recognise that the debate must become specific. If theology is 
to be a partner in the ongoing debates about Identity, Alienation 
and Community it must recognise the plurality that exists 
amongst the interpreters who bring the issues that Hegel raised 
to prominence, and respond to it with specific reference to 
particular figures. It seems to me that an honest recognition of 
this plurality is only possible within the confines of a single 
study by a concentration on selected figures from amongst 
Hegel's many interpreters. Hence JOrgen Habermas is taken as 
one, and possibly the best, example of a contemporary social 
theorist who perceives the need for a radical reconsideration of 
the aforesaid themes as they have been influenced by Hegel. 
Society is not, he believes, a pure Idea. It is not a static thing or 
object but is about living socially through better coordination of 
the activity of communication. Language is available to 
everyone, he says, proposing a predominantly linguistically 
mediated theory of communicative action.; -it is a universal-, the 
theory of communicative action being a deliberate attack on the 
'I' - 'We' framework of much Hegelian influenced socio-
philosophy. 51 
51 J. Habermas (1987b) p. 397. For Habermas's summary of Hegel's cognitive 
and idealist philosophy of SUbjectivity in relation to his own project see pp. 374-
403, "The Tasks of a Critical Theory-. 
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This question of the 'I - We' framework of Hegel's social 
theory refers to a dualism rooted in Hegel's subject - object 
framework of philosophy. It refers to the dualism which, I 
maintain, is the main hazard of the salvation in a social context 
debate, the dualism between talking of salvation either in terms 
of the individual response of faith to God's act in Christ or as an 
impersonal, interchange between God and society as a single, 
static entity. 52 Habermas's is a well-established voice within 
an explicitly Hegelian influenced tradition which analyzes and 
rejects Hegel's 'I - We' framework for debate. I hope to reflect 
on the valuable conclusions of his work and incorporate some 
into an analogical exercise in Christian theology. In so doing, I 
work with the idea of 'parable' as a bringing together of 
discourse about God and human society. From the Greek 
parabo/e, meaning to place beside or to make a comparison, my 
intention is to bring together theological discussion of the 
ramifications of Hegel's 'I - We' framework for debate with 
Habermas's treatment of the major issues of Identity, Alienation 
and Community. 
But there is also a fourth stage in the analogical task of 
theology which is particularly important in grasping the 
conceptual relation between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory. This is the restoring of non-Christian social theory to 
its own agenda, as it were giving it back to its particular 
concerns as distinct from the motive force in any theological 
study. If theology is to be a partner in contemporary debate 
about Identity, Alienation and Community it must listen to and 
52 I am reminded of Edna McOonagh's raising of these questions with a 
commendable clarity (1989) esp. Ch. 1 "The Gracing of Society-. 
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be able to be heard by those otherwise involved in its 
substantive questions. It must do this, however, without losing 
its specifically Christian hope of salvation which finds true 
identity and community within a fully Trinitarian theology. The 
fourth moment in the analogical task of theology must therefore 
be a renewed distinguishing of the separate agendas which 
determine Christian and non-Christian social theory. 
These four 'moves' or stages in the analogical task provide a 
working agenda for the opening up of logical space between the 
two realms of discourse and a pursuing their relation. By 
engaging in dialogue with Hegel and Habermas I am not 
suggesting that salvation has more to do with human relation and 
community than communion with God. That would suggest a 
horizontal notion of salvation purely in social terms. 53 I am 
suggesting that because sociality and relation are at the heart of 
the gospel, because God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit is 
communication and relation par excellence, because of the 
interrelation of the different dispensations of God's work in the 
world, and because of the human vocation to become like God, it 
is we" for us to dialogue with those for whom the overcoming of 
alienation and community are pivotal for how we understand 
human experience. 
53 An example of current emphasis on salvation and the social with broader 
theological focus than the so·called wSocial Gospelw of 19205 is Paul Fiddes 
(1989). 
Salvation must be a healing of our will ... But, ... there is also something more 
oorporate about sin . ... We must then try to understand the cross as having some 
effect upon the whole structure of human life and society. p. 152. 
He draws on Abelard's primarily subjective understanding of the transforming 
energy of the cross, opening it out 10 include an objective focus. p. 141. 
SALVATION IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT 
35 
PREFACE 
Before commencing, some indication should be given of the 
German texts and English translations used in my reading of 
Hegel. A. V. Miller's translation of Hegel's Phenomenology of 
Spirit, made from the fifth edition (F. Meiner, Hamburg, 1952) 
edited by J. Hoffmeister and corresponding to Gesammelte 
Werke 9 is the text usually cited by paragraph number. This 
translation is preferred to that of J. B. Baillie, the main reason 
being his preferred use of the term Spirit rather than Mind to 
translate Geist. An advantage of the translation Mind rather 
than Spirit is that it emphasizes point of contact with the 
exposition of consciousness in the Berlin 
developed from the Jena and pre-Jena writings. 
Phenomenology 
I adopt Miller's 
translation as Spirit, however, because it captures something 
of Hegel's employment of quasi-theological imagery whilst 
allowing an ambiguity to remain concerning its reference to the 
human 'spirit' as a basic reality. Spirit, says Hegel, is the 
experience of relation between individuals; 
the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses Which, in 
their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is We' 
and 'We' that is 'I' (177). 
It is this social character and concern of the Phenomenology 
that I wish to emphasize. 54 
I have also referred to Waiter Kaufmann's translation of the 
Preface and H. P. Kainz's wording of occasional passages. 55 
54 For Hegel's Geist as vehicle for nothing greater than the human spirit see 
J.E. Grumley (1989) pp. 22 1. Also R. C. Solomon (1983) pp. 5 - 7; 579; 631-
4. Uke Solomon, I say that Hegel was a precursor of atheistic humanism (p. 
582), a post-Christian, subsuming the ethical insight of Christianity into 
philosophy. 
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When the German text is quoted, reference is made to G. W. F. 
Hegel. Werke in Zwanzig Banden 3, Phanomen%gie des Geistes. 
Occasionally I have referred to Sammtliche Werke, Band V, 
Phanomenologie Des Geistes, which is the translation made 
after the original edition by Johannes Hoffmeister. The most 
useful glossaries of German words used in the text and 
translated into ordinary English are found in R.C. Solomon's In 
the Spirit of Hegel and C. Taylor's 1975 publication, Hegel. 56 
55 W. Kaufmann (1965) Ch. VIII: The Preface to the Phenomenology: 
Translation with Commentary. H. P. Kainz (1976). 
56 R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 273-286. C. Taylor (1975) pp. xi-xii. 
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1. A. THE HUMAN NEED FOR IDENTITY 
Questions of individual identity are important to the way 
people live. A sense of identity arising from the unity and 
persistence of personality is a requirement for sharing, 
participation, togetherness etc. The human need for identity is 
seen in various ways. Pastorally, the individual's need for 
identity is a factor inherent in the care and support of those who 
are depressed or in rebellion against the demands of 
relationships in society. Ethically, the individual's search for 
appropriate practical expression of identity as a Christian 
requires its working out in the light of given experience and 
situations. Doctrinally, we need a better understanding of how 
the theological notion of humanity made in God's image and 
likeness contextualizes that of the human need for -identity. 1 
The subject becomes even more problematic when we attempt to 
articulate not only individual but social and general human 
concepts of identity. 
A. L. McFadyen points out in his 1990 The Call to Personhood, 
that questions of individual and corporate identity cannot be 
taken for granted. "Who am I?" "Who are we?" are typically 
human queries in our Western individualistic and yet 
standardized society, suggesting that there is a deep human need 
for identity and for theological contribution to contemporary 
1 V. Lossky argues that the idea of personality is a Christian contribution to 
identity philosophy: "The Theological Notion of the Human Person-, V. Lossky 
(1974). Ch. 6. See also G. C. Berkouwer (1962) for questions of the image of 
God in humankind after the fall. Ch. 2. 
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debate. 2 McFadyen tackles the typically modern Western 
version of the human quest: "What is individual identity, and 
where does it come from?" within the theological setting of 
creation in the image of God and the call of Christ, presenting 
positively Biblical ideas of God's image and personal identity as 
relational. This is all the more important because increasingly 
today the postmodern challenge (in so far as it can be defined as 
a broad intellectual movement rather than a style or method 3) 
offers an extreme emphasis on the difference of all existing 
things and the need to talk of relation. JOrg~n Habermas speaks 
of extreme fragmentation and a resulting 'unsurveyablility' (Un-
Obersichtlichkeit) in what he calls the 'postmodern' attitude of 
heterodoxy. 4 
Against this background, the timeliness of any theological 
contribution to a discussion of individual identity requires 
adaptability to the contemporary context. We must, however, 
"begin wherever we are ..... 5 'Where we are' - the 
contemporary context for debate - is clearly still influenced by 
Hegel's formative status in modern ideas of identity. This can 
only be appreciated, however, by realizing the pervasive and 
2 A. I. McFadyen (1990) p. 1. 
3 The idea of 'Postmodernity' resists close definition. R. Bernstein describes it 
as "anti-foundational philosophy."in Habermas (1986). Stanley Aronowitz 
links it to the deconstruction of the myths of modernity, notably the ideal of a 
qualitatively better life. (1988) p. 46. F. Jameson says its most decisive inSight 
is: "the bourgeois individual subject is a thing of the past, it is also a myth: it 
never really existed in the first place" (1985) pp. 111-126. 
4 P. Feyer:abend (1987) quotes Habermas's Eine Neue UnObersichtlichkeit 
p.1. 
5 M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 3. 
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profound influence that Hegel continues to exercise on much 
contemporary social theory. For this reason Habermas's 
interpretation of Hegel is important in our study. He identifies 
an increasingly decentred, fragmented picture of the human 
condition that is plausible particularly within the Hegelian 
tradition. 6 The fragmentation he describes takes different 
forms. For instance, he distinguishes the philosophical 
decentred subjectivity of the French antimodernists, 
associated with Bataille via Foucault to Derrida, from the 
administrative separation of culture and society associated with 
those he calls the Neoconservative postmodernists, notably, the 
early Wittgenstein. 7 I would call your attention in particular 
to one disturbing thrust of Habermas's comments about identity 
in society. Talk about society, he says, seems to be exhausted. 
Politically left-wing ideologies have failed, only to be replaced 
by a lack of social identification. 8 By appealing to critiques 
of so-called "modernism" in art, he speaks of a disillusionment 
with the failures of the Enlightenment project for the 
enrichment of social life. Hence, he finds it ever more difficult 
to speak of individual identity and societal integration: "If I am 
not mistaken", he says,the chances for this today are not very 
good". 9 
6 Habermas says this himself in Hegel's Social and Political Thought Ed. D.P. 
Verene (1980)p. 247. 
7 J. Habermas -Modernity versus Postmodernity- in New German Critique No. 
22, Winter 1981, pp. 3 - 13. 
8 J. Habermas (1989) 'Ch. 1 -Neoconservative Cuhural Criticism in the 
United States and West Germany- pp. 22 - 47. 
9 J. Habermas ibid. p. 11. 
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The need for better understanding of the history and develop-
ment of this sense of fragmentation alongside the increasingly 
intense human quest for identity is clear. And Hegel's place in 
this story is an important one. Habermas's comments upon the 
pathological deformations of collective and individual identity 
leave any discussion about salvation in a social context with 
unfavorable prospects of success. Yet, this is our context for 
our discussion in the so-called 'postmodern' situation and it 
must be faced realistically if interdisciplinary practice is to be 
possible. The intention in this Chapter is to show that questions 
raised by Hegel about conceptual issues in conceiving of 
individual identity link us firmly into contemporary debate about 
restrictively subjective conditions for identity, relation and our 
understanding of God. 
1. B. HEGEL'S NOTION OF IDENTITY 
For the purpose of 'scene setting' it should be observed that it 
was under the influence of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) that 
issues of identity became central to philosophy via questions of 
self-knowledge. An individualist in terms of the sources of 
knowledge being the intuition and deductive reasoning of the 
'thinking I' , Descartes built structures of knowledge on 
assumptions about the intuitive and inductive operations of the 
mind. 10 (By intuition he means the immediate self evidence 
10 R. De scartes , in J. Cottingham, transl. (1986), Second Meditation, p. 18. 
-Discourse on Method- in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. 
(1985), Vol. 1, pp.112-131. Also, -PrinCiples of Philosophy-, p.193f. 
Bertrand Russell (1947) writes: -Having secured a firm foundation (cogito 
ergo sum), Descartes sets to work to rebuild the edifice for knowledge-.p. 587. 
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with which a truth forces itself upon us,.deduction then being 
the the analyzing of the axiomatic principles of knowledge, the 
certainty of which cannot be doubted. 11) Hume (1711 - 1776) 
challenged the idea that we can attain justification of individual 
identity simply by taking 'I think' as a standard, albeit retaining 
some basic elements in Descartes' concept of the 'I'. 12 In the 
main, however, he attacked Descartes' inability to provide 
universal criteria for knowledge of the self by inference from 
the ideas present to the mind. 13 
It should also be born in mind that at the time of writing the 
Phenomenology, the term Identitiit was commonly invoked in 
the context of G. W. Leibniz' assertion that the identity of a thing 
is contained in its 'substantial' or existing unity. This theory, 
known as the identity of indiscernibles, allowed Leibniz (1647-
1716) to argue the genuine, intrinsic identity of a thing as a 
subject of predication. Leibniz extended Thomist arguments 
about individual things being known by reference to their nature 
or essence, deducting and interpreting the predicable identity of 
a thing. 14 It is clear from his 1801 essay The Difference 
11 R. Descartes , in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985), 
Vol. 1, p. 14-5; 33. 
12 Jonathan Bennet (1971) notes parallels between Hume and Descartes 
concerning knowledge of identity through both intuition and demonstration. p. 
249. He drawn on Hume. T. H. N., Vol. 1, Part 1, sect. 1, p.16; Vol. 1, Part 11, 
sect. VI, p. 71; Ethics, 12, 1,116, p.149. 
13 See T.H.N. ·Of the Origin of our Ideas· C, part. 1, sect. 1; Vol. 1, Part 11, 
sect. VI, p. 71; Vol. I, Part Ill, sect. VI, p. 89; Ethics, 12, I, 116, p. 149. A 
Treatise of Human Nature deals particularly with identity and the contents of 
the mind as both impressions and ideas; ·Of the Origin of our Ideas·, C, part. 1, 
sect. 1. 
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between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy 
that Hegel is critical of what remained of Leibniz' notion of 
identity as the logically discernible form and quality of a thing 
in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 15 As I shall show, he joins 
Kant in condemning the difference between the identity of a 
thing and its intelligence as merely logical, dealing most plainly 
with the problem of the identity of -the Thing- in §§ 111 - 131 
on Perception. 16 
This is but a brief introduction to the complex background of 
Hegel's charge against his contemporaries that they had a 
restricted notion of individual identity. The modern problem for 
Hegel was an excessive emphasis on identity as sameness. He 
warns against an inherently non-relational view of the self. At 
the beginning of the Preface he says that to become human is to 
actualize our social and rational nature, to become aware of the 
self not only as merely private and personal but as relational and 
'objective'; to some extent mutually involved with others; 
14 See Leibniz' Discourse on Metaphysics, GP. IV. 436, p. 22 for summary of 
how two objects can be identitical in all respects and yet differ numerically. F. 
Copleston, S.J., Vol. IV, Ch. XVII ·Simple Substances or Monads· pp. 295 - 301. 
15 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel: The DIfference between the Fichtean and Schellingian 
System of Philosophy, Transl. J.P. Surber, Ridgeview Publishing Co., 
California, 1978. Hereafter abbreviated as the Difference essay. 
16 I. Kant C.P.R. A 44 / B 62 f; B 292 - 294; A 263 / B 320 F. On Leibniz 
and Kanfs notion of the unitary ego see R.C. Solomon (1983) pp. 67 - 79. Also 
B. Aune (1985) who links Leibniz' identity of a thing as substance to problems of 
personal identity in J. Locke and R. Descartes. pp. 82 - 99. On the tension 
between perception and reason; the passive receptivity of sensory impressions 
and their active, rational ordering, with reference to Descartes, locke and Hume, 
see C.E. Gunton (1985) Pt. 1, Ch. 1. 
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"mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole" (2). 
Later, he urges: "The single individual is incomplete Spirit ... the 
others being present only in blurred outline" (28). Identity 
awaits full awareness in conscious social relations, "a truth 
ripened to its properly matured form so as to be capable of being 
the property of all self-conscious Reason" (70). It is not in the 
sameness of the epistemologically centred 'I' that identity is 
found, but through relationship: "Only this self-restoring 
sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an 
original or immediate unity as such - is the True" (18). 
There is an intensity in Hegel's conviction that Kant, In 
particular, sets the wrong boundary conditions for speaking of 
individual identity . "Just to talk", Hegel says, "of the unity 0 f 
subject and object ... is inept, since object and subject, etc. 
signify what they are outside of their unity" (39). Identity 
consists in more than the externally perceivable conditions for 
rational deduction. Kant and Fichte are caught, he suggests, in 
the divide between the empirically observable, substantial unity 
of the self and the concept of the transcendental 'I'. The merely 
external perception of identity can only ever be partial; a 
"lifeless Understanding and external cognition" (51). 17 This 
understanding of identity suffers from its impermanence and 
superficiality. Hence, Kant is said to have a restricted and 
"unsocial" notion of identity. 18 
17 See the Difference essay pp. 15 f. for obvious reference to the Kantian table 
of judgements and its restricting identity philosophy to a limited number of 
thought functions: reflection, speculation, transcendental intuition and absolute 
reason. 
18 The word 'unsocial' is used by J. Habermas with reference to Hegel's opening 
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The situation is rather more subtle than interpretation of 
Hegel easily allows. Insofar as the Preface and Introduction are 
set against the background of a post-Cartesian and post-Kantian 
context, the first sense of identity [ldentitiit] for Hegel is the 
being able to distinguish one being from another by the control of 
one's perceptions. Identity is a momentary totality of thought 
determination under Kantian conditions: 
They speak of the existence of external objects, which can be more 
precisely defined as actual, absolutely singular, wholly personal, 
individual things, each of them absolutely unlike anything else; this existence, 
they say, has absolute certainty and truth- (110). 
This momentary totality of thought is the certainty of individual 
identity over against all that is different from it. It has an 
apparent "absolute certainty and truth" (110). Hegel's general 
intention is toward a more comprehensive certainty in which the 
movement of logical thought presents a progression from 
identity through difference to relation and unity. 
This is evidenced in his primary use of the concept of identity 
as a logical principle throughout the Phenomenology and can be 
illustrated statistically in the words used to convey different 
senses of the concept of identity - Identitiit, Gleichheit and 
Personlichkeit. Identitiit, meaning that which can be identified 
by the conditions required in the activity of representing or 
naming the existence of a thing, occurs six times, twice in the 
out of Kant's philosophy of identity to include a particular form of social relation: 
The Phenomenology of Mind attempts this reconstruction ... through the 
socialization process of the individual, through the universal history of 
mankind- (1979) p. 19. 
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Preface and four times in "The Revealed Religion" (748-787). 
Gleichheit, meaning sameness or that which has identity with 
another thing in parity, occurs fifty eight times throughout the 
text. Personlichkeit, meaning personality, occurs twenty-
seven times, including five times in the sections on Spirit and 
legal status (477-483) and nine times in the sections on Culture 
and actuality (488-526). Einzelheit denotes individuality as 
one element in Hegel's triadically structured manifestation of 
individuality. and occurs two hundred and six times. 
The Phenomenology is not a logic, at least in the 
systematized sense of the Logic of 1812 which, according to 
the Preface to the first edition, is a developed form or "expanded 
arrangement" of the content of logic there. 19 Nonetheless, I 
take logic as my point of departure in order to understand how a 
concept like identity functions in Hegel's science of 
consciousness vis-a-vis his Kantian context. Logic is always a 
prius in Hegelian theoretical inquiry and identity is first a 
logical category of pure thought. G.R.G. Mure writes: "It is a pure 
thought with no necessary reference to sense." 20 This is . ~ not 
to underplay the significance of Hegel's contact with the early 
Romantics e.g., F. Schlegel, Tieck and Novalis who also helped 
form his concept of identity. 21 The 1801 essay The Difference 
19 S.L. -Preface to the First Edition- pp. 25-29. In support of this see, J.N. 
Findlay (1958) "The Logic may be said, ... to carry out in the medium of pure 
thought what the Phenomenology carried out in the medium of individual experience. 
(p.150). H.G. Gadamer (1976) "The Phenomenology of Spirit is a kind of 
anticipation of what was to come .... (p. 75). Also, A. Sarlemijn (1975). 
20 G.R.G. Mure (1940) p. 112. 
21 Consider, for example, the early Schelling's attempt to su~r ;ade Fichte's 
duality between the identity of the empirical self (ego) and the non-ego in the 
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between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy 
also shares some of the idealist leaning of Schelling and the 
Romantics, like whom he sees philosophy as expanding the 
questions about identity into the infinite. 22 To the contrary, 
the metaphor of a circle and circular movement is commonly 
employed after some of the earlier Romantics with a Neo-
Platonic influence, depicting identity in terms of a departure 
from a primal unity, subdivided and reconvergent. (§§ 32; 50; 
802) 23 We should be aware, however, that the Phenomenology 
is Hegel's -exposition- [Auslegung] (10) of the developing 
character of pure thought vis-a-vis Kantian subjectivity. 24 
The significance of this in Hegelian terms is partly explained 
by the fact that the Critique of Pure Reason is largely a 
response to both the Cartesian principle of private conscious-
ness and Hume's refusal to speak of the unity of personal 
identity. 25 Immediately prior to Kant, epistemological theory 
Erster Entwurf eines System der Naturphilosophie (1799) and System des 
Tranzendentalen Idealismus (1800). 
22 The Difference Essay p. 108. 
23 On Hegel's sharing idealist leanings of Schelling and the Romantics, M.H. 
Abrams (1971) "The Great Circle: Pagan and Christian Neo-PlatonismW pp. 146-
172. 
24 D.M. Schlitt (1990) finds logic to be the main content of absolute philosophy 
for Hagel because the latter defines spirit in terms of thought: "Thought was its 
own content, hence logic was absolute formw p. 136. 
25 See Kant, C.P.R., B5 on Hume's wrepeated association with .. customW as 
inadequate for derNing notions of the self and that which comprises subjective 
necessity; 820 on Hume's claim to have shown a priori propositions jmpossible; 
87.93 on Hume's not distinguishing pure understanding from pure reason; 8794 
on what Kant sees as his errors in failing to allow for a transcendental logic. Cf. 
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was caught in the dilemma of self-knowledge resting either on 
logical inference drawn from the spontaneous act of thought or, 
as Hume contends, on the possibility of knowledge of the self 
deriving from observation deduced from sense experience and 
ideas. 26 To be fair to Kant, we must recognize his dilemma. 
He was faced, on the one hand, with Hume's emphasizing of the 'I' 
as a passive receiver of external events and, on the other, with 
remnants of Descartes' idea that the ego is more than a 
complex of ideas or successive mental states. It is important to 
recognize the deficiencies that he sees in Descartes and Hume's 
philosophy of self-understanding and personal identity. 27 
Nevertheless, there is considerable force in Hegel's argument 
against Kant that fixed, transcendentally derived limits of 
consciousness are insufficient to attain knowledge of identity: 
"For what is lifeless, since it does not move of itself, does not 
get as far as the distinctions of essence ..... (45) 28 Hegel 
argues against Kant's transcendentally fixed limits of 
consciousness, affirming that the experience of conscious 
identity must learn to judge itself for what it is: a "dialectical 
Hume, Treatise, Vol. 1, Part 1V, sect. VI, p.239. 
26 The dilemma was made acute by Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a disciple of 
Descartes, who claimed that empirical experience and that beyond the empirical 
could be solved within a complete and rational system of philosophy. 
27 See Kant, C.P.R., A760/8788 - A769/ 8797; A764/B792. Also, H.J. Paton 
(1936) pp. 138-140; 372-3n. Also, D. A. Cousin, -Kant on the Sel,., Kant 
Studien, Band 49, 1957/1958, pp. 25-35. 
28 The phrase -the distinction of essence- [Wesen] has a history of interpret-
ation that we cannot consider here. See E. Husserl (1983) pp. 55-7 for his 
Hegelian influenced notion of the of being in its phYSical, value and thought related 
manifestations. Also Heidegger (1969) pp. 61 - 73 for his sense of 'Wesen' as 
that which is intuited in thought. 
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movement ... called experience [Erfahrungr (86). 29 He rejects 
Kant's 'fixed' notion of identity. 
1. C. THE QUESTION OF HEGEL'S INFLUENCE 
Reference to Kant's conception of the experience of 'I'-ness 
illustrates the difficulty in entering imaginatively into the 
background for Hegel's ideas of identity. A deep cultural abyss 
exists between ourselves and his historical and philosophical 
context which prohibits direct translation of what he understood 
by the word identity [/dentitiit]. It is only reference to the 
background provided by the figures of Descartes, Hume and Kant 
which opens up the real issues of how individual identity is to be 
understood. Hegel accuses his predecessors of constraining 
individual identity within an undifferentiated notion of same-
ness: "Usually, the Subject is first made the basis, as the 
objective, fixed self" (60). 
Needless to say, interpretations vary as to what Hegel means 
by opposing the simplicity and 'fixity' of consciousness with his 
demonstration of consciousness as a supposedly non-fixed, living 
and developing programme. Compare A. KojEwe, for whom 
Hegelian consciousness was irreducibly personal with C. Taylor's 
discus·sion of what can be known supra-personally of the basic 
29 For an accessible description of the task of the Phenomenology as a re.sponse 
to Kant's views on cognition, see Werner Marx (1975). Marx is convinced that 
the 'idea' and significance of the Phenomenology lies in its principle of self-
consciousness (p.98). Ivan Soli's An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics 
(1969), also largely approaches Hegel in terms of his critique of Kantian 
epistemology. 
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data of experience. Kojeve stresses distinctions of 
consciousness within the self, extending what is known by the 
human individual to what is universally and eternally known. 30 
C. Taylor, by contrast, emphasizes that the 'I' is as much 
universal as particular, implying a distinction between Hegel's 
treatment of the identity of the individual 'I', and the 'I' 
understood as humanity generally as an indefinite number of 'I's. 
C. Taylor stresses that the science of consciousness for Hegel is 
not all personal or subjective because it always has practical, 
social implications; "there is no level of experience that can be 
thought of, even as an abstraction, as pure receptivity". Rather, 
the shared experience of engagement in relation gives unity to 
the universal: "It was the absenoe of this notion in Kant's 
conception of experience that made it inevitable that he present 
causality as necessary succession according to a rule". 31 
The very diversity of Hegel interpretation presents a problem 
but that is not the key issue here. Of itself, the tension between 
Kojeve's emphasis on the irreducibly personal nature of Hegel's 
treatment of the moments of consciousness and C. Taylor's 
stressing the wider social implications is not a problem, but is 
part of the 'I-We' dualism that is a much larger issue than Hegel 
interpretation. The character of modern socio-philosophy is 
deeply shaped by it and I try to'1Jue consideration to at least one 
30 A. Kojeve (1969) locates the question of identity in the individual who 
experiences it; -to give a correct and complete answer to the Cartesian question, 
"What am I". pp. 33 - 35; 261 1.. C. Taylor reads the Phenomenology as a 
transcendental argument about the universal characteristics of experience. In A. 
Maclntyre, ed. (1972) Ch. VI pp. 182 - 187. 
31 C. Taylor, ibid. p. 186. 
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line of its development through Hegel interpretation in the 
Chapters that follow. The decision to raise the issue early in the 
thesis is a deliberate one, for I think that it has played an 
important role in modern discussion both of Hegel and, more 
widely, of socio-philosophy in general. I do not think that it is 
primarily a question about Hegel for the very reason that it 
entails questions that range more widely than his work, as the 
contemporary debate shows. But that is not to say that the 
interpretative question of Hegel is an empty one. It opens up a 
space between the socio-philosophy and the Christian faith. 
Putting a space between the two does not by any means reduce 
the Christian message of salvation. Both are allowed to stand on 
their own terms with their own proper authority. It is in the 
relation between the two that the need for analogical theology is 
found. 
1. D. HEGEL'5 NOTION OF IDENTITY AND GOD 
So what is to be said? How is the analogical task to proceed? 
What does analogy require? On the basis of Aquinas's distinction 
between the semantic content; meaning (L. res significata -
thing signified) of salvation within Christian theology and 
different modes of expression (modus significandi - mode of 
signification), we are dealing with two things. First, the 
meaning or content of the Christian message of salvation. 
Second, the mode of expression that is appropriate to the 
dialogical context, in our case, socio-philosophy. There is a 
logic operating in each of the two domains that is in some way 
related. It is the analogical task of theology to ask: How? The 
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perennial dilemma is that the logic of neither domain is fully 
clear. For this reason and in this context I have thought it right 
to engage in such excavative work as iIIumines the contemporary 
debate. Hegel and his interpreters are made a focus of study not 
only as a means of getting in touch with our roots, but to cast 
light on the issues as they are. It is more of the excavative work 
that must concern us now as we consider the relation between 
Hegel's notion of identity and his concept of God. 
The Phenomenology delves deeply into issues of identity, 
alienation and community whilst condemning the Christianity he 
knew as a pallid and socially ineffective faith. Early in his 
career, the TObingen essay of 1793, Religion ist eine, implied a 
disenchantment with the Christian faith in concluding that the 
religion, historical tradition and political constitution of a 
people constitute its spirit. 32 His remarks on love in 1799 on 
The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate were a condemnation of 
a perceived tendency to dehumanize at the expense of the 
concept called 'transcendence'. Rln all the forms of the Christian 
religion ... which have been developed in the advancing fate of the 
ages, there lies this fundamental characteristic of opposition .... 
33 In the Phenomenology he warns against theoretical 
acceptance of God as little more than an idol; Ressentially an 
'other ' in relation to self-consciousnessR (529). It is this 
sense of self-consciousness developing in relation to his notion 
of God that must be explored. 
32 H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 481 - 507. 
33 E.T.W. p. 301. 
HEGEl'S NOTION OF IDENTITY AND GOD 
52 
Ch. 1 INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
The relation between the logical conditions for individual 
identity and the Absolute touches on the association of the 
former with the idea of the Absolute as God. Hegel wrote at a 
time when the construction of individual identity as a logical 
category had an inevitable connection with Kant's transcendental 
concept 'God'. Kant's fixed notion of the self is inextricably 
linked with the Christian God as absolute and simple in itself. 
Hegel renders problematic both Kant's non-relational view of the 
self and the idea of a God set over against the self: 
If the understanding fixes these opposed determinations, the finite and the 
infinite it destroys itself, since the opposition of the finite and the infinite 
means that, insofar as one of them is posited, the other is sublated. 34 
His conviction in this passage is that an idea of individual 
identity framed logically over against a concept of the Absolute 
as God is unsustainable. An idea of the Absolute who cannot be 
thought to engage with historical social issues remains an 
illusion. "It may be expedient", he says, "to avoid the name 'God' 
since this word is not immediately a Notion, but rather the 
proper name ... of the underlying Subject" (66). God as the 
Absolute 'Other " he says, destroys the individual's search for 
identity in the recognition of its being set against something 
abstract and objective. 35 
There are pOints of contact between Kant's failure to show 
consciousness as relational and Hegel's assumptions about the 
identity of God. The first has to do with a critique of Kant's 
34 The Difference Essay, p.16. 
35 L Boff (1988) outlines some of the effects in associating God as an -a-
trinitarian monotheism- with ideas of individual identity as fixed and singular. 
pp. 20 - 24. 
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formal extracting of conclusions about identity from the 
content of experience. (By formal, understand Kant's presuming 
a priori the basic structures and categories of deductive 
knowledge. 36) Though we need not enter into the detail of this 
argument, we should note that Hegel's argument is a 
demonstration against the attitude of formalism in philosophy 
which occupies itself with structures for knowledge from the 
external features of experience. 37 The second is the resulting 
asociaJ notion of Christianity and, determining it, a notion of God 
as 'other' and alien; "'the Divine', 'the Absolute', 'the Eternal'. etc. 
... as something immediate" (20). There is a notable coincidence 
between Hegel's deliberate move against Kant's confining the 
activity of the 'I' in itself and his naming the Christian God as 
precluding any meaningful relation with the world. 
His reaction against Kant's demonstration of the transcend-
ental conditions of consciousness is important. Kant had linked 
the latter with postulation of the Absolute as a rationally 
derivable feature of the conditions of self-consciousness: 
Now the transcendental concept of reason is directed always solely towards 
36 For Kantian formal logic as considered defective by Hegel see J. Hyppolite 
(1974) pp. 13 - 15. Also Werner Marx (1975) who is convinced the 'idea' and 
signifICance of the Phenomenology lies in its principle of self-consciousness as 
response Kant's views on cognition. (p.98). Ivan SoU's An Introduction to Hegel's 
Metaphysics (1969) also approaches Hegel in terms of his critique of Kantian 
epistemology. 
37 D.M. Schlitt (1990) speaks of Hegel's PhSnomeno-theo-logik as an indication 
of the relation between Identity and Religion in the three logical moments of the 
concept; Universality, where Hegel treats of the problem of beginning with the 
Absolute, particularity, where he examines forms of consciousness, and 
Individuality, where he considers their relation. Pt. 111, Ch. 5. 
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absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never terminates save 
in what is absolutely, that is, in all relations, unconditioned (A 326). 
The Absolute is an extension of this synthesis of the conditions 
of human reason; that which is really transcendent is the 
universality of the human will. 38 Not until Fichte was the 
Absolute conceived of as activity, implying that it should be 
identified with the infinite striving of the human ego. 39 Kant 
has, however, solved the problem of the derivation of individual 
identity by accepting a division between the sensible world and 
active reason directed towards the universal structure of the 
mind. Individual identity has been made into a property of the 
nature of active reason itself, what he calls; "absolute totality 
in the synthesis of conditions". 
I do not want merely to represent this happening in process, 
however. The challenge is to address the implications of Hegel's 
critical interpretation of Kantian epistemology in relation to 
contemporary debate. This means asking how his condemnation 
of the idea of God as the Absolute in itself links into current 
issues about individual identity and alienation. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to understand that Hegel is one of many in 
38 On this see C.E. Gunton (1985) pp. 57 f. 
39 S. Rosen argues that Hegel retains Fichte's doctrine of individual reflection 
which identifies the activity of the Absolute with that of the individual ego. S. 
Rosen (1974) Ch. 10. (This is influential in Rosen's reassimilating Hegel's logic 
into contemporary philosophy because of the need to distinguish philosophical 
truth from subjective opinion. p. 265). For a contrasting reading of Fichte's 
response to Kant which underplays FtChte's notion of the Absolute as Das Ich the 
first principle of philosophy and hence Absolute see, F. Copleston S.J. (1965) Vo/. 
VII pp. 1 - 31. 
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the post-Enlightenment era to suggest replacing a particular 
understanding of the Christian confession because of problems 
associated with the idea of the Absolute in itself. 40 The 
evidence in the text of the Phenomenology and amongst his 
early and more recent interpreters is that his notions of 
problems associated with individual identity derive, at least in 
part, from what is believed about God. Hegel's rejection of the 
idea of the Absolute in itself leads to his replacing the name 
'God' and Christian revelation with a higher truth - namely 
philosophy, the study of which he says is, -life, Spirit, ... truth-
(67). He raised profound and serious questions about the failings 
of Lutheran piety; -providing edification rather than insight- (7). 
As both R. Solomon and P.C. Hodgson point out, Hegel's criticism 
of the Christianity he knew pervades his entire corpus: -The 
telos of both logical idea and finite spirit is the reality of God 
as Absolute Spirit.- 41 
Hodgson draws on E.L. Fackenheim's claim that a religious 
dimension is essential to understanding all Hegel's thought; 
-Hegel holds the actual existence of religious life to be an 
indispensable condition of his philosophy as a whole-. 42 
Religion, the Holy and the Eternal are, Hegel says, -the bait-
required to arouse the desire for philosophy. Half a century later 
# 
40For Kant's definition of the Enlightenment as -man's emergence from his self-
incurred immaturity- - namely, the assuming of courage to use one's own 
understanding without the guidance of another, see, I. Kant, -An Answer to the 
Question: 'What is Enlightenment-, in H. Reiss (1970). For the Enlightenment as 
linked to the idea of the autonomy of modem humanity since Kant see, Michael 
Welker (1975). 
41 P.C. HocJgson in Ed. N. Smart et al. (1985) Vol. 1, pp. 81 - 82. 
42 E.L Fackenheim (1967) p. 9. See P.C. Hodgson ibid. p. 108. 
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both Feuerbach and Schopenhauer had made explicit what for 
Hegel was implicit, a time "not far distant, when religion will 
depart from European humanity, like a nurse whose care the child 
has outgrown." 43 It is Hegel, however, who represents the 
early origins of a post-Christian humanism that grew out of the 
failure of Lutheran piety and its understanding of God as the 
Absolute in itself to engage with social questions. R.C. 
Solomon comments that Christianity for Hegel was not simply a 
"false" religion to be rejected altogether, but that he wanted to 
retrieve the human sense of community lost in meaningless 
dogmatism. 44 L. Dickey says that Hegel stands at the end of 
the tradition in the 1790s which tended to incorporate socio-
economic ideas learned from the Scottish economists A. Smith, 
J. Steuart and A. Ferguson into the doctrines of Lutheran piety: 
"Hegel's problem was how to turn the arguments of the Scottish 
Enlightenment to the advantage of the religio-political ideal of 
Protestant civil piety". 45 
Hegel's philosophy is marked by intense engagement with the 
Christian tradition. And, as Dickey's study makes clear, this 
engagement can perhaps best be explained with reference to the 
debate amongst the Aufkliirer who were philosophers, poets and 
43 A. Schopenhauer, Essays, p.121. 
44 R.C. Solomon (1980) p. 231. 
45 L. Dickey (1987) p. xi. Note how the concept of folk-religion [Volksreligion] 
functions in the "TObingen Essay- of 1793 in an ethico-political sense: -How must 
folk-religion be constituted? .... It must be so constituted that all lhe needs of life 
- the public affairs of the State are tied in with it-. In H.S. Harris (1972) p. 
499. 
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pastors between 1748 - 1774 delineating their opposition to 
orthodox Lutheranism. 46 Those amongst the Aufklarer were, 
for example, figures such as Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Spalding and 
Klopstock. Hegel's involvement with these people, Dickey 
suggests, sharpened his argument that the Christianity he knew 
must die as the precondition for a more human spirituality that 
left behind a notion of individual identity in relation to a God 
who is an Absolute in itself. 
1. E. THECONTEMPORARYDEBATE 
Some two hundred years ago then, Hegel was proclaiming the 
death of the rationally coherent 'I' as an epistemological 
construct and today we still strugg le with restrictively 
subjective understanding of the 'I'. Hegel wants to be free of 
Kant's location of discussion of individual identity within a 
priori prinCiples which provide no "firm footing" (A 796/ B 824) 
for a structure of knowledge, only a partial extension of the 
activity of consciousness. 47 He wrote in 180617; 
the general nature of the judgement or proposition, which involves the 
distinction of Subject and Predicate, is destroyed by the speculative proposition, 
and the proposition of identity which the former becomes contains the counter-
46 L Dickey (1987) pp. 12 - 32. -[T]he Aufklarer could be said to have been 
searching for what their detractors called -a compromise theology,' ... voluntarist 
in a religious sense, activist in an ethical sense, civil in a human sense, and 
moderately synergist in a soteriological sense- (p. 26). 
47 ·Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest-.J. 
Habermas (1972) p. 310. For the persistence of this idea see Robert R. Sullivan 
"The Most Recent Thinking of JOrgen Habermas- Interpretation. A Joumal of 
Political Philosophy, 14-15, 1986-7. Also "The Relevance of Reason- in T. 
Rockmore (1989) pp. 169-178. 
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thrust against that subject-predicate relationship. (61) 
The subject / predicate framework for thinking about individual 
identity allows only an external perception of identity. The 
issues here run deep, linking us firmly into the contemporary 
debate about restrictively subjective conditions for individual 
identity, relation and our understanding of God. "In itself", 
Hegel says, Christianity's perception of the Absolute as God has 
little to do with the troubled ambiguities where faith must live: 
"In itself, that life is", he says "one of untroubled equality and 
unity with itself, for which otherness and alienation, and the 
overcoming of alienation, are not serious matters" (19). 
This quotation may simply represent a thinly disguised 
idealist statement on behalf of a totalizing logic that organizes 
all questions of theology, history, nature and society within a 
philosophical whole. 48 If this were its only significance, the 
question need detain us no longer. It is not its only significance, 
however, because Hegel's challenge exists in his questioning the 
relation between our views about what it is be human in relation 
to what we believe about God. Hegel's is a critical voice and his 
impact on Christian and non-Christian social theory obliges a 
response. As D. Cupitt writes: "Hegel shows a realist idea of God 
becoming so fuzzy, metaphorical and indefinite that it eventually 
dissolves away altogether". 49 Cupitt's observation begs the 
48Jean-Franooise Lyotard (1984) designates modernity - Hagel included - as 
characterized by the idea of the who/e. -Modem- is -any science that legitimates 
itself with reference to a metadisoourse ... such as the dialectics of spirit, the 
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, of 
the creation of wealth-.(p. xxiii). 
49 D. Cupitt (1984) p. 249. 
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question as to what is understood by this 'realist' God, and 
whether it adequately represents the Christian confession. His 
reference to Hegel's notion of a 'realisf concept of God is 
somewhat vague. If his main point, however, is that Hegel's 
Geist is an atheistic destruction of Christian belief and a 
slipping away from classical theism, he makes special call upon 
us to demonstrate the distortions in his understanding of God and 
the consequently damaged notion of individual identity. 50 
We must be careful here. "Enlightenment bashing" is quite 
fashionable, as :Lesslie Newbigin observes. 51 It is easier to 
condemn Hegel's collision course with theistic Christianity than 
to answer his charge of Christianity's tightly closed social 
vision. If, however, Hegel's reaction against the Cartesian and 
Kantian notions of identity is as closely intertwined with 
notions of the Absolute God as simple and In itself as I have 
suggested, we do well to face the challenges that Hegel and his 
interpreters pose. We do well to ask how theological literature 
might be enriched and contribute to the debate assessing and 
informing us of the tendency in the human condition towards 
social interaction. 
With this in mind, three observations can be made about the 
central themes of the thesis. The intention is to indicate how 
constructive dialogue between Christian theology, the ambiguous 
legacy from modernity, and contemporary non-Christian 
50 D. Cupitt (1986) In the Hegelian system, -the individual, Christianity itself, 
were painlessly absorbed- p. 155. 
51 "The Gospel and Our Cuhure- Newsletter 1, Selly Oak College, Birmingham. 
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alternatives regarding individual identity and community might 
proceed. 
1. First of all, one is struck by the astonishing continuity of 
questions and the chief problematics between Hegel and the 
current 'post-modern' era. Much of what Hegel undercuts in the 
'modern' post-Cartesian and post-Kantian view of identity is the 
same as what has been rejected by 'postmodern' thinkers. 
Remarkable is the fact that perceivable amongst both tendencies 
are clear resonances of issues similar to those determining 
Hegel's attack on Kant's notion of the self and individual identity. 
Take, for example, Kant's notion of identity which is defined, 
Hegel thinks, by a false association of identity and sameness: -A 
simple thing of this kind which is through negation, which is 
neither This nor That ... we call a universal. . .. 'This' shows 
itself to be a mediated simplicity- (96; 97). 52 Note the 
echoes of Hegel in M.C. Taylor's assertion that identity is 
complex and temporal not simple and given. -The 'This- with 
which we started no longer seems simple .... -This -is -compound 
and complex-. 53 These words are Taylor's and they bear 
remarkable similarity to Hegel's observation. 
like Hegel, the critical problem for Taylor is how time and 
history alters and even destroys the simple identity of 
consciousness: -It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty 
is nothing else but the simple history of its movement or of its 
experience- (109). Both urge upon us the individual's need for 
52 Compare M.C. Taylor's demonstrates the loss of the modem idea of identity 
and selfhood. (1982) p. 89. 
53 M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 47. 
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identity as a factor inherent in modern and postmodern 
experience. Both perceive that an a priori belief in a fixed 
unity of consciousness yields a rationally coherent, but static 
and relationally incompetent, notion of the '1'.54 M.C. Taylor 
hints that Hegel's critique of the pretensions of the thinking 'I' 
pre-empted 'postmodern' criticisms of the Enlightenment. This 
is obvious in Hegel's idea of identity as sameness or what he 
calls the fixity of the self; ·the fixity of its self-positing, ... 
the fixity of the pure concrete, which the 'I' itself is, in contrast 
with its differentiated content". (33). For Hegel, it is reaction 
to this Kantian concept of identity which leads to his own 
speaking of "identity in diversity" or difference. Like Taylor, 
Hegel's notion of identity in difference causes the self to 
'deconstruct' whenever time and relation is taken seriously by 
the thinking individual. The finite self as a single 'I' must admit 
its non-existence in deference to the infinite that negates it. 
This remains a consistent theme within 'postmodern' 
condemnation of naive assumptions about the inviolability of the 
setting of rational conditions for individual identity. Note J. 
Oerrida's comment when speaking of his own understanding of 
epistemological "displacement" and the fallacy of speaking of 
the 'I' as simple, that Hegel "did not know the extent to which he 
was right·. 55 What is significant is the degree of continuity 
54 M.C. Taylor's (1984) essay the -Disappearance of the Selr compares Hegel's 
critique of Kanfs philosophy of consciousness with his own ideas of the 
temporality of consciousness: "The now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has 
been- pp. 46 - 48. Cf. Phen. Sects. 90 - 110. 
55 J. Derrida (1978) p. 257A Quoted from G. Bataille in Ch. 9 -From 
Restricted to General Economy. A Hegelianism without Res~e-. 
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between Hegel and postmodern 'deconstruction' of simple, 
rationally contained identity. A typical summary of the 'classic' 
view of postmodernism suggests: 
Identity is suggested by the very structure of language itseH, a language 
logically prior to the subject. .•. The subject, in other words, is subjected, its 
pre-eminent position usurped; no longer sovereign but dethroned, constructed 
in and through discourse. 56 
These words are P. Currie's but F. Jameson and others also note 
that post-modern ism's most radical insight is similar to Hegel's 
conviction that the modern human subject has disappeared; -this 
construct is merely a philosophical and cultural mystification, 
which sought to persuade people that they 'had' individual 
subjects and possessed this unique personal identity-. 57 M.C. 
Taylor writes that 'postmodern' philosophy must break free of 
reason as the simple identity of the subjectivity of the self with 
its identity and relationality: -The sameness of a person or thing 
at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a 
person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, 
personality-. 58 There are remarkable points of continuity 
between Hegel's attempt to break out of the -infinite opposition-
59 of Kant's subject-object model of philosophy, and the 'post-
modern' carrying of this critique forward to its logical 
conclusion. 60 
56 P. Currie "The eccentric self: anti char~cterization and the problem of the 
subject in American postmodemist fiction" in Malcolm Bradbury and Sigmund Ro, 
Ed.s (1987) p. 67. 
57 F. Jameson (1985) p. 115. 
58 M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 36 - 7. 
59 "[T]he opposition here has become fixed in infinity". Difference essay, p. 
57. 
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2. The continuity is reinforced not only through a 
'deconstructive', but also through 'reconstructive' critique. 
have already mentioned Habermas's emphasis on individual 
identity as constituted by relation with others amongst 
constantly changing social and historical needs. Despite the 
technicality of much of Habermas's language it is possible and, I 
argue, necessary to keep theological confession closely 
alongside a critique of related socio-philosophic issues if a 
more adequate understanding and expression of identity is to be 
attained. It is significant, for example, that Hegel's one explicit 
reference to human nature per se in the Phenomenology is to 
communication at a rational level: 
For it is in the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; 
human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds ... and being 
able to communicate at that I~vel. (69) 61 
Hegel, in similarity with both Habermas and Pippin, transfers 
Kant's absolute transcendental reference to the realm of social 
human interests. This is seen especially in his assertion that 
60 The; influence of Nietzsche in this debate should not be under emphasized as it 
was he .. , not Hegel, who expressed the il"l'eversible condition of despair as regards 
the self that also characterizes deconstruction. Nietzsche was the prophet who 
foresaw -irrevocable loss and incurable faulr, beginning, he says, with the 
'death of God' and closes with the 'the death ·of ourselves'. M.C. Taylor (1984) p. 6 
says it is under Nietzsche's influence as well as Hegel's that influences Derrida's 
denial of anything outside of the individual uniting him with the sameness shared 
with others. This is the risk that postmodemity takes: "To risk meaning nothing 
is to start to play, and to enter into the play of Differance .... (1981) P 14. 
61 The 1832-1845 Grundlage der Werlce speaks of 'nature' not human nature: 
-Denn die Natur dieser ist. .... It does so, however, in the context of humanity and 
Its roots: -die Wurzel der Humanita,. 
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the truth of consciousness has nothing to do with an Absolute 
outside of consciousness; -the exposition of the untrue 
consciousness in its untruth is not merely a negative procedure-
(79). Note the parallel with Habermas's conceiving of the 
transcendental conditions for knowledge as transcultural human 
needs: -The transcendental logic of an earlier period '" seeks a 
solution to the problem of the a priori conditions of possible 
knowledge. For both, the conditions for knowledge are no longer 
a priori in themselves, but found in the process of inquiry-. 62 
Habermas's work is of interest because, as I have indicated, 
towards the end of the 1970s he started a turn that culminated 
in his Theory of Communicative Action which grounds an idea 
of the social in the function of communication. 63 His is not 
the only major reconsideration of Hegel's influence, however, 
Robert Pippin's study of Hegelian idealism also re-appropriates 
Hegel's analysis of the failure of Kantian idealism to show 
individual identity as both self-relating and in relation with 
others from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. 64 In some 
agreement with Habermas, we shall see that R. Pippin stresses 
Hegel's demonstration of Kant s failure in demonstrating 
62 Habermas (1972) p. 194. Raised in Nazi Germany, having studied under 
Theodore Adorno, heir to the Frankfurt legacy of the criticism of ideology, JOrgen 
Habermas has been hailed as one of the most influential thinkers in Germany today. 
See Bibliographical Dictionary of NBo-Marxism (1985) Ed. R.A. Gorman, 
Mansell, London. 
63 For Habermas on Hegel's early projects in the concept of a reconciling reason 
as opposed to his later loss of criticism and supportive philosophy of the state, see 
J. Habermas (1987) Lecture 11. 
64 Robert B. Pippin (1989). 
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consciousness and individual identity as "socially interactive" 
rather than private and inner. 65 Both Habermas and Pippin draw 
on Hegel's intention to demonstrate the social nature of selfhood. 
This makes it all the more important to consider the goals that 
Hegel set himself regarding the social design of individual 
identity. 
Thus there is widespread recognition of Hegel's influence on 
individual identity as a socio-philosophic problem. What I have 
done is to take both 'deconstructive' and 'constructive' 
interpretations of Hegel's notion of identity in order to assess 
Hegel's continuing impact. In order to do this, I have made a 
broad distinction between two types of postmodernism; 
deconstruction and construction, of which Habermas represents 
the latter. 66 This distinction is hardly new and tends towards 
the over generalized, but it derives from widely perceived 
differences in the nature and function of language - namely, the 
tension between its indeterminacy and universality. In other 
words, the tension between language perceived as culture 
specific over against the universal fact of language per se. 
There are problems in contextualizing the discussion of 
Hegel's influence in this manner. First, locating a description of 
major trends within 'postmodernism' in the nature and function 
65 R. Pippin (1989) p. 36. See also pp. 102-3. 
66 J. B. Cobb describes two types of postmodemism: deconstruction and process. 
Theology Today Vol. 47 1990 - 91 pp. 149 - 158. Broadly, I agree drawing on 
the 'constructive' reaction against modem idealism not through process 
philosophy but Habermas's social reconstruction through the universality of 
language. 
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of language is overly narrow if not shown to be founded on a 
deeper logic and to have socio-economic and political 
implication. Locating the study in this manner is also 
misleading if allowed to colour Hegel retrospectively as a 
'language philosopher'. Kojeve interprets the Phenomenology's 
dialectical method in terms of language discourse: -By an act of 
freedom ... he (man sic.) speaks with his adversary, he engages 
in a dialogue with him: he uses a dialectical method'. 67 
Habermas also treats Hegel's concept of spirit as the 
underlying subjectivity of self-consciousness and relation with 
another; -the medium within which, as an absolute mediation, 
the two mutually form each other into subjects-. 68 As 
Habermas is aware, however, Hegel offers no linguistic basis for 
the process of spirit. 69 
The advantage of locating Hegel's influence in deconstructive 
and constructive approaches to language is the access it gives to 
major contemporary interpretative methods for considering 
individual identity. Habermas represents a linguistically 
constructive approach to questions of individual identity left 
to us by Hegel. M. C. Taylor, by contrast, advocates a 
deconstructing of Hegel's absolute claims. He works under the 
67 A. Kojeve (1969) pp. 179 - 80. 
68 J. Habermas (1974) -Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind', p. 
145. 
69 J. Habermas suggests; Wit is the dialectical interconnections between 
linguistic symbolization, Jabour and interconnection which determine the concept 
of spiritw• (1974) p. 143. He refers back to the 1803 - 6 Jena lectures on the 
Philosophy of Nature and Mind, aware that Hegel did not proceed to a linguistic 
'communicative path. 
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influence of Derrida's conviction that the message is always in 
the medium. The medium of language, he says, is always 
relative: "Truth with a capital 'T' cannot be articulated 
reflectively according to a single grammar". 70 I should say at 
this point that the distinction between deconstruction and 
construction is not to be exaggerated. Istvan Meszaros suggests 
reasons why the gap which seems to be unbridgeable is more 
imaginary than real. He mentions Habermas's allowing a 
pluralist perspective resembling that of some postmoderns. 71 
Indeed, I have shown already that there are many shared 
interests regarding Hegel's influence in questions of individual 
identity. The distinction is purely functional, therefore, in 
analyzing both divergence and convergence in recent Hegel 
interpretation. 
3. The challenge is whether Hegel's post-Christian 
perspective is better positioned to deal with questions of social 
relation than is the Christian faith, tied, as he says it is, to an 
unmediated alienation from a theistic God and a flight from the 
real world: "the alien content of its consciousness" (803)". The 
task of theology in this respect is to understand the social 
character of salvation. 72 Contemporary theology does well, I 
70 M. c. Taylor (1982) p. 47. 
71 Istvan Meszaros (1989) p. 38. 
72 Some work is being done in this area. John Zizioulas's Being as Communion 
(1985) has proved to be a major contribution, showing as it does how an 
understanding of eccIesiology can be revitalized if the full social consequences of 
the idea of identity in communion are accepted. Leonardo Boffs Trinity and 
Society (1988) is a dogmatic interpretation of the Trinity, important for its 
exposition of divine communality as a model for personhood and society. D.W. 
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believe, when it explores critically its relationship to the 
ambiguous legacy of Hegel interpretation. This is necessary in 
order to go beyond his negative interpretation of the Christian 
faith and to affirm something positive. It is clear that the full 
development of such a task would go beyond the limitations of 
this study. In this first Chapter I have tried to follow something 
of the current theological discussion about this topic, opting for 
analogical forms of reasoning that open the logical space 
required for such discussion. My aim in the following Chapters 
is merely to reflect upon how this work might be accomplished, 
considering the type of interface required for dialogue between 
Christian and non-Christian social theory. 
Hardy's essays in On Being the Church (1989) and The Weight of Glory 
(1991) introduce the significant notion of 'sociality' into theological discourse 
about the form and practice of society. in C. E. Gunton & D.W. Hardy (1989) pp. 
21 - 47; -God and the Form of Society- in D.W. Hardy & P. Sedgwick (1991) pp. 
131 - 144. For other expositions of the communion of the Trinity as the basis for 
ecclesial relation see P. Avis Christians in Communion (1990). Church as 
Communion. A.R.C.I.C 11 (1991); -The Ecclesiology of Communion- in The 
Church: Local and Universa/WCC. 
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2. A. IDENTITY AND HEGEL'S LOGIC OF RELA TION 
Time and again the Phenomenology touches on the great 
themes of human relation. Its relevance rests in Hegel's ability 
to identify perennial needs of the human spirit. And, as I pursue 
the theme of individual identity and relation it makes a better 
place than most to test a theological perspective. Of particular 
interest now as I look at §§ 90 - 165 is the question: Does the 
perspective from the 'I' established by Hegel allow for a recovery 
of the self as social? Already, I have shown that Hegel draws 
attention to the short sightedness in Kant's establishing the 'I' 
as a single activity of consciousness. But how successful is he 
in forgoing Kant's non-relational setting of limits and boundaries 
to the notion of individual identity; "the immediacy of my 
seeing, hearing, and so on" (101)? 
Hegel aims to offer a renewed vision for locating individual 
identity within a social context. As R. Pippin says, he attempts 
"to reformulate the notion of subjectivity itself, attacking 
virtually all of the post-Cartesian assumptions, denying that 
consciousness is "private," "inner," or a "spectator," of itself and 
world, and asserting that it is, in a special sense of the term, 
"communal," ·public," and even socially interactive.· 1 His call 
is for a re-examination of the 'modern' prioritizing of the 
individual as single and in itself. It may be that the cultural 
abyss between Hegel's philosophical and historical context and 
our own prohibits a complete 'translation' of the issues here. 
Nevertheless, the contemporary resonances in his intention ~ 
1 Robert B. Pippin (1989), p.36. See also pp.102-3. . 
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convincing enough cause to ask the question: Does Hegel succeed 
in making individual identity thinkable in a new way? 
On the positive side, conversation with Hegel in addressing 
this question makes us sensitive to certain asocial concepts of 
the self. §§ 90 - 165 on Consciousness, Sense-Certainty, 
Perception and Understanding are an attempt to show that some 
relational dimension of the individual is inherent in 
consciousness; ·pure being at once splits up into ... 'This' as 'I', 
and the other 'This' as object" (91). Pure being entails, he says, 
the dimension of the self functioning relationally because 
relation is entailed in sense-certainty: ·It is not just we who 
make this distinction between essence and instance, between 
immediacy and mediation; 
sense-certainty itself" (93). 
however, we find §§ 90 
on the contrary, we find it within 
By studying the text in more detail, 
- 165 to assimilate many of the 
conditions for identity laid down by Kant's account of the 
apperceptive nature of experience. In R. B. Pippin's words: 
Hegel's procedure here already betrays an important Kantian assumption about 
the apperceptive nature of consciousness .. he is assuming that there must be 
such conditions explicit in a possible sense experience.2 
As I shall show, Hegel does indeed draw on Kant's ontology of 
individuality in framing the debate about sense certainty and 
particularity. However, the results are denigratory 
consequences fo.r individual identity as relational. 3 
2 Robert B. Pippin (1989) p.120. 
3 Interpreting Hegel neither on the basis of an Hellenic idealism (which he 
believes not to fulfil the necessary . criteria for the realization of true social 
relations ), nor on the sole basis of immediate social needs and conditions. R. B. 
Pippin focuses on the principle of identity that, for Hagel, resides in thought 
itself. See (1981) -Hegers political Argument and the problem of Verwirk-
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On the negative side, the nub of my argument is that Hegel 
fails to think of the 'I' in a new way, and that this is 
simultaneous with his ceasing to believe in God in any sense that 
can be called Christian. The two matters are not unconnected. 
For Hegel, the positing of an onto logically singular God is bound 
logically to his positing of the 'I' as a simple, unified subject 
engaging with the objective world. E. Jungel's comment on this 
relation is that we cannot underestimate the significance of 
Hegel's questioning the nature of Divine Being as a consequence 
of making the divine essence a problem. 4 "The systematic 
connection ", he says, "of the death of God with the 
epistemological-metaphysical problematic of modern atheism 
could be Hegel's most significant achievement for theology". 5 
Hegel, more than most philosophers of the nineteenth century, 
challenges Christian theology to make God thinkable in a new 
way. 6 This is reflected in E. Jungel's particular theme of how 
to allow for Hegel's corrective emphasis on the story of the 
humanity of God in Christ. 7 The related question I pursue 
concentrates on the soteriological implications of connections 
between Kant's notion of the 'I' as singular and self-contained, 
and his understanding of the Absolute as unconditioned. 
Iichung·, p.513. 
4 E. JOngel (1983) p. 100 f. 
5 E. JOngel ibid. p. 97. 
6 E. JOngel ibid. pp. 64 - 100; 101 - 122; esp. pp. 110 - 111. JOngel's 
emphasis on Gods activity in history finds links between Hegel's triadically 
structured philosophy and Trinitarian theology. 
7 E. JOngel Ibid. "That the God who is love must be able to suffer '" is an 
indispensable insight of the newer theology schooled by Luther's Christology and 
Hegel's philosophy· (1983) p. 373. 
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I mentioned above the need to recognize that in Hegel's 
discourse about identity and relation, we are simultaneously 
involved in analogous talk about God. If one examines what is 
meant by the concept of a God who, for Hegel, is 'Being', 'the One' 
or 'the Singularity', a necessary relationship can be perceived 
between the self-determining of individual identity and the 
overall movement of absolute Spirit, in which Hegel subsumes 
the Christian faith. The main reason for this contact is that 
Kant ascribes to the function of language an implied analogy of 
being which defines the concept God in proportional relation to 
the concept 'I', -the proper name, the fixed point of rest of the 
underlying subject- (66). 8 As I indicated above, Kant's notion 
of the 'I' has been established as the premise for the Absolute 
raised to the status of an infinite principle: -For what 
necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and 
of all appearances is the unconditioned - (C.P.R. Bxx). 9 Thus, 
we are dealing here with a connection framed by Kant according 
to which the ontic order between God and the 'I' are intimately 
related. 
Hegel's complaint against Kant is centred on an analogy of 
being between God and the 'I' and the presumption of a priori 
structures and categories of deductive knowledge that 
8 For Kant's ambiguity re: extending this discipline of pure reason to belief in 
a primordial being see C.P.R. A 792 "' B 820 1. G.E. Michalson Jr. (1990) 
writes: -God enters Kant's scheme by riding on the coat-tails of the principle of 
proportionality ... to satisfy reason's demand for symmetry- p. 24. 
9 On the relation between Hegel's attack against the defences against scepticism 
which he finds built into the religious outlook of faith and Kant's a priori claims 
for philosophical method see M.N. Forster (1989) pp. 89 - 94; 110 - 116. 
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determines each: "This pattern of giving reasons and stating 
conditions belongs ... to external conditions" (66). 10 We shall 
see that §§ 90 - 165 of the Phenomenology take apart Kant's 
restricted knowledge of consciousness whereby the 'I' is a 
simple, unified subject in receipt of intuitive representations, 
engaging with the objective world: 
Through inner experience I am conscious of my existence in time ... It 
is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is 
determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with 
my existence, is outside me. (C.P.R., Bxln.) 
Consciousness of individuality is awareness through perceptions 
of the object before it: "knowledge by means of connected 
perceptions" 11 Initially the 'I' identifies itself in conscious-
ness. Then, through a series of successive reflective moments it 
identifies itself as distinct from the external world. Hegel 
reviews the nature of Consciousness, Sense-Certainty, 
Perception and Understanding, intending to reformulate the 
Kantian notion of subjectivity as relational rather than private 
and inner. The question to be asked is how successful is he in 
this task? 
10 For definition of Kant's so-called formalism in philosophy see Ch. 1 p. 27. 
Hegel defines Kant's formalism as his relying on truths taken for granted; -it just 
lays them down, and believes it is entitled to assert them- (67). 
11 Kant, C.P.R., B 147; 161. Habermas explains this as follows: 
Hegel directs himself against the organon theory of knowledge .... Knowledge 
appears mediated either by an instrument with whose help we form objects or 
as a medium through which the light of the world enters the subject-. 
J. Habermas (1972) Pt. 1, Ch. 1, p. 10. By -organon theory of knowledge- under-
stand consciousness as an instrument of knowledge empirically available to itself. 
-Science must liberate itself from this semblance- says Hegel (76) and be replaced 
with a phenomenological self-reflection of consciousness. J. Habermas (ibid.) p. 
7. 
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2. B. THE'I' AND THE 'WE' 
In order to answer this question and to understand these early 
sections on Sense Certainty, Perception and Understanding, it is 
necessary to recognise that Kant represents for Hegel a 
culmination of long-term epistemological problems. 12 I have 
shown already that his idea of social reality is a response to 
Kant's ideas of individuality consisting in isolated 
particular 'I'" (90); "wholly personal, individual 
absolutely singular entities" [Wesen] (110). 13 
units; "This 
things 
Howard P. 
Kainz indicates as much in recording Hegel's dissatisfaction 
with Kant's failure to reflect genuine experience: "The attitude 
of Formalism in philosophy, which occupies itself with applying 
the schemata of the mind in mere external fashion to things, 
without going out of itself to enter into the dynamism of the 
thought content .... must endeavour to take the "leap" to true 
systematic philosophical knowledge". 14 He condemns Kant's 
12 In many respects Plato remains the starting point for Western studies of 
epistemology insofar as he discusses knowledge of the self by the self. Amongst the 
Minor Socratic Dialogues Charmides contains a dialogue about the distinction 
between knowing and the object known (166a-b). Th.ae/ps seizes on a similar 
problem. determining the conditions under which knowledge (E1nC1T1JJl7J) of the 
self is possible. See A.E. Taylor (1937) pp. 53-57. 
13 On Descartes' notion of the 'I' as singular based on the intuitive and inductive 
operations of the mind see Louis E. Loeb (1981). 1.3, -Epistemology in Descartes. 
Locke and Berkelely-, p.41. See. R. Descartes • in J. Cottingham. R. Stoothoff & D. 
Murdoch. Transls. (1985) Vol. 1. p. 14-5; 33. where intuition is the immediate 
self evidence with which a truth forces itself upon us and deduction is the 
analyzing of the axiomatic principles of knowledge, the certainty of which cannot 
be doubted .. 
14 Howard P. Kainz (1976). p. 57. Kant's 'I' who thinks is a simple. unified 
subject engaging with the objective world: -I am immediately conscious only of 
that which is in me- (C.P.R. Bxl n.). For instance. the -numerical unity of this 
apperception- (A 106) refers to the unity of intuition and empirical identity 
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inability to move beyond this external designation of identity. 
The question is whether he escapes what he himself condemns as 
an asocial understanding of the self. 
In asking this I am building on the hermeneutical thesis 
established in Chapter 1 that Hegel's idea of the process and 
experience of consciousness is intended to demonstrate the 
social nature of selfhood. Hegel's notion of -phenomenological 
experience- is, as J. Habermas says, about -the socialization 
process of the individual ... as it reflects upon itself in the forms 
of absolute mind-. 15 Judith Shklar observes: -The turn to the 
social aspects of any shape of consciousness was, for Hegel, the 
decisive moment-. 16 Yet my contention is that Hegel's notion 
of the social is inadequately based on assumptions about the 
particularity of the 'I'; -consciousness ... only as a pure 'I'; or ... a 
pure 'This'- [Oieser] (91), and the universal objective realm; -the 
object similarly only as a pure 'This'- [Oieses] (ibid.). 
Consequently, these early sections illustrate that individual 
identity, which for Hegel is not yet fulfilled in notions of 
consciousness as 'I'; -nothing more, a pure 'This'- (91), is as 
incomplete as the divine objectivity which stands over against 
the 'I'. 
Clearly, Hegel wants to demonstrate a primitive and more 
encompassing understanding of pure being than Kant's notion of 
transcendental apperception can reach. It is all too obvious, 
bound together in the experience of cognition or transcendental apperception. 
15 J. Habermas (1972) p. 19. 
16 J. Shklar (1976) p. 20. 
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however, that he is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, he is 
faced with Kant's and, to some extent, Descartes' understanding 
of the self as the possibility of self-knowledge and conscious 
relation with others drawn from the spontaneous act of 
thought. On the other, is the argument which Hume contended, 
namely, that identity comprises the substance or being of 
sense experience, and ideas from which the possibility of such 
knowledge is derived. This is to put the matter rather baldly. 
However, the divide concerning the free activity of 
consciousness vis-a-vis physical being caused Hegel to seek a 
new overview of the experience of consciousness. Descartes 
built structures of knowledge and relation on the intuitive and 
inductive operations of the mind. 17 In his 'Second Meditation' 
the implication is that one can have knowledge of the self and 
relations by reflecting on the mind, its faculties and workings, 
given the appropriate intellectual discipline. 18 Similarly, the 
'Sixth Meditation' is about recognizing the history of one's own 
mind by inferring the distinction between one's own volitions 
and judgements and the existence of corporeal things. 1 9 
Against this, the thrust of Hume's attack against Descartes was 
to provide universal criteria for knowledge of the self and 
relations from something more 'substantial' than ideas present 
to the mind. 20 For both, everything in thought can be traced 
17 By intuition Descartes means the immediate self evidence with which a truth 
forces itself upon us. Deduction is the analyzing of the axiomatic prinCiples of 
knowledge, the certainty of which cannot be doubted. R. Descartes , in J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Transls. (1985) Vol. 1, p. 14-5; 33. 
18 R. Descartes. in J. Cottingham. transl. (1986) Second Meditation. pp. 16-23. 
19 R. Descartes, in J. Cottingham, transl. (1986) Second Meditation, pp. 50-
62. 
20 -It is therefore by experience only that we can infer the existence of one 
object from that of another". Hume, Treatise ,Vol. I. Part Ill, sect. VI, p. 89. 
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back to some impression or idea given to the single subject. 21 
Hume's main complaint, however, was the need to establish a 
more permanent basis for knowledge of the self and relation: "We 
are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, 
connecting the parts, ... though we are not able fully to satisfy 
ourselves in that particular". 22 
Kant had attempted a response to this dilemma when he made 
the point that conceiving of the thinking 'I' involves a distinction 
between the empirical and transcendental self. As I have shown 
already, the problem which Hegel sees here is that of abstractly 
derived functions of reason. Even language itself, he says, 
remains external to the relational construct of consciousness. 
He talks about the need "to help out language" (110). It is a 
universal, he says, in the sense of being logically available to 
everyone; "it is a universal. I take it up then as it is in truth ..... 
(ibid.). Even the function of language, however, does not go all 
the way down to the ontological principle of the self. It might 
be observed that this polarity remains at the heart of 
contemporary questions about individual identity and relation. 
They arise again later with reference to Habermas. For the 
moment, note Hegel's conceived need for a new expression of the 
relational construct of consciousness. His solution stands or 
falls within the 'I' - 'We' framework. 
21 -Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are 
supposed to be derived from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple 
ideas proceed, either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent 
impression. . .. This then, is the first principle I establish in the science of human 
nature-. Treatise, Vol. 1, Part 1, sect. 1, p.16. 
22 Hume, Treatise, Vol. 1, Part. IV, sect. VI, pp. 238 - 249. Esp. p .• 241. 
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So what kind of relational construct is it that Hegel 
suggests? Let us consider relation as spoken of in §§ 90 - 165 
of the Phenomenology. Here, when Hegel speaks of a more 
significant relation with others he often does so in terms of 
community; ffGemeinschaft mit anderen ff (117) and essence 
[Wesen]. The term Wesen occurs nine hundred and thirty three 
times in the Phenomenology although its meaning is not well 
developed. In the Logic, Wesen is spoken of as "the truth of 
being ff or that which is affirmatively present in it [ist an ihr 
seiend]. 23 Note, for example, his use of the term Wesen in 
§110 quoted above. Its use is remarkable because in §§ 90 - 165 
of the Phenomenology it most often occurs as a relativizing of 
the gap between immediate consciousness or sense-certainty 
and the objective realm that it perceives; "this inner truth, as 
the absolute universal ... in which the truth has its essence" 
(144). Here, however, the point seems to be that Singular 
entities contain something implicitly of the essence that is 
universal. It is, he says, merely meant "not actually expressed". 
This concept of essence is significant in Hegel's attempt to 
address the gap between the particular 'I', (based on the 
certainty of the experience of life as belonging to the 'this I'), 
and the universal 'We' (that which can be instantiated by any 
number of particulars: 
When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one not the other is 
only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same 
time mediated (92). 
The way in which Hegel deals with this gap imposes limitations, 
I suggest, for how the self can have a social reference. It 
23 Hegel L. pp. 389 & 391 respectively. 
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precludes any understanding of 'the social' except as the 
mediating or relativizing of all opposition in anticipation of 
potential unity: "a mediated simplicity, or a universality ... 
sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth 
of its object is the universal" (98 & 99). He maintains the 
tension in consciousness between the '" and the universal 'We' 
through an idea of the self bound by ontological particularity. 
Hegel's awareness in these sections of a problem in relating 
the particular 'I' and the universal 'We' is evident in § 110 when 
he argues that there is an essence prior to individuality that 
has been denied by Kant and other epistemological thinkers; "if 
they wanted to say it, then this is impossible, because the 
sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language" 
(110). He adopts what might be called an essentialist approach 
evidenced in the comment that language, as the primary function 
of relation, cannot obtain to the nature of the 'I' that is anterior 
to any active consciousness or reflection: 
They speak of the existence of extemal objects ... absolutely singular, wholly 
personal, individual things ... but what they mean is not what they say ... 
This that is meant cannot be reached by language ... which is inherently 
universal. (110) . 
By this I mean that there is something "beneath" socialization 
and prior to individuality in the sense that the 'I' is conscious of 
a history and the idea of being-for-self. 
What has emerged for it as a result is the Notion of the True - but only as the 
implicit being of the True ... which lacks the being-far-self of consciousness 
(133). 
This 'essential' or foundationalist notion of human nature places 
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him at odds with Kant and functionalist thinkers who find the 
social to be no conscious activity on the part of the 'I'. Kant 
wrote: -The proposition, 'I think', in so far as it amounts to the 
assertion, -I exist thinking', is no mere logical function, but 
determines the subject (which is then at the same time object) 
in respect of existence-. (C.P.R. B 429). For Kant, Hegel says, 
abstraction constitutes the relation between the act of 
consciousness that is the 'thinking I'. Or, as G. Deleuze 
comments, it is only in pure philosophy that Kant looks for the 'I' 
in its purity and genuineness. 24 
Beyond Kant's notion of the pure 'I', says Hegel, is a relational 
essence which is implicit in the 'I's being-for-self and 
confers on the self the meanings and prerogatives of the 
universal. Essence is the dynamic process by which the implicit 
relationality of immediate consciousness and the 'We' is 
realized: 
In essence the object is the same as the movement: the movement is the 
unfolding and differentiation of the two moments, and the object is the 
apprehended togetherness of the moments (111). 25 
In this passage it is the surpassing of immediacy and singularity 
in relation; the self is not existing of itself, bei sich selbst but 
exists in relation with others, it is bei uns. Individuality is not 
in-itself but for others, fDr-ein-Anderes. The verification of 
this fact is given, Hegel thinks, in the movement of thought. 
24 "The first two critiques (suggest) a necessary submission of the object to the 
'finite' subject: to us, the legislators, in our very finitude (even the moral law is a 
fact of moral reasort. G. Deleuze (1984) p. 69. 
25 George Myro in Richard E. Grandy, Ed. (1986) Wldentity and Timew considers 
if 'identity' is always relativized to a concept and does not exist tout court. Ch. 15. 
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This movement is being described non-temporally in terms of 
fleeting totalities; "the singular being ... becomes universality ... 
My 'meaning' has vanished, and perception takes the object as it 
is in itself, or as a universal as such" (130). He wants to 
demonstrate that the social structure of the individual lies 
within the experience of consciousness in distinguishing itself 
from the universal and at the same time relating itself to it. 
Clearly, Hegel sees the need for reconciliation between the 
particular 'I', which he makes foundational for all subsequent 
discussion, in relation to universality and the 'We'. 26 The 
question is whether he can attain to it. 
2. C. INDIVIDUALISM IN ONTOLOGY 
§§ 90 - 165 of the Phenomenology thus set out some of the 
premises for Hegel's understanding of the origins, evolution and 
socialization of particular consciousness. These are the less 
glamorous sections of the Phenomenology being concerned with 
the most primitive forms and shapes of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, it is here that he makes the particular 'I' 
foundat~onal for all subsequent discussion. We have seen that 
Hegel makes particularly the truth of individuality prior to the 
social and this, we argue, has intolerable consequences for any 
sense of the self as social. A brief word survey shows is that 
beziehen (acc. to connect with or refer to) is- often used in 
connection with the verb to differentiate [unterschieden] , 
meaning to recognize the being of self to be distinct from any 
other. (113; 115; 121; 123 .... ). The question is again how the 
26 On "Particulars as Bundles of Universals" see D.M. Armstrong (1989) Ch. 4. 
For a summary of traditional arguments for universals see B. Aune (1986) Ch. 3. 
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distinctness of the 'I' is played off against the plurality of the 
'We'. 
Inherent in all this is the issue of individualism in ontology. 
Hegel retains, we argue, the overwhelming modern Western 
mentality that shows being or substance to precede the function 
of relation, implying a priority for individuality in ontology. It 
is of course necessary that regulative principles for 
understanding the nature of individual subjectivity require the 
condition of distinctness. Like Kant, he accepts the given 
relation of the 'I' to objectivity, and goes on to ask about the 
possibility of relation. W.W. Floyd Jr. refers to Kantian criticism 
as the guardian of plurality; "sociality, understood first as the 
'letting be' of the integrity of that which is alien to the subject, 
the dialectical affirmation of heterogeneous otherness". 2 7 
Hegel's, however, is not only a 'letting be' of the self and the 
'other' in a given relationship but rather, I suggest, the 
assumption that every individual exists as a non-relational 
singularity before engaging in the activity of relation. 28 
It is important to look closely at these early sections of the 
Phenomenology for the characteristic and disfiguring features 
of individualism that are embedded in much subsequent modern 
and contemporary thinking. Time and again the 'I' is conceived of 
as subject to a particular interpretation of the necessity of its 
27 W.W. Floyd Jr. (1988) p. 111. 
28 Bonhoeffe(s Akt und Sein (1956) is a study in the act I being divide in 
modem philosophy, believing its resolution to be found in Christ; -the unity of 
man, of human existence, is founded solely in the Word of Goer p. 106. For a 
critique of Bonhoeffe(s revelational resolution of th_e problem see E. Feil (1985) 
pp. 5 - 14. 
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'substantial', immediate existence. In particular, in associating 
sense-certainty with pure being, Hegel restricts a notion of the 
'I' that can only be particular and non-relational. Two things 
should be made plain. First, individualism is to be distinguished 
from individuality, the former being manifest in forms of 
isolation and social dissolution; the latter calling for full 
participation in various forms of community. 29 Secondly, 
individualism is not a system of general principles nor ethical 
code, but a way of thinking about the 'I' as the centre of 
existence. (It should, of course, be remembered that Hegel's is 
only one representation of the modern problem of individualism. 
D. Riesman's Individualism Re-considered made this point in 
1954 as did Stephen Lukes' Individualism in the 1970's. 30) 
This being said, of particular concern is how Hegel sets up 
discussion about 'the social' in terms of a gap between the 
particular 'I' and the universal 'We'. The danger is that there is a 
reduction of the subject and object to a sameness of opposites 
which needs a third term; a 'concept of thought', to bring about 
an identification. The presupposition operating here is the 
distance separating one individual from another. Isolation like a 
second nature surrounds the individual, concealing the absence of 
29 M.C. Taylor (1980) says that Hegel makes this point as follows: 
Hegel's recognition of the essential coimplication of opposites enable us to see 
that the individual is never only the individual. To the contrary, concrete 
individuality arises only through the internal relation of self and other. 
p.273 
30 -D. Riesman (1954) defends the individualism that will not sacrifice the 
individual to the needs of the group. p.38. Stephen Lukes (1974) argued that 
progressive conceptualization of the supreme worth of the individual has had 
harmful social implications in political, economic , religious and ethical spheres. 
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true relation. Viewed in this way, the individual continues to 
have identity, to live, to move, to meet with others. But the 
quality of relation is coarsened, and instead of reflecting the 
spiritual sense of God's creation lapses into the struggle for 
survival that Hegel so vividly depicts. E. Levinas' distinctive 
ontology of the plurality of beings is critical of Hegel and the 
whole of Western Metaphysics for this reason. "Most often", he 
says, it is "an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by 
the interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures 
comprehension of being". 31 In other words, relation is a 
function that brings together isolated beings which are separate 
before they are social. 
The peculiar perspective on Hegel's notion of relation offered 
by Levinas is considered more fully in Chapter 4. For the 
moment, the impression of relation to which I refer can be seen 
in the usage of the words for relation in §§ 90 - 165. The most 
general word for relation is the noun Verhii Itn is, which occurs 
over 150 times throughout the Phenomenology in singular and 
plural forms. It occurs 50 times in the infinitive and compound 
infinitive verb forms and 41 times in verb form with a singular 
subject. Its meaning can vary but in §§ 90 - 165 tends to be 
used either in the impersonal sense of approaching an idea or 
object (90; 123) to describe the connection between the act of 
knowing and its object; "das Verhiiltnis, ... das Wissen und der 
Gegenstand (100), or as an umbrella term for that feature or 
attribute of things which is involved when considering the 
particular individual in connection with another; "niimlich das 
31 E. Levinas (1979) pp. 40 & 43 respectively. 
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Verhaltnis zu Anderem". ( 128 also 114; 125.) In other words, 
Hegel's uses the idea of relation to indicate a particular type of 
connection between discrete entities. 
This limited sense of relation is seen in the way various verb 
forms of the infinitive beziehen occur 11 times in §§ 111 -
165 including twice in the compound form Sichaufbeziehen, 
meaning to relate to oneself (113). In the main it is used of 
perception [Wahrnehmung] as the determination of thought in 
detaching itself from sense-certainty and being plunged into the 
contradiction of being pure and simple negativity: "The This is, 
therefore, established as not This, or as something super~ded" 
(113). The 'I's comprehension of its own existence is one of 
distinction within itself of what it 'is' and the reflective 
distinguishing of itself from objective universality: "Our 
Nothing, as the Nothing of the This, preserves its immediacy ... 
but is a universal immediacy" (ibid.). What this means becomes 
clearer in §§ 111 - 131 on "Perception: or the Thing and 
Deception" regarding the relation between subject and object. 
The object or 'opposite' is spoken of in two ways; in the form of 
posited selfhood; "a relation of self to self" [sich auf sich 
bezieht] (114) and as objective otherness; "the universality 
otherness itself.. immediately present for him" (116). 32 In 
both senses it is present to the subject as an object of 
perception for understandin.g across the void of reflective 
consciousness. 
32 J. Habermas (1987) condemns the Phenomenology as caught within an ego-
centric principle of subjectivity; -the infinite processing of the relation-to-self 
that swallows up everything finite within itselr. p. 36. 
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Note how the verb beziehen is often used to effect the play 
on words between the noun for object [Gegenstand] and its 
adjectival, objective form [gegenstandlich], the noun for in 
opposition to [Gegenteil], and its additional adjectival form 
which also means opposite to, [gegentei/ig]. For example, § 144 
states: "The One is the moment of negation; it is quite simply a 
relation of self to self and it excludes an other ... As a One, ... the 
determinateness is set free from this unity with its opposite, 
and exists in and for itself". 33 We see this particularly in the 
relationship between the particular 'I' and universality where 
reflective action takes sense-certainty towards identification 
with universality as the truth of its particular 'I'-ness: "With 
this, the Understanding has indeed superseded its own untruth 
and the untruth of the object. What has emerged for it as a 
result is the Notion of the True ... " (133). It is the universal, he 
says, which is the true content of sense-certainty. "Through the 
fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal 
medium as our reflection, we preserve the self-identity and 
truth of the Thing, its being a One" (119). 
This notion of the 'I' being "a One" leaves me wary because any 
notion of the social presupposes a separation of opposites. C. 
Taylor speaks of an original richness of consciousness being lost 
in difference; "sensible certainty as a conception ... is a prey to 
contradiction ... in principle unrealizable". 34 R. B. Pippin 
observes that contradiction is at the heart of Hegel's notion of 
33 -Das Eins ist das Moment der Negation. wie es selbst auf eine einfach Weise 
sich aut sich bezieht und Anderes ausschlieBt ... als Eins aber ist sie, wie sie von 
dieser Einheit mit dem Gegenteil befren-. (114). 
34 C. Taylor (1975) p. 142. 
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immediate identity as an "identity of identity and non identity. " 
Contradiction, he says, is seen as a metaphysical doctrine for 
Hegel at the heart of all movement and vitality. 35 Hegel 
allows opposition to become entrenched at the very heart of 
human consciousness. §§ 132 - 165 on "Force and the 
Understanding" make this plain. His notion of 'force' is 
consciousness aware of itself as a comprehensible and distinct 
unity, wanting to maintain its original separateness: "Force, 
splits" into an antithesis which at first appears to be an 
independent difference, but which in fact proves to be none; for 
it is the selfsame which repels itself from itself" (156). If we 
accept Hegel's notion of particularity as original to the self, 
ontology is still not liberated from regressive reflection of the 
self upon itself. It is still, as he observes himself, "communing 
directly with itself, enjoying only itself; although it seems to be 
busy with something else" (163). 
Thus I have shown that the easiest and, I argue, the necessary 
way into Hegel's understanding of identity [ldentitat] is at a 
level of logical abstraction. Far from being just a logical 
principle, Hegel shows tne idea of identity to feed into 
concerns about the human will, the natural order, morality, 
culture, society etc. As a moment within the science of 
consciousness, Hegel's idea of identity is a pivotal point from 
which all his social theory develops. We saw this in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology where the principle of 
identity was claimed to manifest itself in a process of thought 
from simple abstractness to something that is relational and 
35 R. Pippin, "Hegel's Metaphysics and the Problem of Contradiction·, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 16, pp. 301 - 312. See SL esp. pp.439 - 442. 
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conditioned: "Self-identity... is pure abstraction; but this is 
thinking ... Comprehended in this is the fact that Being is 
Thought". (54). Here in §§ 90 - 165 we have seen again that 
Hegel's basis for social theory makes 'being' individual logically 
prior to any notion of the social. Thus I have identified two 
levels, so far, at which the concept of identity operates for 
Hegel; at the level of logical principle and as a moment within 
the science of consciousness. 
To recapitulate, in any contemporary consideration of identity 
and relation it is clear that we cannot shake off our past. M.C. 
Taylor's 1980 Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard is 
just one illustration of the lasting significance of Hegel's 
critique of Kant, especially regarding the unitary idea of the self 
as providing a contact point for the experience of the self in the 
modern and postmodern world. 36 Placing the idea of 'identity' 
squarely back at the centre of the contemporary philosophical 
agenda, he makes the point that we are all, to some extent, living 
off the 'intellectual capital' of the post-Reformation period in 
looking for contemporary criteria in interpreting the modern 
sense of identity. The question is whether we too are to adopt 
the distinction or opposition [Gegenstand] between the single 'I' 
and the univ.ersal 'We' as axiomatic for a notion of relation. Are 
there any other options for change? 37 
36 See also M. C. Taylor (1984) "Disappearance of the Self" which claims to 
show how both Kant and Hegel's idea of the self 'deconstructs' itself because of a 
fallacious reliance .on the idea of ·self-sameness." pp. 36 - 7. 
37 M.C. Taylor (1980) compares Hegel and Kierkegaard, the latter insisting, 
Tay-lor thinks, that to be individual is deliberately not to be identified in relation 
with others: "The individual is only the individual. [Den Enkelte kun er den 
Enkelte]. p.272. Quoting from Fear and Trembling, Transl. W. Lowrie. 
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2. D. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE? 
I have suggested reasons why Hegel's starts from the wrong 
place in order to reach an adequate understanding of the social, 
simply playing off the 'I' over against the 'We'. As yet, Hegel has 
offered no adequate way of healing the isolation of the 'I' vis-a-
vis the universal 'We'. Perhaps he has no intention of so doing. 
R. Rorty thinks that the Phenomenology is just a literary device 
designed for this purpose of engaging the one over against the 
other; "not an argumentative procedure or way of unifying 
subject and object, simply a literary skill ... constantly shifting 
vocabularies, thereby changing the subject". 38 As Rorty 
observes, Hegel merely makes smooth, rapid transitions from one 
moment or terminology to the other. 39 
It is not enough, however, to throw stones at Hegel if no 
alternatives can be energized. 40 Especially in the light of J. 
Milbank's recent suggestion that we "re-do" Hegel's critique of 
the Enlightenment, his critique of Christian practice, and 
encounter of the philosophical logos with the theological 
logos within a more explicitly Christian framework, we must 
ask what options for change there are available. 4 1 
Contemporary theologians including some feminists feel strongly 
(1970) Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 80; 3: 119. 
38 R.Rorty (1989) p. 78. 
39 R. Rorty (1989) p. 78. 
40 Kart Barth once said: "Theology had, and still has no occasion to throw stones 
at Hagel H it has not trodden the same path as he, only not in so firm or so logical a 
manner 'as he did". (1959b) p. 281. 
41 J. Milbank (1990) Ch. 6 pp. 147 f. "The best way to 'retrieve' Hegel would be 
to try to see this narrative of Christian Si/dung as itself 'foundational" p. 173. 
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about the need for new foundations for an understanding of 
relation. Oaphne Hampson looks for a "different sense of self and 
different sense of relationality". Talking about relation in 
Hegelian terms has repercussions, she says, for the assumed 
opposition between women and men. 42 From a different 
context, Enrique Dussel, a contemporary Latin American 
Liberation theologian condemns Hegel as an example of modern 
European philosophy's "culture of the centre" which denigrates 
anything other than the thinking 'I' to the edges of consciousness. 
Consequences are drawn from European philosophy for 
subsequent colonial exclusion of 'third world' countries to "the 
periphery". 43 There is clearly a need for a new basis for social 
theory other than that offered by Hegel. 
Having thus identified the need to resituate Hegel's starting 
point for consideration of the social from the particularity and 
asocial self to sociality we must look for new articulations of 
individuality and relation. Some work is being done across the 
range of non-Christian social theory. Michael Argyle's 1991 
Cooperation. The Basis of Sociability is, for example, an 
experimentally based study in the human capacity to cooperate. 
Cooperation, he says, may well be inherent in human nature as 
opposed to being learnt through social functions: "All kinds of 
cooperation have a universal, possibly innate, part which is much 
the same in all cultures". 44 It is common for representatives 
of biological, 45 ecological, 46 geographical, 47 and political 
42 Daphne Hampson (1990) p. 119. 
43 E. Dussel (1985) esp. pp. 4 - 15. 
44 M. Argyle (1991) p. 243. 
45 See K. Lorenz' (1963) biological study of e.g., ·Social Organization without 
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disciplines to find that the social is an undervalued concept 
when thinking about the individual. Over against the claim by the 
so called I new right' that 'here is no such thing as society; there 
are only individuals and families·. 48 D. Marquand. J. Boswell 
and others represent significant attempts to mediate between 
the discrediting of the idea of society as an existing entity, and 
assuming the social somehow comes about through changes in 
environmental, political and economic values. 49 
Specifically in Chapter 3, I take Habermas's interpretation of 
Hegel as the most promising exploration of the communicative 
nature of the self as a test ground to look at whether the social 
signifies a function to link multiple particulars, a 'property' of 
the substance of the '1', or is constitutive of who the '1' is. 
With Hegel and Habermas together I ask: Can sociality be 
accorded primacy in our social thinking? The question raises 
general issues of the relation between theology and non-
Christian socio-philosophy, especially regarding how to appraise 
Love- (Ch. IX) in flock organizations. His plea is that human society is so 
characterized by aggression that biological sciences must be employed to 
appreciate human bonds of love and friendship (Ch. XIV, esp. p. 258). 
46 For study of the need for sound ecological/social practices as early as 1959 
see R.F. Dasmann (1959) on Environmental Conservation. 
47 P. Dickens & P.E. Uoyd (1981) comment on the simultaneity of individualist 
and interdependent urban values, the -phenomenon of individuals rubbing 
together- (p. 15) 
48 For this as a quote from Mrs. Thatcher see R. Dahrendorf -Changing Social 
Values under Mrs. Thatcher- in R. Skidelsky (1988) p. 195. 
49 E.g., D. Marquand (1988), pp. 31 - 2; 81 - 2; 86. See F.A. Hayek, Studies 
in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (1967). J. Boswell (1990) -I suggest 
that the value of community is ... the summit of our thinking about social ideals ... 
even though it has fallen into disrepair- p. 10. 
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the pre-existing divisions and conflicts of consciousness that 
Hegel perceives. The position of a Christian theology of 
salvation vis-a-vis non-Christian social theory, as proposed by 
this study, is at the same time both critical and affirmative. I 
can safely say that I do not identify myself too closely with the 
options for change proposed by Habermas. My aim is to draw 
from his work whatever liberating factors exist in his re-
interpretation of Hegel. The intention is to illuminate analogies 
of the healing effect wrought in Christ which may be utilized in 
giving content to what God's salvation is like in sociQI economic 
and political terms. 
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3. A. DID HEGEL'5 PARABLE GET IT RIGHT? 
Can sociality be accorded primacy in our thinking about the 
self? In this Chapter I address the question in the light of 
Hegel's analysis of the self's existence for itself, as recounted 
in §§. 166 - 230 of the Phenomenology. These sections bring 
together questions about the fears and uncertainties of human 
existence alongside issues surrounding the temporal nature and 
social existence of the self. Hegel's general concern is with the 
certainty and satisfaction of self-conscious existence, and 
Chapter IV of the Phenomenology starts with a critical 
reflection on what it is to be certain of individual selfhood; "a 
certai nty wh ich is identical with its truth" (§ 166). §§. 166 -
230 include the (in)famous Lord / Bondsman parable in which the 
fear of losing identity takes concrete form in the so-called 'trial 
by death'. Hegel's parable itself does not mediate an analogy of 
what God's salvation is like. It points, however, to the need for 
parables through which it is possible and entirely correct to 
speak of salvation in a social context in an analogous sense. 
No story from nineteenth century philosophy has had a greater 
impact upon modern social theory than the Lord / Bondsman 
parable. The contemporary reader of Hegel cannot but be aware 
of the many interpreters who have gone before, and wonder 
whether there is anything worth saying that has not already been 
said. 1 Nonetheless, the fact is that it has a classic quality, 
1 See R. H. Roberts, "The Reception of Hegel's Parable of the 'Lord and 
Bondsman" in New Comparison. A Joumal of Comparative and Literary 
Studies, Vol. 5, 1988, pp. 23-39. 
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addressing perennial assumptions that individual identity 
consists in struggles over conflicting interests, desires and 
needs. Much discussion about the parable has centred on whether 
it is an arbitrary paradigm of psychological and social behaviour 
or the expression of an inclusive, necessary method arising from 
the nature of consciousness. H. Adelman phrases it neatly in his 
article "Of Human Bondage", when he asks if the parable 
expresses contingent forms of fearful and conflict oriented 
consciousness or forms which are permanent in human 
experience. 2 
This question is central as I argue that human nature is not 
inherently or necessarily conflict oriented; identity and conflict 
are separable. With this question of the contingent or permanent 
nature of fear and conflict in the human experience in mind, I 
distinguish two different forms that fear takes in §§ 207 - 230; 
the fear of death and meaninglessness. The Preface has already 
spoken of death as the first and most universal type of fear: 
"Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of 
all things the most dreadful" (32). Fear, for Hegel, is an 
ambiguous experience. Though a force that destroys relation it 
is also the power that resists death and is present in the 
experience of nothingness; "this is the tremendous power of the 
negative" (ibid.). The fear of death is present in every self-
consciousness. The fear of meaninglessness is also present in 
every self-consciousness and is expressed as the uncertainty 
experienced in the need for recognition : "A self-consciousness 
exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact self-
2 H. Adelman -Of Human Bondage- in D. P. Verene Ed., (1980) The HegeJ 
Society of America 1976, pp. 119 - 134. 
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consciousness; ... " (177). For Hegel, the fear of death is not only 
physical (§§ 4S2f.). It is a spiritual element in human 
experience, formative of finite human identity in the sense of 
being integral to the higher, rational element in humankind: "In 
that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in 
every fibre of its being the simple, essential nature of self-
consciousness" (§ 194). 3 
A. Kojeve makes death and the fear of death the major 
emphasis in his interpretation of the Phenomenology, insisting 
that the thinking of death is the only way that human 
consciousness discovers its potential for life: "It is death that 
engenders Man in Nature, and it is death that makes him progress 
to his final destiny". 4 Death is not 'nothing' or false for 
Hegel, says Kojeve, but must be 'lived with' or 'lived through' in 
order that human consciousness be fully itself. "It is therefore, 
when all is said and done, this consciousness of death that 
humanizes Man and constitutes the ultimate basis of his 
humanity". 5 Consider the overall structure of §§ 166 - 230. 
3 The only time Hagel uses the tenn 'finitude' [Begrenzung] is in §731 to 
talk of the independent existence of the gods of antiquity. Begrenzung is 
translated as 'limitation' by A.V. Miller in § 731. 
4 A. Kojeve, "The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel- in -Interpretation. 
A Journal of Political Philosophy- Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 114 - 157. We do not 
follow Kojeve in believing the celebrated struggle of lordship and bondage to 
represent the nub of Hagel's philosophy; 'he key to an understanding of the 
Hegelian system in its totality and to the Phenomenology in particular- (p. 
134). He does, however, usefully facilitate a reading of the Phenomenology in 
terms of the human consciousness rather than a mystical, quasi-divine idealism. 
This is useful in assessing the impact of of the desire of consciousness for 
recognition and objectification of itself through a struggle for identity. 
5 A. Kojeve (1969) p. 153. The fear of death is the source of selfhood for 
Hegel; -the profound basis of Hegelian anthropology is formed by this idea that 
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As the debate moves on from the Lord and Bondsman parable to 
new 'shapes' [Gestalt] of consciousness, the point is that 
neither the Stoic nor the sceptic has a real answer. The Stoic, 
for example, suffers from self-delusion, unaware that its 
withdrawal from the struggle is correlate to the surrender of 
selfhood; "it has not there achieved its consummation as 
absolute negation" (§ 201). Neither can the Sceptic ever be more 
than partially free, denying any permanent relation with the 
truth; "it owns to being a wholly contingent, single and separate 
consciousness- a consciousness which is empirical, which ... it 
knows has no truth for it" (§ 205). Escape from the fear of death 
is no simple desire for the immediate satisfaction of the self's 
interests but a fundamental question of hope. 
The subject is emotive. There is no denying the a priori fact 
of natural death; the unavoidable radical negation in response to 
which life is either be enhanced or undermined. But the fear of 
death aroused in the self for Hegel is not only a realization of 
the fact that humans must die. It is a fundamental constituent 
of the truth of selfhood; "the essence of the negative movement 
in which consciousness turns against its particular individual-
ity, but which, qua relation, is in itself positive ... " (§ 226). 
Here is the crux issue: Is fear and the negative moment of death 
in itself positive? Is it the passage to the social or does it 
strike at the root of sociality? Fear, Hegel appears to say, 
makes a positive contribution to social meaning. But this, I 
argue, is consequent upon a 'tragic' notion of selfhood. Instead of 
Man is not a Being that is in an eternal identity to itseH in Space, but a 
Nothingness that nihllates as Time in spatial Being, through the negation of this 
Being·. p. 48. 
DID HEGEL GET IT RIGHT? 
97 
Ch.3 THE PARABLE OF THE PARADIGM SHIFT 
this, we require a para~igm shift to a communicative and 
cooperation based sociality. 6 
3. B. DOES FEAR DETERMINE SOCIALITY? 
The sense of human fear which gives this parable that accent 
of humanity is the stamp of Hegel's genius. It can be read as any 
tragic drama in which events perpetuate the disastrous trauma. 
The reminder of "absolute negation" which the Phenomenology 
never tires of presenting, contains the basic ingredient of 
tragedy - inevitability. But it is not only the death that kills 
outright that is the main cause of fear in §§ 166 - 198; "for this 
univer~al flux has its negative nature only in being the 
supersession of them" (169). The realism of the scene in Hegel 
is potentially much more varied in its devices. From the force 
that makes the self into a thing through fear there proceeds 
another force, and much more portentous, that which determines 
life while the self is still fearful - the fear of meaninglessness. 
Given that the 'I' is in search of "The Truth of Self-Certainty" -
as Hegel says, "[S]elf-consciousness is Desire" (174), this 
undefinable influence of fear is exercised by those with enough 
self-certainty to exert themselves explicitly; "in an objective 
manner" ( 1 7 4 ). It is not exercised by those whom the 
satisfaction of desire could deprive them of life but only by 
those who take fear seriously enough to dare to express a desire: 
"A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so 
6 J. Sensatcaptures the significance of this in political terms. He argues that 
Habermas' critique of Marx rests on the latter's Hegelian influenced failure to 
recognize socialization not conflict in the process of social evolution. J. Sensat 
(1979) Ch. 4. 
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is it in fact self-consciousness ... the object of Desire- (177). At 
least some will have experience of desire and step out -into the 
spiritual daylight of the present- (ibid.). But the implication is 
that there are others, more miserable selves, who without the 
fear of meaningless and not attaining self-satisfaction have 
become things for the rest of their lives. 
It is significant that the word 'meaning' [Bedeutung] 
(translated both as significance and meaning in A.V. Miller's 
edition), occurs thirteen times in §§ 166 - 230, as a noun. The 
past-participle 'recognized' [anerkannt] occurs four times and is 
interpreted by A.V. Miller as 'being acknowledged' and being 
recognized (§§ 178 & 185). Other verbal forms appear thirteen 
times. In the main, the fear of meaninglessness is expressed as 
the need for recognition and there are four different uses of the 
word 'meaning' [Bedeutung] in relation to the idea of recognition: 
meaning in relation to opposition [entgegengesetzen Bedeutung] 
(§ 178); meaning that is dual [doppelte Bedeutung] (§§ 178, 
182); meaning that is required or demanded [geforderte 
Bedeutung] (§ 188); and positive meaning, [positive Bedeutung] 
(§ 196). Hagel seems to think that it is the need for meaning and 
recognition that gives opposition its basis in relational theory. 
We see this again in the connexion between the third and fourth 
uses of the word 'meaning' identifiable in §§ 166 - 230 - namely, 
required or demanded meaning [geforderte Bedeutung] (§ 188) 
and positive meaning [positive Bedeutung] (§ 196). -[N]egativity 
is not negativity per se, and therefore is formative activity-
(ibid.). Death and the fear of meaninglessness have become 
existential values. 
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But is Hegel only arguing against himself here? § 196 speaks 
of the formative and positive significance of the self's own 
negativity of fear; "the negative significance of fear", suggesting 
that death and negativity exist in a creative union with free 
self-consciousness. Only when we appreciate the dialogical 
character of Hegel's style do we realize that his thought is self-
polemic. As G. Steiner writes: "Hegel, and this is rare, was able 
to think against himself". 7 Because the prospect of death 
casts a shadow of fear in these passages, perhaps it is only that 
Hegel values human relation and regrets the limits that fear 
imposes. 
This dialogical character of his thought raises the important 
point that we must identify what, if anything, is of constructive 
value in Hegel's theory of fear. In what sense can fear be thought 
of as a formative activity in overcoming the threat of 
meaninglessness? Mary Daly's paradigmatic account of the 
"enspiriting process" or recreation of the female self is 
patterned on Hegelian imagery: 
To the degree that the Female Self has been possessed by the spirit of 
patriarchy, she has been slowly expiring ... lacking independent vigour 
and forcefulness. . .. As she creates new her Self she creates new space .... 8 
Daly uses Hegel's test of the control and use of fear not only of 
what fear does to people but what fear does for them, 
implying that women need to interiorize a mastery of fear in 
order to become oneself. Jose Miranda who was perhaps one of 
the most influential early liberation theologians wrote in 1971; 
dialectical thought does grasp the contradiction ... this is because dialectical 
7 G. Steiner (1984) p. 20. 
8 M. Daly (1979) p. 340. 
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thought believes in hope ... Man is an abstraction if he does not signify suffering. 
working struggling mankind. Such is the subject. but such too is the object of 
knowing". 9 
The message is that the oppressed need Hegelian and Marxist 
dialectics as a defence against those who would exploit them. 
Both Oaly and Miranda are struggling to maintain a control of 
fear appropriate to a responsible agent. 
Oaly and Miranda would have us acknowledge - and I agree -
that the control and use of fear is necessary if any individual is 
to be the maker of his or her own life. In this Hegel highlights a 
real and intrinsic connection between fear and the very heart of 
self-understanding and psychology. 10 Liberation theologians 
have spoken of "the awakening of consciousness", arguing that 
fear-mastery is integral to self-understanding and relation. 1 1 
As Oaly and Miranda are aware, the parable can be used to 
empower the fearful to improve their chances of survival by 
creating new expectations of life. On the other hand, what are 
the consequences of this parable of fear-mastery becoming a 
basis for an under_standing of selfhood which allows no 
possibility for relation other than that motivated by fear? Far 
from offering a release from the fear of death as the problem 
par excellence of selfhood, if the fear of death is natural as 
Hegel suggests, the necessity of fear-mastery and the ideals of 
responsibility and self-identity must be sustained. "Life 
9 J. P. Miranda (1977) pp .. 271 & 273. 
10 Donald Evans (1980) makes a psychological study into how the conflicting 
tendencies of trust and fear lead one both to affirm and to deny life. He argues 
that struggle and fulfilment are the main constituents of selfhood. 
11 E.g., J. Miguez Bonino (1983) pp. 103 - 6. 
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consists ... in the self-developing whole which dissolves its 
development and in this movement simply preserves itself" 
(171). If fear is taken as one's teacher it is possible to become 
its master, but the necessity of the lesson is terrible. 
Hegel is not blind to this. He uses the idea of fear-mastery to 
show what cannot be attained by its values of self-realization 
as much as its value for inspiration: "What still lies ahead for 
consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute 
substance which is the unity of the different independent self-
consciousnesses .. , "(177). He knows that fear-mastery alone is 
insufficient to attain the higher, rational element in the self. 
Yet the real subject of §§ 166 - 230 is fear. Not only is death 
deeply embedded in authentic selfhood for Hegel, but the fear of 
death and meaninglessness is what makes human selfhood 
authentically real: "If it has not experienced absolute fear but 
only some lesser dread, the negative being has remained for it 
something external, its substance has not been affected by it 
through and through" (§ 198). Not only is the self subject to the 
fear of death but here the truth of selfhood is found. 
Hegel uses an almost Homeric style in recounting the parable, 
showing the misfortune of human consciousness not as a goal for 
which to strive, but to be recalled and respected as a judgement. 
12 S. Weil's -essay "The 'Iliad', Poem of Might" recapitulates the 
vicious circle of war in Homer's epic in a way that shows Hegel's 
parable to shadow its dramatic unfolding: "The thought of death 
12 Similar points are made by J. Shklar (1976) pp. 57 - 68. "The battle of 
heroic competition cannot be anything less than mortal combat. Hector and 
Achilles never consider anything else-. p. 59. 
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cannot be sustained ... death itself is their [warriors] future-. 1 3 
Like Hegel, she illustrates how sensations of fear, threat, 
reification and the undefinable influences of human presence on 
the self overlap. George Steiner's Real Presences situates 
Hegel's dialectic of meaninglessness amidst poets and 
philosophers of the modern era for whom heroic but doomed 
action becomes almost obsessive: -The enigma of nothingness 
haunts the inception of cosmological and philosophical thought in 
the Western tradition- 14 Steiner sees Hegel as expressing the 
kind of meaningles~~at arises when the self is driven by some 
ill-understood desire for self-assurance which dare not 
surrender to itself or the enemy. 
So, we simply cannot negotiate the fragility of the 'I' or the 
compulsion to self-preservation which roots our fear. He makes 
plain the formative function of fear in the development of the 
self: -In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is 
as essential to it as pure self-consciousness- (§ 189). Similar 
to a tragic drama in which events move to a fatal, inevitable 
conclusion, Hegel's parable is an expression of human misfortune 
par excellence. -The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided 
and unequal- (191). 15 Like tragic drama it has a purging effect 
13 S. Weil, -The 'Iliad' or the Poem of Force-, (1986)pp. 182-215. 
14 G. Steiner (1989) p. 133. Leibniz, Pascal, Heidegger, Sartre and Derrida 
are but a few whom Steiner mentions in connection with the Hegelian influenced 
idea of the 'death of God'. -The break with the postulate of the sacred is the break 
with any stable, potentially ascertainable meaning of meaning-. p. 132. 
15 Sartre's comment is apt: 
What the gambler apprehends at this instant is again the pennanent rupture in 
determinism; it is nothingness which separates him from himself. ... I must 
rediscover the fear of financial ruin or of disappointing my family, etc., 
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in which reading the parable prevents us from becoming 
overcharged with tragic emotion at the foregone conclusion 
almost without hope that both master and slave cry for 
deliverance. Every facet teaches the uncertainty of human 
nature. The progress of relation is no more than the play of fear 
and desire. 16 
Hegel's urge to characterize selfhood by the desire for self-
satisfaction is linked with the fear of contingency. In §§ 166 -
230 the noun contingency [Zufalligkeit] occurs four times and 
the adjective [zufallig] twice, notably, all within § 205. The 
word is used consistently throughout the Phenomenology, 
adjectival forms occurring eighty-one times and the adverb 
[zufalligerweise] six times. The noun [Zufa lIigke it] occurs 
forty-eight times in the whole text, the idea of contingency 
providing Hegel with different threats from those discussed 
previously. Broadly speaking, it takes two forms. The first is 
described most clearly in Ch. 5, part A, §§ 231 - 346 where he 
speaks about the cause and effect structure of the natural order 
where the confusions and caprice of immediate natural existence 
determine the limits of experience. 17 Organic nature has no 
I must re-create it as experienced fear. 
J.P. Sartre (1958) p. 33. On the rapprochment between Hegel and Sartre see R.C. 
Solomon (1987) From Hegel to Existentialism. "Hegel and existentialism form a 
natural dialectic, whose vicissitudes have come to define not only continental 
philosophy but much of life in both Europe and America. (p. ix). 
16 Julia Kristeva speaks of negativity as the "death drive" in her reflections on 
desire; "he who loves a reflection without knowing that it is his own does not, in 
fact, know who he is". (1987) p. 107. This is a description ot Narcissus but the 
relation between fear and desire in that myth parallels many concerns of the 
parable. 
17 See §§ 245; 257; 275; 295. Also the Preface § 10 where the contingency of 
DOES FEAR DETERMINE SOClAUTY? 
104 
Ch. 3 THE PARABLE OF THE PARADIGM SHIFT 
history, he says (§ 295), each part being ruled with the 
contingency of nature's uncertainty. There is no guiding 
principle in the natural order, immediate facts independent and 
unrelated; "the freedom of Nature ... irrationally playing up and 
down the scale of contingent magnitude" (§ 275). 
The second is a distinguishable but related sense of the word 
'contingency' used in the context of the argument against 
Stoicism and Scepticism. 18 The theme of fear is continued as 
a factor in discussing Stoic and Skeptic expressions of the 
freedom of selfhood in §§ 197 - 206 where Stoic apathy, he 
says, is not far removed from the strain of thought that teaches 
the utter contingency [vo/ligen Zufii/ligkeit] of human selfhood; 
"in its own self infinite" (§ 202). Contingency, in this second 
sense, is the singleness and separation of individual self 
consciousness in the flux or "confused medley" (205) of 
innumerable other selves: 
This consciousness ... passes back and forth from from the one extreme of 
self-identical self-consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent 
consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering (205). 
His discussion of Stoicism and Scepticism is neither clear nor 
detailed but the general aim of the former is easing "universal 
fear and bondage" (§ 199), by conceiving the world order as 
basically harmonious. The latter is seen by Hegel as an 
extension of Stoic apathy-: "Scepticism is the realization of 
that of which Stoicism was only the Notion" (§ 202). Its primary 
the natural order is again likened to caprice. 
18 R. Solomon (1983) says Hagel refers to the late Stoicism of Seneca, Epictetus 
and Marcus Aurelius not that from Zeno to Chrysippus, 3rd. C S.C. (pp. 457 -
461). 
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characteristic is what he calls "self-conscious negation" (§ 
204), the denial that self-consciousness contains any permanent 
truth. Selfhood rests in the self's being a single and separate 
self-consciousnesses for whom there is no ultimate truth. 
The question of individual truth vis-a-vis ultimate truth is 
important here because it relates to what Erich Kahler calls the 
the 'splitting of consciousness' or the 'I' expressed in terms of 
the "'I' that is We". 19 This fear of contingency is not only 
negative for Hegel because it requires that the self be able to 
develop from an immediate, static or non-relational state to the 
maturity of what Hegel calls the "'I' that is We.". Michael Forster 
claims: "Hegel's critical interpretation of the skeptical tradition 
in philosophy proves, then, to be the key ... to unlock the whole of 
his epistemological enterprise". But compare Forster's account 
of Hegel's subsuming Stoic and Sceptic fear of contingency 
within dialectical method; "a proof of Philosophical Science for 
all nonscientific viewpoints", with David Lamb's presentation of 
Hegel's absolute as relative to both . 20 Forster names Hegel the 
anti-skeptic with a series of defenses against both ancient and 
modern schools. D. Lamb believes that Hegel's dialectical method 
embraced a total scepticism: "The method employed must be 
sceptical, and the critique must be used unsparingly against 
itself", 21 destroying any basis for foundational certainty by 
19 Erich Kahler (1989. originally published 1957) describes psychological and 
social effects of the ·second consciousness· or splitting of the ego drawing on 
psychological studies of pain. Ch. 4. The republication of his book reflects its 
curiously up-to-date diagnosis of the pervasive malaise of human consciousness. 
20 M.N. Forster (1989) p. 172. 
21 M.N. Forster (1989) p. 4. See Ch.s 7 & 8 on Hegel's defences against 
Skepticism. D. Lamb (1980) p. 24. 
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accepting the ultimate partiality of truth. 22 
Forster and Lamb's differing perspectives on the quest for 
self-certainty vis-a-vis the contingency of selfhood illustrate 
the tension inherent in the text. On the one hand, the freedom of 
consciousness can be managed only, Hegel says, by those for 
whom self-certainty is an uncompromising demand or "required 
meaning" [geforderte Bedeutung] (§ 188). This demand of free 
self-consciousness is a simple truth of freedom: "The individual 
who has not risked his life ... has not attained to the truth of this 
recognition as an independent self consciousness" (§ 187). On 
the other hand, if such independent self consciousness is of the 
stoic or sceptic kind, it is never wholly aware of the truth 
because of isolation and singularity. 
In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. 
In Scepticism, this freedom becomes a reality, negates the other side 
of determinate existence, but really duplicates itself, and now knows itself 
to be a duality (§ 206). 
He condemns the "simple freedom" of consciousness which 
develops centrifugally only to enjoy its own 'I'ness, recalling the 
statement in § 184 that not only does the self develop centri-
fugally from its own centre in response to inbred desires but 
also centripetally in recognition of another: "They recognize 
themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (184). "For 
itself" he says, free self-consciousness remains pitiable, 
hinting that to cope with contingency is a social process that 
involves recognition of a 'universal will' (§ 230). 23 
22 D. Lamb (1980) pp. 34 - 39; -From Explanation to Description: Hegel-. 
23 Hegel's idea of 'universal will' is very different from Rousseau's notion of the 
social contract in which each individual is alienated with all his/her rights to the 
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So, did Hegel's parable get it right? Yes, it would appear, at 
least insofar as these fears are part of the permanent and 
enduring existence of the self and human relation. He offers, as 
Lamb suggests, a presuppositionless presentation of the shapes 
of consciousness. 24 But is this the whole story? Hegel's 
depiction of free self-consciousness lived out over an abyss of 
fear ignores the crucial question of whether contingency, fear 
and meaninglessness have been given an entirely unacceptable 
slant. My main point lies in the implication of Hegel's words -
not that these passages describe the uncertainties of 
consciousness, rather, they imply that because of possible 
results, fear and death are positive, not negative. Fear is made 
the criterion of relation not relation the criterion of fear. 25 
The crux for the contemporary reader must surely be whether 
Hegel shows that it is the case that death is inseparably joined 
with life or whether he describes what happens when free 
self-consciousness is desired above all else. 
universal will. On Hegel's reaction against Rousseau's idea of weakness making a 
person social see J. Hyppolite (1974) pp. 11 1. On Hegel's unfairness to Rousseau 
in failing to recognize that he wanted a more integral, universal idea of reason than 
arbitrarily bringing individuals into agreement see C. Taylor (1979) pp. 406 -
414. On Rousseau's lack of belief in progress as a major point of contrast with 
Hegel see Hilail Gildin "Revolution and the Formation of Political Society in the 
Social Contract" Interpretation Vol. 5, issue 3, pp. 247 - 265. 
24 D. Lamb (1980) p. 37. 
25 Cf. Hegel's treatment of death in "The Revealed Religion" where, by being 
raised to the level of "natural universality", the death of "the divine Man" is 
almost said not to be the enemy of life: 
The death of the divine Man, as death, is abstract negativity, ... This self-
consciousness therefore does not actually die, ... but its particularity dies away 
in its universality, i.e., in its knowledge, which is essential Being. (784). 
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3. C. A PARADIGM SHIFT? 
'Paradigm shift' is the phrase used by Habermas for the 
conversion from purposive activity to communicative action. 26 
He speaks of individual subjectivity being liberated to give 
content to its social dimensions: "Subjectivity frees itself here 
from the conventions of daily perception and of purposive 
activity, from the imperatives of work and of what is merely 
useful". 27 Significantly, he views the task of a critical social 
theory as getting beyond the limitations of egocentric modern 
philosophy: "The theory of communicative action is meant to 
provide an alternative to the philosophy of history on which 
earlier critical theory still relied, but which is no longer 
tenable". 28 Of interest here is how this opens up discourse 
between Christian and non-Christian social theory. R. Siebert 
suggests that Habermas allows new discussion of the ' disunion 
and reunion of the religious and the secular; he "is able to help 
political theology's search for a new co-incidence of the 
religious and the secular". 29 Habermas is willing, Siebert 
argues, to break with the Hegelian conjunction between religion 
and subjection. He quotes his invitation to political theologians 
to collaboration on the spiritual situation of our age. 30 
26 J. Habermas (1987b) Ch. V "The Paradigm Shift in Mead and Durkheim: From 
Purposive Activity to Communicative Action". 
27 J. Habermas (1987 b)p. 379. 
28 J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 397. 
29 R. Siebert (1985) see pp. 473 - 483. 
3.0 This refers to Habermas's editing Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of 
the Age- (1984) to which D. SOlle, ,J.B. Metz and J. Moltmann contributed. This 
is not to forget the purely human content of Habermas's.work:"My experiences 
have transcendental necessity only under the factual condition of successes and 
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Like Hegel, Habermas projects an ideal of mutual 
understanding and intersubjectivity framed within an interest-
determined interaction: "The human interest in autonomy and 
responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a 
priori". 31 Unlike Hegel, he claims to address the fundamental 
problem of socio-philosophy - the relation between instrumental 
and communicative reason - not bound to the perspective of the 
subject. 32 In particular, he reflects on what elements of 
contemporary socio-philosophy that are influenced by Hegel can 
be accepted or rejected by a communicative rationality. As I 
have said, his rejection of Hegel's 'I' - 'We' framework of thought 
is most important. His suggestion is that is is necessary to 
break this unhelpful mould by providing a new and primary 
context for debate. This he terms the 'life-world' [Lebenswelt]. 
He means by it the totality of cultural, systemic, symbolic and 
material structures of society. It is a conceptual notion that has 
a mediating function whereby the 'I' and the 'We' are related. He 
says; -Ill introduced the system concept of society by way of a 
methodological objectification of the lifeworld ... in a:ction-
theoretic terms". 33 Significantly, it is this concept of the 
lifeworld which gives expression to his idea of 'the social', the 
former having an analytic function obtained by abstraction 
through his theory of communicative value. 
failures of possible Instrumental actions·. J. Habermas (1972) p. 129. 
31 J. Habermas (1972) p. 314. For an evolution of Habermas's thought between 
1972 - 1989 see A. Honneth & H. Joas (1988) pp. 151 - 167. Presupposed 
human interests remain of decisive importance. 
32 ·Socialactions can be distinguished according to whether the participants 
adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to reaching understanding· 
J. Habermas (1987 a) p. 286. 
33 J. Habermas (1987b) p. 374. 
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The problem as I see it is whether it is possible to break out 
of Hegel's domestication of fear into mutual recognition. In R.C. 
Solomon's words: "The question is still personal identity and 
survival". 34 The question is whether it "ultimately involves a 
kind of weakening, homogenization, or flattening of any "vital" 
self". 35 Is the accommodation of self-determination; the ego 
"as self-deflating as self-inflating", 36 the only way to 
facilitate the social dependence and interdependence of 
individuals? In order to address these questions I compare 
Habermas's communicative and cooperation based sociality with 
R.B. Pippin's reappropriation of Hegelian subjective logic. Pippin 
challenges the need for and plausibility of Habermas's paradigm 
shift, and would have us make a fresh attempt to realize the 
Hegelian project; "the PhG and the Logic might provide us with 
a "logical framework", he suggests, "within which some domain 
of spirit might be investigated". 37 According to Pippin, it 
remains incumbent on postmodernity to realize Hegel's project 
regarding the social nature of self-consciousness: Hegel 
"provokes again the "groundless" search for reconciliation with 
other self-conscious agents". 38 Current postmodern problems 
in attaining a social understanding of consciousness rest in the 
failure, he says, adequately to account for the individual project 
of self-determination. Hence, the need to relearn from Hegel 
34 R.C. Solomon (1980) p.239. 
35 R.B. Pippin (1991) p. 112. 
36 Pippin (1991) p. 165. 
37 R.B. Pippin (1989) p. 259. Ludwig Siep (Inquiry, 34. pp. 63 - 76) says 
Pippin 'transcendentalizes' Hagel's conceptual scheme, unjustifiably interpreting 
Hegel's notion of consciousness with reference to an extra-conceptual reality. 
38 Pippin (1991) p. 167. By ·groundless· Pippin means without reference to 
Christian metaphysics or even Platonic themes. (pp. 22 f.) 
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what he calls the German idea of self-determination or self-
grounding. 39 Anything else, he suggests, is a final co-opting of 
the autonomous subject. 
Pippin describes the causes of fear recounted by Hegel in 
words similar to those of Habermas; "in Hegel's account of what 
he calls ·negativity," the dissatisfactions responsible for 
historical change, ... stem from an original failure of self-
consciousness·. 40 Yet he steers well clear of Habermas's 
rethinking sociality, contesting its hopes for a socially 
integrating appeal to reason in public life. My unease relates to 
his retaining the idea of self-determination as central to Hegel 
and the whole modern project, assuming the Hegelian ethos of 
the 'I' in search of freedom from the fear of reification, death 
and bondage; "the unavoidable role of a spontaneous self-
determination". 41 Pippin refers in passing to ideas of the ideal 
speech situation and other forms of "practical wisdom" as 
possible reconstructions of Hegelian intent. He wants the 
radical shift that Habermas thinks to be possible; "the 
progressive elimination of bases of recognition linked to the 
mere exercise of power". 42 But Habermas's limitation, he says, 
is not being Hegetian enough to understand that the unavoidable 
role of self-determination can be countered only by a framework 
of reasoned constraints. 43 
39 Pippin (1991) pp. 14.; 110. 
40 Pippin (1991) p. 71. 
41 Pippin (1991) p. 165. 
42 Pippin (1991) pp. 147; 164. 
43 Pippin (1989), pp.6; 39; 103; 120. Robert, B. Pippin (1989) pp.154; 
170; 184. -Habermas is not anything like -Hegelian- enough- he says, p.197. 
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For Pippin, individual identity remains determined by the need 
to escape from fear and uncertainty through self-determination. 
This is clear in his interpretation of the relation between Hegel 
and Nietzsche where he thinks the dispute turns on whether 
~t rejects or realizes an order of relation in which each can be "an 
individual self" with an identity gained in relation with others. 
The question is whether Pippin's critique is moulded by the 
illegitimate presuppositions of Hegel's treatment of the control 
and use of fear. If so, it will remain caught, for the reasons 
already shown, in the dualism between talking of 'the social' 
irA 
either- terms of the functions of · collected individuals or as a 
single entity. 
I have argued that the heart of Habermas's critical theory is 
the criticism of this 'I' versus 'We' dichotomy. R. Geuss makes 
the same point, distinguishing the Frankfurt School tradition of 
Ideologiekritik from Hegelian influenced scientific theory. He 
suggests three reasons as to why this is significant: 1. Its aim is 
emancipatory not instrumental knowledge. 2. It has no theory I 
object divide because it is always part of the object domain it 
describes. 3. It evaluates and anticipates social conditions 
beyond the provision of empirical evidence. 44 This is not to 
suggest that Haberf!las's own enterprise is not about the meeting 
of individual needs and interests. To the contrary, in Knowledge 
and Human Interests, Habermas's distinction between technical, 
This is argued in -Hegel, Habermas and Modernism-, Monist, 1990. Ct. Hegel's 
singular individual seeking the -tranquil unity certain of its [own] truth- (§ 
237) in relation to the plurality of others. J. B. Thompson (1990) also prefers 
a regulated pluralism to Habermas's public opinion formation because of the 
concentration of power in transnational media conglomerates. 
44 R. ~ss (1981) pp. 79 - 80. 
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practical and emancipatory interests stressed that the type of 
critical theory necessary to bring about their contextualization 
within a mutual responsibility for society. 45 Similarly, it is 
not to deny any social possibilities contained within the 
Phenomenology. G. Steiner writes: -The self-realization of 
'spirit' (Geist) in Hegel's Phenomenology is an Odyssey of 
consciousness ... made in and through speech·. 46 This is 
significant given Habermas's linguistically oriented social 
theory, suggesting that Habermas might follow at least the 
intent of Hegel's ·Odyssey of consciousness·. It is to suggest 
that by reconceptualizing Hegel's individually instrumental 
framework for social theory with a communication based 
concept of action and reason, he makes the type of paradigm 
shift required when talking about critical and integrative social 
theory. 
In view of Habermas's intentions to set social actions and 
intents within the cooperative interrelations of society's 
members, it would obviously be mistaken to represent Th e 
Theory of Communicative Action as anything more than a 
contribution to the on going debate about specific problems in 
social theory. However, in allowing his concerns to stand 
alongside and influence our concerns of how to speak of 
salvation in a social context, we are engaged in a particular type 
of dialogical practice that stresses the importance of learning 
and expressing theological truths, at least in part, through the 
language of socio-philosophy. 
45 J. Habermas (1972) pp. 307 f. 
46 G. Steiner (1989) p. 91. 
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This type of dialogical practice enables us, I suggest, to 
consider Habermas's paradigm shift as a type of parable for 
Christian social theory. The word parable (Gr. para = over + 
ballein = to throw) suggests the harnessing of independent, 
accepted truths from known fields of knowledge to illustrate 
truths of God's nature and action. Parabolic language is a 
second-order discourse that makes God's saving act in Christ the 
condition for positing analogies wherever possible with non-
Christian social theory. It is not surprising perhaps that the 
theology of liberation has drawn frequently on the parables of 
Jesus which, says Christopher Rowland, ·were an invitation to 
change things according to God's justice and goodness·. 47 
There is, of course, ~ quantum leap between what Habermas 
means by societal community and Christian talk of the Holy 
Spirit and community. No amount of analogical reasoning will 
bridge the gap which says that all human action is .provisional 
before the coming again of Jesus Christ. But with properly 
derived analogical tools we have an interface for dialogue in 
which political and social values are more adequately assessed. 
Three reasons can be suggested as to why a critical reading of 
Habermas can serve parabolically to illuminate and give content 
to the idea and practice of sociality. They are as follows: -
1. The first reason why Habermas's communicative action theory 
is like a parable is that the heart of what he is doing is about 
communication and relation. This accords with the nature of the 
human self created in the image of the God who is community and 
relation par excellence. 
47 C. Rowlandand M. Corner (1990) "Parables of Today" p. 9. 
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2. The second reason is that he subordinates the logic of self-
determination to that of communicative action. He subordinates 
the logic of self-determination to that of communicative action. 
This means that he addresses squarely problems inherent in the 
Hegelian heritage regarding the concept of rationality, critical 
theory and their embodiment in social interaction. By looking for 
concepts of rationality that are more comprehensive than Hegel's 
fear determined notion of Verstand, he replaces the central 
concept of self-reflection with the social dynamics of these 
processes. This gives some practical content to 1. 
Taking as our guideline the idea of a "linguistification" [Versprachlichung] of 
this ritually secured, basic normative agreement, ... This concept takes us 
beyond ... purposive activity and purposive rationality. 48 
Self-determining or strategic action is said to presuppose a 
primary mode of communicative action. Convinced of the need 
for a paradigm shift from the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy of 
consciousness, he has exposed the whole ambit of the modern 
turn to the subject to critical analysis: 
The paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm 
of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action.49 
The values of self-determinative purposive action are made 
logically to depend on conditions of linguistic interaction. 
Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in 
which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the 
social and the subjective worlds. 50 
48 J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 2. 
49 J. Habermas (1987c) "Communicative versus Subject-centred Reason", Ch. 
XI, p. 295-6. For Habermas's summary of the links between Kant and Hegel's 
philosophy of consciousness in relation to his own theory of communicative action 
see "The Tasks of a Critical Theory" (1987 b) pp. 374-403; (1988) p. xiv. 
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He wants to break with the primacy of epistemology and treat 
questions of communicative action and mutual understanding 
independently of Kantian and Hegelian presuppositions about the 
singular nature of the 'I'. 
3. The third reason why Habermas's communicative action theory 
is like a parable for a more adequate notion of sociality is that 
he goes some way to overcoming the 'I' - 'We' divide that plagues 
Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness. How? Through the 
analyzing of the functions of communicative acts. Consider the 
following illustrations (Fig.s 1 & 2) which represent '· his 
understanding of the relations of communicative acts. They are 
centred around the act of communication. In any act of 
communication there are individual actors and the act of 
communication. Communication happens largely through 
language but many factors influence that depending on the 
"Iifeworld" of which the actors are part. By lifeworld he means 
all those assumed background norms of geography, history, moral 
standards, art heritage etc. that provide the general context for 
thinking about society; all those taken for granted things which 
individuals mayor may not hold in common. 
50 J. Habermas (1987 b) p. 120. Habermas's (1979) Communication and the 
Evolution of Society introduces the shift to communicative action. For a critical 
account of Hegel's failure to replace models of instrumental reason with inter-
subjective rationality, remaining within the framework of subject-object 
relations see G. Wagner & H. Zipprian Inquiry, 34, March 1991 pp. 49 - 62. 
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RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS 
Fig. 1 
LIFEWORlD 
LANGUAGE 
(A 1) ....-( - ~1(A2) 
A = ACTOR 
COMMUNICA liON 
CA 1 ---~) CA2 ( 
CA = COMMUNICATIYE ACTIO. 
The following, (Fig. 2) is a fuller representation of the same 
illustration and is based on Habermas's own representation of 
the World-Relations of Communicative Acts in The Theory of 
Communicative Action Vol. 2. 51 
51 J. Habermas (1987b) p. 127. 
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RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTS 
Fig. 2 
SUBJECTIVE 
WORLD 
(A 1) 
LIFEWORLD 
LANGUAGE (A 1) ( (A2) 
-......&) . UBJECTIVE 
COMMUNICATION (A2) 
CA1(-------~)CA2~--~ 
OBJ CTIVE 
WORLD 
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(A 1 + A2) 
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The impact of Fig . 2 is that of action and movement and one 
can see that what is happening is a resolution of the aforesaid 
dualism in the activity of communication. Note how the 
subjective worlds are here belonging to each individual; so we 
have the elements of individual responsibility. Also the 
objective world, retaining a limited sense in which society can 
be studied as something which exists for reflection. This is the 
work of the empirical sciences. Also the social world of public 
structures; local & national government, the media, the judiciary 
and police. The arrows represent the relations that 
communicating actors establish around the goal of critical 
communication . It is a dramatic model in which society is 
understood in terms of the dynamics of human relation. 
Habermas owes much here to the writings of Talcott Parsons, 
acknowledging that the questions with which Parsons starts are 
influential to his own work; "how is society possible as an 
ordered complex of action" . 52 The intention is to develop the 
type of conceptual strategy that allows societal mechanisms to 
connect up with intersubjectivity and critical consciousness. 
Here we have diagramatic illustrations of Habermas's 
conception of communicative integration that is possible and 
necessary in order to mediate the 'I - We' dichotomy that has 
plagued modern social theory . Individually interest-guided 
action is subordinated to the transcendental condition of action 
coordination. Habermas grounds his theory in the basic use of 
52 J . Habermas (1987b) p. 201. On this see A. Giddens (1978) p. 11 f. Also 
"Habermas on the Alleged "Priority" of Communicative Action over Strategic 
Considerations of Power" in A. Smith, Ethics and Politics in the Worlc of JOrgen 
Habermas, Interpretation, 11, 1983, pp. 333-351. 
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language and its orientation towards the communication of each 
\ persons narrative of events that take place in their lifeworld, 
and understanding. The 'subjective worlds' and the 'objective 
worlds' presuppose the original mode of communicative action. 
In the communicative practice of everyday life, persons do not only encounter 
one another in the attitude of participants; they also give narrative 
presentations of events that take place in the context of their lifeworld. 53 
He is replacing Hegel's philosophy of self-conscious reflection 
with a critique of mutual understanding, a subjective philosophy 
of individually instrumental reason with an intersubjective 
philosophy of communicatively functional reason. 
Thus, to recall the four 'moves' or stages of analogical 
theology specified in the Introduction, I am now showing 
something of the relation between the second and third of those 
stages - namely, the relation between the investigative task of 
Hegel interpretation and the making of specific contacts 
between Christian and contemporary non-Christian social theory. 
This is an interpretative exercise in unpacking a Christian idea 
of human sociality through dialogue with a specific example of 
non-Christian social theory. In making points of contact here I 
am not suggesting that salvation has more to do with human 
communication than communion with God. That would suggest a 
horizontal notion of salvation purely in social terms. I am 
suggesting that because of the human vocation to become like 
God who is communication and relation par excellence, we 
might well dialogue with those for whom communication is made 
the norm for how we understand society. 
53 J. Habermas ibid. p. 136. 
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3. D. QUESTIONS THAT ARISE 
The task is not easy and becomes all the more difficult as we 
realize the extent to which Habermas's theory is problematic in 
its own spheres of reference. It must be recognized that 
Habermas's work is not unproblematic and I consider reasons for 
this shortly. Habermas does, however, use linguistic analysis in 
shaping a critical theory that, I argue, convincingly breaks free 
of the constraints of the philosophy of consciousness stemming 
from Kant and Hegel. I am using the debate between Hegel and 
Habermas, however, to relearn an understanding of the social in 
order better to comprehend and articulate the social dimensions 
of God's salvation. As C. Boff writes: "Theology can construct 
its socio-analytic mediation only from the findings of a 
discipline whose conclusions are susceptible of articulation by 
and in a properly theological discourse". 54 
Following C. Boff, I am using non-theological vocabulary and 
expertise hermeneutically in order to engage in a critical, 
interpretative exercise of one of the best contemporary 
representations available for social relation. The thesis 
proposed is that Habermas's grounding an idea of the social in 
the function of communication is a parable of divine salvation if 
it can be shown to articulate a new quality of relation. In 
theological terms, the quality issue in relation means asking 
where salvation (L. salve~ to heal) is to be found for selfhood 
under the control of fear. Salvation as God's healing can be 
identified only to the "eyes of faith". If, however, substantial 
content is to be given to an articulation between Christian and 
54 C. 80ff (1987) p. 54. 
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non-Christian social theory then this type of dialogue is needed 
in order to provide the contact required. 
What we have here is the relation between 'first' and 'second' 
theology really being put to the test. 55 To recapitulate, 'first' 
theology corresponds to the confessional doctrines of God, 
creation, incarnation etc. 'Second' theology is an outworking of 
the content of these doctrines through socio-analytical 
mediation. In Boft's words, ·Second theology does not work 
upon the concept of salvation ... but works with that concept 
.. . Second theology has recourse to this concept to establish the 
relationship between its content and the reality of 
liberation· .56 The act of interpreting the impact of Habermas's 
relocating of Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness within 
contemporary analytical debate belongs supremely to our own 
time and concerns context specific issues. By this I mean that, 
for our purposes, what he says is said primarily of the particular 
hermeneutic process surrounding the ramifications of Hegelian 
discussion . But the advantage of considering analogical 
questions on the level of Habermas's socio-philosophic theory is 
the fact that his critical method is not caught in the 'I' - 'We' 
divide that plagues Hegel's notion of free self-consciousness. He 
aims at a resolution of the aforesaid dualism in the activity of 
communication. 
55 Socio-analysis and hermeneutics are the two principles specified by C. Boft as 
epistemological foundations for a theology of liberation. (1987). pp. 221 - 232. 
56 C. Boft (1987) p. 81 . Cf. K. Barth's Introduction to his Ethics: "The theme of 
dogmatics is simply the Word of God, but the theme of the Word of God is simply 
human existence. life or conduct-. God's salvation understood apart from the 
relation to our experience is. he says, not God but a mere concept of God. p.17. 
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We must be aware that the usefulness of Habermas's paradigm 
shift to help us articulate what God's salvation is like in socio-
philosophical terms is limited. He has been criticized for 
neglecting important aspects of human experience. Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith, for example, criticizes his ignoring the role of 
listeners. 57 Istvtm Meszaros condemns his dissolving "real 
speakers"; passionate and demanding individuals, into "competent 
speakers" who conform to definitional assumptions. 58 A 
further problem is his perhaps undue rejection of 'de-
constructionist' writers, at least in his early essays. Contrary 
to what Habermas indicates in the aforementioned article 
Modernity versus Postmodernity, 59 there is no blanket denial 
in 'postmodernity' of a social articulation of the individual need 
for identity. 60 R. Rorty's emphasiS on the public project of 
solidarity in Contingency, irony and solidarity is evidence of 
this. "What can there be" he asks, "except human solidarity, our 
recognition of one another's common humanity?" 61 
Charles Taylor finds Habermas' conception of the social too 
narrow. "The fact that the self is constituted through exchange 
in language ... doesn't in any way guarantee us against loss of 
meaning, fragmentation, the loss of substance in our human 
57 B. Herrnstein Smith in J. Fekete Ed. (1987) "Truth Without Truth Value-
pp. 16 - 21. 
58 Istvan Meszaros (1989) p. 33. -Habermas's 'pure communicative action' is 
a pure fiction- (ibid.). 
59 See n.5. 
60 I use 'postmodern' as an umbrella term for a reaching beyond modernity's 
love of unifying meta-discourses, rational determination of knowledge and belief 
in the theoretical truth of scientific and technological progress. 
61 R. Rorty (1989) p. 189. 
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environment and our affiliations". 62 In his search to explain 
the degree of moral consensus that is evident throughout 
modernity, Habermas's account of modern identity leaves Taylor 
unsatisfied with his functional emphases on language as a 
foundation for the social sciences. He has strong intuitions that 
the practice of communication and morality points to some other 
source supporting the norms to which Habermas appeals. 63 
For aesthetic reasons T. Eagleton warns against a demise of 
the idea of the social as something humanity might 'be'. 
Lamenting the loss of the aesthetic as a social force the 
implication in his work is that Habermas's purely functional 
critique is incomplete. "The idea of a human nature does not 
suggest that we should realize any capacity which is natural, but 
that the highest values we can realize spring from part of our 
nature ... "64 It cannot, he says, take account of what it is to 
'be' both individual and social: "What is it to 'be' a woman, a 
homosexual, a native of Ireland?" 65 Similarly, Richard Rorty 
distances himself from Habermas' locating of the social in the 
activity of communication for "poetic" reasons: "He (Habermas) 
thinks of his account of "communicative reason" as a way of 
updating rationalism. do not want to update either 
universalism or rationalism but to dissolve both and replace 
them with something else". 66 
62 C. Taylor (1989) pp. 509 - 510. 
Rhetoric, poetics and 
63 "The intention of this work was ... to make these sources again empower, to 
bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirir. Ibid., p. 
520. 
64 T. Eagleton (1990) p. 412. 
65 T. Eagleton (1990) p. 414. 
66 R. Rorty (1989) p. 67. 
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imagination are the primary elements of human society but none, 
he suggests, are accounted for by Habermas adequately. 
Taylor, Eagleton and Rorty make the point that relation and 
communication are inherently suggestive of the quality of 
human sociality rather than its mere presence or absence. Such 
qualitative usage connects us immediately to Habermas's 
perceived need to break free of the Hegelian self-determination 
of consciousness through fear: 
Hegel's experience of reflection shrinks to the consciousness that we are 
delivered over to a process, itself irrational, in which the conditions of 
rationality change with time and place .... 67 
The criticisms of C. Taylor, Eagleton and Rorty are pertinent but 
do not invalidate our question of whether Habermas's paradigm 
shift can function as a symbol or metaphor of divine salvation. 
To the contrary, they sharpen the issue. Framing a critique of 
Hegel and Habermas in these terms requires asking how faith -
to use C. Boff's word - clarifies 68 the quality issues of 
human relation. 
Hence, it is clear that merely representing the content of 
Habermas's shift towards a paradigm of communicative action 
provides no analogy of salvation unless it signifies something 
additional. The energy of symbol or parable depends, as I shall 
explore more fully, on the nature of analogy possible. In C. Boffs 
words: "Its (theology's) discourse is therefore not representative 
but significative. That is, it is shot through with the energy of 
67 J. Habermas (1988) p. 172. 
68 C. Boft (1987) p.130. 
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symbol, and must finally end in apophasis". 69 In other words, 
we can speak of human categories of relation and look through 
them to what is signified there of salvation in a social context. 
The thesis being developed is that the nature of the controversy 
surrounding the salvation in a social context debate demands 
that we have methodological tools with which to address the 
task. These tools, I suggest, might well take the form of 
analogical reasoning, helping us in dialogue with Habermas to 
articulate theologically what God's salvation is like in socio-
philosophical terms. 
3. E. DEVELOPING THE IDEA OF 'PARABLE' 
Let me summarize my considerations thus far. Hegel's is a 
brilliant portrayal of the psychology of fear. However, not only 
does he describe its painful realities but he implies that through 
the control and use of fear the promise of the Notion of Spirit 
is good and desirable: "What still lies ahead for consciousness is 
the experience of what Spirit is ... 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 
'I'" (177). The implication is that fear may be positive in a 
qualitative sense. This, I suggest, invites the reader to use fear 
and envy as motives in attaining free self-consciousness and, as 
Habermas is aware, restricts the Notion of Spirit or, what 
Hegel calls the potential for perfect freedom in the unity of 
independent consciousnesses (ibid.), to a philosophy of 
individual consciousness not sociality. In order to assess the 
possibility of giving primacy and content to sociality, criteria 
are required to assess its healing signification. 
69 C. Boft (1987) p. 55. 
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I have shown that there is ambiguity in the text and in its 
interpretations between fear and Hegel's promise that the 'I' has 
universal significance. 70 Interpreting §§ 166 - 230 with these 
questions in mind does, however, offer a coherent reading of the 
Phenomenology as a whole, and is, as far as I can see, 
compatible with the logic of Aufhebung which says that 
something is sublated only insofar as it enters into unity with 
its succeeding moment. This reading is confirmed by C. Taylor 
who directly refutes Hegel's claim that only by finding itself 
through fear can the self subsist again in itself. C. Taylor shows 
how moments of fear and death in the Phenomenology not only 
represent certain characteristics of consciousness but have an 
additional, and perhaps illegitimate, purpose: "The initial task is 
to show that the object in question is to be understood in terms 
of the realization of a goal". 71 Hegel, he says, forces 
consciousness at crucial points to conform to an ontological 
vision: "It is this longing for total integrity which for Hegel 
underlies the striving of self-consciousness" 72 
Beyond this, I have been engaged in a critical, interpretative 
exercise concerning the best medium that modernity offers for 
giving content to sociality. In particular, I am asking about the 
critical sensibilities required to escape Hegel's language of 
separation and self-determination. 73 Theologically this is 
70 As S. Smith writes; "lesser and more inadequate forms of life are both 
annulled and preserved in the higher ones". (1989)Ch. 6, "Hegel'sldea of a 
Critical Theory". p. 190. Ct. "To sub/ate [aufheben] has a twofold meaning in 
the language: •.. it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to 
cause to cease, to put an end to". S.L. p. 107. 
71 C. Taylor (1975) p. 218. 
72 C. Taylor (1975) pp. 148 f. 
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important if Christian social theory is to be both analytic and 
hermeneutic; - both assessing Hegel's dangerous disruption or 
splitting of the self from within, and positing of the 'I' vis-a-
vis the 'We', 74 and interpreting new socio-analytic 
mediations of sociality. Hegel's idea of the "'I' that is We" 
marks, as we have seen, a susceptibility in thinking about the 
self that allows opposition and fear to characterize selfhood. 
Fear makes a 'thing' of the self as the 'I' stands over against the 
'We'. 75 The task is really to think clearly about the possibility 
of critical social theory as moving from an objectifying to a 
relative, integrative critical theory. 
73 Julia Kristeva shows the Hegelian language of separation and struggling 
towards identity as the primary opportunity for narcissim. (1980) pp. 254 f. 
74 Erich Kahler (1989) makes this point. pp. 90 f. Also R.D. Laing (1965) re: 
the threat of engulfment of the 'I' by the 'We', and consequent fears of implosion, 
de-personalization and petrification. pp. 45 f. 
75 J. Habermas (1987 b) says reification is a pathological principle of sociation 
where the 'We' systems of government, media etc. impose preconceived ideas and 
categories on historical events. pp. 343; 375. G. Lukacs elevated the concept of 
reiflCation to a central category in Marxist theory through a transmuted Hegelian 
standpoint on the spliHing apart of universal and particular, subject and object 
etc. See Lukacs's famous essay "'Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat- in his (1932) Geschichte und Klassenbewusstein. Previous to this, 
in 1892 Karl Kautsky expressed the objectifying effect of the link between 
commodity and capital as the worker's -transformation into property less 
proletarians- (1971) p. 15. For a recent argument that reification is still the 
structuring prinCiple of the capitalist mode of production, leaving social life riven 
by antinomies, see P. Brown (1990). 
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4. A. DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR DIALOGUE 
Reason cannot reach up to simple form, se as to know what it (know/edge of 
God's salvation) is; but it can know whether it exists or not. 1 
These words of Aquinas express a desire for knowledge of 
God's salvation. Reasoned discourse, he suggests, can say how 
salvation is but requires the eyes of faith for its theological 
content to be perceived. Having sketched the controversy 
surrounding the salvation in a social context debate, this Chapter 
pursues the analogical discourse with philosophy, or in my case 
socio-philosophy. I suggest methodological tools derived from 
Aquinas and C. Boff with which to address the task and two 
things become clear. First, no principle of analogy offers a 
determinate pattern or condition for articulating God's salvation; 
it is not directly derivative of the truth of revelation. 2 
Second, any attempt to speak of salvation in a social context 
relies on its being knowable and perceivable. We can, Aquinas 
says, "know whether it exists or not". 
But how can we know? What is this knowledge of healing and 
liberation this signifies salvation? The rationale pervading 
Chapter 3 was that the light of the knowledge of God illumines 
social forms of communicative action and the healing of the 'I -
1 T. Aquinas s. rh. 1, Q. 13, art. 12. 
2 D. Nicholls Deity and Domination (1989) surveys 19th & 20th century 
images of God implied analogically in political ideas of freedom, conflict and 
consent. He notes possible perversions in the principle of analogy. reminding us 
of National Socialist ideas of an earthly analogue to God rejected by some followers 
of Barth. pp. 233 -4. 
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We' divide as signifying God's salvation. There must be criteria, 
however, in order to specify what healing qualities might be 
identified and sought. Critique, as distinct from description, 
requires the judging of correctness and the evaluating of purpose 
in any social theory - in this instance, Habermas's new 
conceptual apparatus for giving content to the idea of sociality. 
If, as Habermas implies, the Phenomenology contains no 
framework adequate for a contemporary theory of interpersonal 
relation, we might well affirm his paradigm shift to 
communicative action. That is if, like salvation, it has to do 
with the healing of relations. We should be naive with respect to 
Habermas's theory of communicative action, however, should it 
simply be assumed as having unquestionable pedagogical value. 
What is needed is a theoretical interface for dialogue which 
gives practical criteria for assessing social relations. In this 
Chapter I argue that Hegel allows us to develop some such 
practical criteria in his considerations of various forms of 
social alienation. Hegel wrote in The Berne Plan of 1794 that 
theology's emphasis must be practical. It must "not merely 
concern itself with the knowledge of the existence and 
attributes of God, but deals with this problem in relation to men 
and to the needs of their reason". 3 A major complaint of his 
against the Protestantism of his time was that it failed to 
relate its faith to alienation in the social sphere; "building its 
temples and altars in the heart of the individual. In sighs and 
prayers he seeks for the God whom he denies to himself in 
intuition". 4 
3 The Berne Plan of 1794 in H.S. Harris (1972) p. 508. 
4 Hagal, F. & K. p. 57. 
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We have reached an integrated level of discourse, therefore, 
in which Habermas's reinterpretation and relocation of Hegel's 
concerns are to be tested against Hegel's own treatment of the 
social alienation. In this Chapter. we see that there are many 
reasons for speaking about alienation that are not only Christian. 
The word has diverse applications, referring with equal ease to 
religious, economic relations, political and language interaction, 
often functioning like an empty space that theorists fill with 
meaning appropriate to the time. As I shall show, it is a pre-
ethical term, not of itself denoting specific differentiated 
content. Against this background, the work of analogy is that of 
combining the different, double meanings, articulating the 
relation between socio-philosophy and theological theory. To 
this end I ask: In order for the critical truth of analogy to be 
established, what insights are to be gained with respect to 
Hegel's treatment of alienation and the 'other'? Particularly, I 
am concerned with Hegel's notion of alienation and the language 
used in talking of "the other"; the other God and the other, 
neighboring human subject. 
4. B. THE SEVERAL MEANINGS OF ALIENATION 
The Phenomenology is, of course, not unaffected by 
historico-political circumstances and before proceeding, it is 
necessary to consider the several meanings of alienation both 
contained within the text itself and arising from the differing 
perspectives of its later interpreters. The Phenomenology 
itself is the product of a unique situation when ideas of 
individual freedom and . independence had been alive across 
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Europe for several decades as bearers of the demand for release 
from civil and political restraints. An anonymous poem in the 
Berlinische Monatschrift of 1793 yearned for a land ·where 
sweet equality dwells·. Quoted in The New Cambridge Modern 
History, the accompanying observation reminds us that the 
Phenomenology was written at a time of need for mediation 
between the individual subject and political power: 
We can sense a profound alienation from the society in which such men 
lived, an estrangement from its prevailing values, a repudiation or 
spiritual flight. 5 
This is important because some commentators emphasize how 
the existential implications of these sections derive from 
Hegel's socio-political convictions. S. Averini argued in 1972 
that Hegel's idea of the individual's coming to himself (sic.) was 
an argument against his being made a mere instrument in the 
hands of superior forces. 6 Averini wants to show the 
Phenomenology, and especially Hegel's idea of the cunning of 
reason, to be an answer to the lack of mediation between the 
individual and political power. 
We must be careful here because the etymological origins of 
the idea of alienation are difficult to trace. Nathan Rotenstreich 
finds the Latin word alienatb to have two meanings. First, a 
legal meaning concerned with the conveyance of property. N. 
Lash agrees, noting that this first meaning also reflects an 
5 The New Cambridge Modem History Vol. VIII. The American and French 
Revolutions 1763 - 93, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965, p. 
442. For a brief statement of the German political structure see J.H. Shennan 
(1986) Uberty and Order in Early Modem Europe. The Subject and the State. 
1650 - 1800. Also R. Zaller (1984) Europe in Transition 1660 - 1815. 
6 S. Averini (1972) pp. 230 f. 
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economic fact. 7 Second, Rotenstreich draws on the "ecstatic" 
sources of, for example, Augustine's idea of elevation from the 
senses to connote a going above oneself and reaching submersion 
in God. This positive and ecstatic achievement is changed by 
Hegel, he says, from union with an elevated sphere into the 
means to an end, or an "improper transcendence" which denies 
any transcendent or sublime object to absorb alienation. 8 
It is helpful perhaps to note that the term alienation, as 
derived from Hegel, has a further double meaning: Alienation as 
estrangement [Entfrsmdung] refers to the socio-psychological 
condition of self-consciousness and its contradiction, being the 
direct result of the dynamic character of the principle of 
identity. This sense is developed in response to Kant's 
philosophy of consciousness and concerns the movement of the 
self into otherness returning in a cycle of mediation. This first 
sense of alienation [Entfrsmdung] is the state of divided self-
consciousness that is grasped in relation to the idea of the unity 
of consciousness: "The movement of a being that immediately is, 
consists partly in becoming an other than itself, and thus 
becoming its own immanent content" (53). It concerns the self-
creation of consciousness by a growing through the experience of 
moving outside of the self in thought and is the possibility of all 
development. 
The second sense of alienation, meaning externalization, 
7 N. Rotenstreich, "On the Ecstatic Sources of the Concept of Alienation" in the 
Review of Metaphysics vol. 16, 1963, pp. 550-555. N. Lash (1981) p. 171. 
8 For arguments to show continuity not contrast with pre-modem etymological 
roots of the Idea of alienation, see T. Schroyer (1973) pp. 44 f. 
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[Entau8erung8ftlflt1] is a related philosophical category, possibly 
with roots in Platonic criticism of Aristotle regarding the 
natural world as distinct from the sublime world of ideas. 9 It 
has social overtones relating to the individual when treated as 
an object which is both available to thought and manipulable. 
Hegel gives no explicit specification of social forms of 
Entausserung but the Phenomenology as a whole can be read 
as a classification of types of social externalization in different 
historical contexts. In the course of its progress Hegel touches 
upon ancient, feudal, and capitalist societies. He looks at 
various forms of alienation amongst intellectuals, the religious, 
producers and consumers. 
Thus the two senses of alienation [Entfremdung and 
Entausserung] are philosophically distinct but related. The 
former, simple sense arises from the division of the self into 
conflicting parts, the latter sense also being used of this 
movement of a self, from itself, through itself but including 
more ambiguous uses of the term with applications in social and 
political philosophy. For example, §§ 48 & 66 of the Preface 
speak of the external [auBerlich] character of the Kantian mode 
of cognition, both the Lord and Bondsman want to rid themselves 
of their -self-externality- [AuBersichsein] (187), a society's 
culture is said to be its -externalization- [EntauBerung] (489), 
and the incarnation is an -externalization- [EntauBerung] (759) 
of the divine essence. 
The distinct but related senses of the two words for 
9 s. Rosen (1974) makes this connection, pp. 76 f; 147. 
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alienation have been the cause of much controversy in Hegel 
interpretation. The so-called Young Hegelians B. Bauer, D. F. 
Strauss, Moses Hess and others, who sketched the first pictures 
of humanistic communism, illustrate the sense of continuum in 
Hegel between the alienation in and of individual consciousness 
and social structures. J.F. Toews describes in detail tensions 
arising in early receptions of Hegel's writings in Hegel's own 
I.ifetime. He refers particularly to disagreements within the 
Hegelian school between 1830-41 over left and right wing 
appropriations of his treatment of the idea of alienation and 
its relation to historical reality. 10 As Toews makes plain, 
the usage of terms such as 'left' and 'right' is misleading when 
discussing the problematic of interpreting Hegel's own seamless 
integration of the speculative science of Absolute knowledge and 
alienation in social relations. On the other hand, he makes the 
point that some indication of the general divisions in 
interpretation of the Phenomenology clarifies major diverg-
ences that do occur concerning the place of social factors 
underlying the relation of an ideal to historical experience. 11 
Broad brush strokes are inadequate to do justice to Toews' 
illumination of disputes since the 1820's over interpreting 
Hegel's notion of alienation in the light of the changing German 
social and cultural context. It is helpful, however, to note the 
thrust of his argument that whereas at the time of Hegel's 
writing the Phenomenology interpreters enthused over an 
idealist positing of community as the condition for overcoming 
individual alienation, within less than three decades the only 
10 J.E. Toews (1980). 
11 J.E. Toews (1980) pp. 8-9; p. 205. 
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viable Hegel interpretation had reduced the science of Absolute 
knowledge to the science of human consciousness which saw the 
chief task of philosophy as specifying the conditions under which 
freedom might be achieved. We see in Toews' tracing of the 
dissolution of Absolute idealism into dialectical humanism 
through the figures of Strauss, Bauer, and Feuerbach, the 
reduction of Hegelian Absolute idealism to the functional 
relation of elements of the human consciousness. His point is 
well made that before the German Federation of 1815 
interpretation of Hegel's science of the Absolute was tied to 
tensions within reformist and revolutionary tendencies in 
German politics, whereas after 1815, : the community ideal 
becomes more implausible under the heavy handed rule of Austria 
and Prussia. For example under the influential Austrian 
Chancellor Metternich, 12 hopes of the speculative transforming 
of alienation into reconciliation rang hollow and absolute 
idealism passes into dialectical humanism. 13 
I mention Toews' work to illustrate that we could spend time 
tracing disagreement in the history of the interpretation of 
Hegel regarding the double meanings of alienation., the relation 
between the idealist science of knowledge and its purpose in 
relation to existing social and political reality. The history of 
the idea of alienation since Hegel brings the danger of reading 
12 See A.J. Grant (1945) p. 1851.. 
13 J.E. Toews (1980) ch. 10. We could illustrate the point by noting the extent 
to which Marx reads Hegel through Feuerbach. See K. Marx, "The Early Writings. 
1837-1844", in D.M. McCellan (19n) p. 100, which refers to alienation as 
consciousness of the self in relation to the infinite in terminology heavily 
influenced by Feuerbach's reduction of the Absolute to the infinity of human self-
consciousness. 
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back into the Phenomenology the overtones of his major 
interpreters. Marx and Feuerbach, also Simmel, E. Durkheim, 
Weber and others could be the subjects of long investigation. 14 
For example, after the discovery and publication in 1932 of those 
manuscripts where Marx devotes considerable attention to Hegel 
there was renewed interest in Marx's assimilation of Hegel's 
dialectical relationship of subject and object. This often now 
makes it difficult to disentangle the Hegelian notions of 
alienation from subsequent evaluations. G. Lukacs' reading of the 
Phenomenology, for instance, is determined by a definition of 
EntauBerung as externalization, meaning the product of labour 
when exploited as an object independent of the worker. 1 5 
Lukacs, stands at the head of divergent streams of mid-
twentieth century Marxist interpretation that was active in 
laying bare the Hegelian content of Marx' writings. 16 He 
illustrates the need to be aware of how Hegel comes to us 
through secondary interpreters. 
14 A useful overview of the alienation of consciousness as a formative idea for 
German sociology in the Weimar Republic is D. Frisby's (1983) The Alienated 
Mind. 
15 G. Lukacs (1975) pp .537-568. Ct. -Labour's realization is its 
objectifJCation. In the sphere of political economy this realization of labour 
appears as.loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object 
and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation (Aneignung als 
Entfremdung, als EntauBerung). Marx, in Struik (1932) p. 108. On varying 
lines of tradition within Marxism re: the idea of alienation and production see, J. 
Habermas (1987c) -Excursus on the Obsolescence of the Production Paradigm-, 
pp. 75-82. 
1 6 For a critical re-appropriation of Hegel different in style from that of Lukacs 
but drawing on the same tension between the interrelation of subject and object see 
H. Marcuse (1941) esp. ch. IV. Also (1964) pp. 138 f where he writes of the 
Phenomenology, "The logic of thought remains the logic of domination.-
THE SEVERAL MEANINGS OF AUENATlON 
138 
Ch.4 AUENATION AND "THE OTHER-
4. C. RECENT INTERPRETATION 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the influence of Hegel in ideas of 
alienation still spanned the distinction between socio-
psychological conditions and the socio-economic, political 
issues of work, education, income, authorities etc. 17 In 1955 
Erich Fromm picked up the socio-psychological sense of Hegel's 
notion of alienation: -By alienation is meant a mode of 
experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. 
He has become, one might say, estranged from himself. - 18 He 
emphasizes the subjective sense of estrangement as that feeling 
of unease and separation from the group, when the self has a 
feeling of pointlessness because no goals exist. E. Kahler wrote 
in 1957: -The history of man could very well be written as a 
history of the alienation of man.. 19 In 1958 Hannah Arendt 
emphasized the second sense of alienation [Entau·8erung], 
looking at how the idea of the overcoming of alienation in the 
public spheres of work and politics gives meaning to social 
organizations. Since Hegel and Marx the overcoming of alienation 
meant, she suggests, becoming a participating member of SOCiety 
beyond the work-place: It -consisted in the elimination of the 
gap between the individual and social existence of man-, 
17 See G. Nettler -A Measure of Alienation-, American Sociological Review, Vol. 
22 (1957) pp. 670-77 for estrangement related to creativity, mental and social 
disorder, proclivity to suicide etc. M. Seeman ·On the Meaning of Alienation-
ibid. Vol. 24 (1959) pp. 783 f. on the behavioral consequences of social 
conditions that produce the alienation of powerlessness, meaninglessness, 
normlessness and isolation. Also D. Dwight "The Meaning and Measure of 
Alienation- ibid. Vol. 26 (1961) pp. 753 f. 
18 E. Fromm (1955) p. 20. 
19 E. Kahler (1989) p. 43. 
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claiming that herein lies the contrast between ancient Greek and 
modern political philosophy. 20 
These examples illustrate differences which continued in 
Hegel scholarship in the 1970's concerning the extent to which 
his idea of alienation were to be understood either as a quasi-
metaphysical idea of pure and eternal thought, or in terms of the 
human psyche, or to be cashed out in social and political issues. 
I could, for instance, compare the influential 'revisionary 
metaphysical' reading of Hegel by J.N. Findlay with the socially 
rooted approach of C. Taylor. Findlay believes that for Hegel 
alienation is found in the realms of nature, understanding and 
human relations and overcome in the unifying principle of 
thought, arguing that the crux of the matter lies in "the extent to 
which his (Hegel's) philosophy is Hellenic rather than Kantian", 
'the Idea' being objective after the manner of Plato and Aristotle 
in the sense of a striving towards a rational end. 21 He believes 
that Hegel brings to completion the unifying principles governing 
the relation of things in the world and in the realm of thought in 
a manner suggested by the Platonic development of ideas and the 
Aristotelian notion of active intelligence.22 For C. Taylor, in 
contrast, the alienation of which Hegel speaks mirrors historic 
and social reality as a philosophic appropriation of social 
reconciliation. Alienation arises for Hegel, he suggests, "when 
20 H. Arendt (1958) pp. 89 n. 301, 311. 
21 J.N. Findlay (1958) p. 46. 
22 J.N. Findlay (1970) ch.s. VII; VIII; XV, esp. pp. 262 f. Hegel is understood as 
modifying Aristotle's categories of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in 
important ways that can be seen via his critique of the Kantian categories. He 
retains much from Plato's theory of forms. Notable is his retaining of what Plato 
calls anamnesis in the concept of Erinnerung. 
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the goals, norms or ends which define the common practices or 
institutions begin to seem irrelevant or ... when the norms are 
redefined so that the practices appear a travesty of them.· 23 
4. D. ALIENATION AND THE WORK OF ANALOGY 
My proposal here is that we can specify a thematic relation 
between Hegel's assessment of these types of alienation and 
theology's treatment of otherness; the otherness of God, of 
one's neighbour, of the poor, of Christ. The type of thematic 
relation possible, I suggest, looks for a correspondence between 
divine and human principles of relation co-ordinating everything 
in the highest way to knowledge of God's salvation. This is to 
move the discussion to a deeper level of reflection; towards an 
interface of correspondence between Christian and non-Christian 
social theory which allows for an understanding of the 
disclosing presence and activity of God. 24 It is to say that talk 
about salvation in a social context develops by the mingling of 
different models and discourses, through seeking to express the 
relationship between human relations and the divine prototype of 
sociality proper. It requires my finding meanings that 
correspond between Christian and non-Christian social theory, 
referring simultaneously to Hegel's treatment of alienation, to 
contemporary socio-philosophy and to what Hegel calls Christian 
'positivity', that is, the content of Christian doctrine. 25 
23 C. Taylor (1975) p. 384. 
24 LT. Ramsey writes of the order of disclosure that a new depth or dimension 
comes !lIive when one is suddenly aware of a new encounter, -disclosure reveals 
something of whose existence we are aware because we are aware of being 
confronted-. LT. Ramsey (1971) p. 212. 
2S See H. Marcuse's (1960) definition of positivism as dehumanizing 
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Given the relation in Hegel's work between the metaphysical 
idea of pure and eternal thought, the human psyche, and social 
and political issues, the Phenomenology lends itself easily to 
certain analo,gical forms of reasoning. As we have seen, 
'alienation' is used both of God and self-conscious individuals 
univocally by Hegel, that is, in the exact same sense. His 
description of alienation and 'otherness' is made common to 
both God and fellow subjects as the types of fear and limitation 
felt by the individual against both. 'Alienation' is used 
equivocally of God and self-conscious individuals - not in the 
exact same sense (univocal), but neither in a totally different or 
unrelated meaning. It has a twofold and related meaning; 
whereby what exists in itseff exists equally for an other; it does pervert 
the Unchangeable, but it perverts it from the nothingness of abstraction 
into the being of reality (389). 
The self exists in itself, experiencing itself over against itself 
and set in opposition to its other fellow subject. It knows 
itself to be existing in relation to the Unchangeable and 
experiences an alienation which, this passage implies, is a 
matter both of feeling and thought. 
I have said already that Hegel did not think much of the 
Christianity learned in his Tubingen days because of its neglect 
of social questions. H. Kung describes the dangers held out for 
the orthodox doctrinal teaching of C.F. Schurrer, F.C. Rosier, C.G. 
Storr as "Theology at Odds with Itself" concerning the relation of 
ethical and .politico-economic questions to doctrine. 26 The 
"reification" which creates abstract, scientific domains for inquiry. p. 112. 
26 H. KOng (1987) pp. 31 - 40. 
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180213 System of Ethical Life attempted to establish 
Sittlichkeit as some sort of ethical community consciousness 
or vehicle for a new, objective Christian religion; "in the ethical 
life the individual exists in an eternal mode; ... all things are in 
God and there is nothing singular". 27 L. Dickey goes so far as to 
say that the Phenomenology and later political writings are 
assimilated within an economy of salvation argument or 
"soteriological process". 28 In consequence, consciousness is 
unhappy, he says, when it does not recognise that the idea of the 
Unchangeable which is really internal to consciousness has 
become an "alien Being" (§ 208). 
Hegel wants to supersede forms of relation in which both the 
other God and the other, neighboring human subject are an 
"alien necessity". These passages represent a climactic 
condemnation of Christian theism, drawing on earlier complaints 
at the Christian faith for having reduced human self-
consciousness to defilement (225) and guilt, confronting a 
divided humanity with an Unchangeable and absolutely 'Other' 
God whose power is mediated through the priests (228). Taking 
up the theme of the perversion or distortion caused to the 
individual, in its sense of separation from God, he speaks of 
consciousness' sense of wretchedness, 'one-sidedness' (211) 
weighted against this God, also its sense of passivity (221) and 
brokenness (222). 
27 System Essay in H.S. Harris (1979) p. 143. L Dickey (1987) takes this 
as evidence for the Phenomenologys being the pursuit of a redemptive te/os in 
a pragmatically Pelagian sense: "Hegel conceived of a people, religiously 
characterized, as the carrier of Christian gnosis in the world". p. 289. 
10 L Dickey (1987) p. 290. 
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The work of analogy in this context is to give shape in 
dialogue with Hegel to social processes of liberation. Christian 
theology holds that it is in no way contrary to the individual's 
wholeness, dignity and full development as a person to 
acknowledge the otherness of God, and to find the highest 
reason for sociality in the human vocation to grow in the 
likeness of God. By this belief, the Christian believer knows that 
only the God slhe meets in Christ can heal the deepest alienation 
of the human heart and speak liberation more widely in society. 
The gospel, far from taking away the rightful autonomy of the 
individual, rather restores and guarantees his/her identity. In 
the remainder of this Chapter, I try to address these issues by 
holding on to the critical truth of analogy. The intention is 
neither to cease doing theology in favour of socio-philosophy, 
nor to allow the relation between doctrine and social theory to 
be so weak as to fail to relate the Christian order of salvation 
with non-Christian apparatus for relearning sociality. The 
intention, rather, is to use analogical reasoning to articulate 
theologically what God's salvation is like in social terms. 
In pursuing its own end, salvation, theology not only 
communicates the revealed life of Christ in a direct fashion but 
in a less direct manner diffuses the light of that salvation 
through different forms of social theory. Theology does this 
most of all by restoring and enhancing human social identity, 
both criticizing and edifying social structures, and giving 
importance and deeper meaning to the individual's everyday 
social contacts. This means being -glad to value highly what 
other non-Christian social theorists have done and are doing to 
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co-operate in the same task. Here I set out some general 
principles for promoting this co-operation and mutual help in 
spheres which Christian and non-Christian interpreters of Hegel 
have to some extent in common. 
In order to do this, it must be said that Christian analogical 
reasoning is not primarily political, economic or social, but 
theological. From its theological content, insight, rules of love 
and energy derive which can help to establish an interface for 
dialogue. This means recognizing what is liberating and healing 
in present-day re-thinking of sociality, especially the 
development towards the giving of priority to sociality over 
against individualism. It also means discovering in the mind of 
Hegel the hidden cause of the denial of orthodox Christianity and 
its links to his major questions of human subjectivity and 
alienation. It is thus to some extent a self-critical task on the 
part of theology. The principle of analogy is not directly 
derivative of any particular understanding of salvation but is a 
matter of interpretation. As D. Njcholls writes in Deity and 
Domination: "It would ... be wrong to suggest that Trinitarianism 
logically implies commitment to a communitarian political 
ideal". 29 It would mean degrading the concept of divine 
otherness and the incarnation to suppose that it is in any way 
manipulable. The incarnation is not to be made into a 
philosophical principle abstracted from the historical instance. 
'Th~ iSL~ndemned comprehensively as an offence leaving God without 
relation to the world. 30 
29 D. Nicholls (1989) pp. 187; 237.shows that manipulation occurs in Hegel's 
understanding. incarnation according to an analogical, literal content. 
30 Ferenc Lehel's notes in I. TOdt Hg. (1988) speak of Bonhoeffer's complaint 
AUENATlON AND THE WORK OF ANALOGY 
145 
Ch.4 ALIENATION AND "THE OTHER-
In his treatment of alienation, we are reminded that the very 
least that Hegel required was the relation of ethical and 
politico-economic questions to doctrine. His concern was that 
Christianity is incomplete both as an objective religion 
(ritualized and institutionalized) and as a subjective religion 
(absorbed in moral education). 31 This does not mean that, like 
Hegel, I want to heal the 'alienation' and 'otherness' discussed 
through a belief in "The Certainty and Truth of Reason". It does 
mean that some general principles can be set out for promoting 
the healing of alienation and the overcoming of otherness in 
spheres which Hegel, his interpreters, and Christian theology 
have to some extent in common. 
4. E. SOME PROBLEMS OF ANALOGICAL DISCOURSE 
The analogical task then is to allow the logic of God's 
otherness and presence to inform relational categories of 
human knowledge. There are problems in attempting to meet this 
need practically through dialogue with Hegel and his 
interpreters. For example, the fact there there are analogical 
forms of reasoning already operating in the Phenomenology is 
both a disadvantage and an advantage. The main problem is that 
the type of analogical critique and reasoning developed by Hegel 
submerges the distinctiveness of Christian theology within his 
own particular 'philosophical construct. There is no escaping the 
fact that Hegel's is an illegitimate sameness or unity of being 
between the alienation and 'otherness' of Absolute Spirit and 
against Hegetsnotion of the incarnation as such: -,Gott als Beziehungs-Iosigkeit 
zur WeIr. p. M. 
31 See the Beme Plan of 1794 in H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 508 - 510. 
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that of human self-consciousness. Quentin Lauer poses the 
question; -has Hegel not overreached himself when he claims 
that what we know in knowing God is what God knows in 
knowing himself?- 32 As Lauer points out, there is an obvious 
danger in Hegel's logic of analogy; - namely, the subsumption of 
theology to socio-philosophy. 33 The dangers are plain to see in 
§ 234, for instance, where Hegel attempts speculatively to 
penetrate beyond the limits of analogy to an idea of totality: 
-Consciousness-, he says, ·will determine its relationship to 
otherness or its object in various ways, according to the precise 
stage it has reached in the development of the World-Spirit into 
self-consciousness-. 
This problem is caused by the fact that 'otherness ' and 
'alienation' as used by Hegel in the Phenomenology apply both to 
the human experience of itself and in relation to God, the 
Unchangeable [der Unwandelbare] . In this twofold usage of the 
terms we can distinguish two 
-proportional- uses of the word. 
kinds of analogical or 
First, there is the case of 
alienation being used both of God and human subjects because 
each of them has the same order or relation to -The Certainty and 
Truth of Reason-. He uses the word 'alienation' univocally of the 
'I' that rests in its own self-certainty or ·tranquil unity 
certain of its [own] truth- ( 237), and of the Unchangeable 
because each of these has some relation to the activity of reason 
in the self. The former suffers from the antithesis of the 
certainty of its own truth over against the 'We' or universal; 
32 Q. Lauer (1982) .p. 278. 
33 R.B. Edwards (1979) usefully -contrasts Aquinas' subordination of philosophy 
to theology with Hegel's subordination of theology to philosophy, pp. 72 - 86. 
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"certainty, qua 'f ... is not yet in truth reality" (239). The 
latter is another symptom of wh.at Hegel calls the tension 
between particularity and totality, that is, "the element of 
universality, in the qualityless void of being" (405). His concern 
that consciousness move beyond the the emptiness caused by the 
Other's being regarded as separate from the human order; 
"something indifferent and extraneous" (238). Hegel's language 
used about God is derived from the human experience as he seeks 
comprehension of a more fundamental relation. 
Second, there is the case of alienation being used equivocally 
of the two things because the nature of God as the Unchangeable 
is similar to, or causes, the alienation of self-conscious 
individuals. Recall from §§ 207 - 230 how Hegel says that 
Christianity renders the individual passive. The active 
independence of the individual is said to be largely denied; -the 
Unhappy Consciousness merely finds itself desiring and 
working .. (§ 218). 34 The same is true of the 'I's relation to 
the 'We' or the totality of the universal which puts particularity 
at stake: "The abstract necessity therefore has the character of 
the merely negative, uncomprehended power of universality, on 
which individuality is smashed to pieces" (366). 35 In both 
cases, 'alienation' applied to self-consciousness is used 
34 See the -Frankfurt Sketch- (1798) in which faith is a mode of union with the 
object of belief and religion a fonn of power set up to confine human activity. In 
H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 512 - 515. For Hegel's influence by G. C. Storr and 
other, according to him, -poSitivist- thinkers of the [old] TObingen Stitt see H.S. 
Harris (1983) pp. 5; 15, also W. Jaeschke (1990) 2.1; .3.4; 3.5. 
35 Compare the -bad infinity' of simple connection in The Jena System pp.32-
8: -Bad Ieality stays at the concept of quality ..• bad ideality stays at the concept of 
quantity .•. bad infinity .•. allows them both to subsisr. p. 33. 
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primarily either of God or the 'We'. This is seen in the 
consequences for the status of the particular when ideas of 
quantity or number are the basis for relation: "As a who/e ... 
there thus enters a play of individualities with one another in 
which each and all find themselves both deceiving and deceived" 
(416). 36 
As illustration, take Hegel's polemic in §§ 231 - 437 against 
those whom he thinks hinder the overcoming of alienation. 
Criticizing forms of thought which have "thrown off all 
community (Gemeinschaft) with others into the sheer opposite 
... being-in-itse/f " (§ 364), he sets in relief the relative values 
of the Hedonist, the Aesthetic and the 'Knight of Virtue' as 
examples of inadequate bases for human, and especially ethical 
relation. 37 He targets the classic arguments of the 'Hedonist' 
and the 'Aesthetic' and "Knight of Virtue" for criticism because 
of mutual indifference to the "other", that is, following "the way 
of the world" (384), and it is important to bear this in mind as 
examples of univocal predications based on the one non-univocal, 
analogous experience, that of the "other". For the Hedonist, the 
'other' "does not yet possess [objective] being which confronts it 
36 The Jena System is an important backdrop to §§ 231 ·437. This is because 
of the bonding in thought developed between the subject as singular and the totality 
of the universal: "What is more determinate in this totality of the universal is that 
it connects with the -this· ... and posits it as sublated, in that it posits others equal 
to ita. In J.W. Burbidge and G. -di Giovanni (1986) pp. 107·8. 
37 Neither the term hedonist nor aesthetic are found in §§ 231 • 437. but their 
use is justified on the grounds that 'hedonisf is widely used by commentators, e.g., 
R. Norman (1976) pp. 78 t., and R. C. Solomon (1983) pp. 498 f. The term 
'Romantic' sometimes replaces 'aesthetic'. T. Eagleton (1990) argues against 
identifying the 'aesthetic' with Romanticism in the German philosophical tradition. 
pp. 116 t. 
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as a reality other than its own- (§ 360). The Hedonist fails to 
raise himself above his/her own pleasure: -It plunges ... into life 
and indulges to the full the pure individuality in which it 
appears- (§ 361). The Aesthetic regards the other whom the self 
confronts either as its oppressor or object of suffering; -on the 
one hand a law by which the particular individuality is oppressed 
and, on the other hand, a humanity suffering under that 
ordering- (§ 369). Either way, the other is an -alien necessity-
(ibid.). 
In both of these cases, the word 'other' or 'alien' is 
transferred from the human to Absolute Spirit; it is used first 
of the individual and only then of the divine. There is a sense, 
however, in which the reverse is true in that Hegel also takes 
theological language from its primary meaning and applies it to 
his science of consciousness. W. Jaeschke's comment on Hegel's 
language about God in the Phenomenology seems to imply that 
these words are used primarily of God, and then of the human 
experience: 
More clearly than in the later lectures, the religiohistorical conception of 
the Phenomenology is that of an incarnation of God in human form. 38 
Language about the incarnation is used, he says, of the human 
experience because of some prior reference it has to the divine. 
It is the incarnation, Jaeschke says, which supplies the pattern 
of 'otherness' and alienation, the consequence being that we 
cannot explain what Hegel means by the alienation of the 'other' 
without mentioning its order of relation to the divine. 39 
38 w. Jaeschke (1990) p. 204. 
39 -[O]ne way of understanding Hegel's philosophy as a whole is to think of it as 
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Thus we see that not only does Hegel's treatment of social 
alienation operate, so to speak, 'from below' vis-a-vis the 
'otherness ' of divine subjectivity. He also maintains a logic of 
divine 'otherness ' in which the possibilities of divine presence 
inform his categories of human knowledge and relation. 
Interpretations vary as to Hegel's scathing attack against this 
logic of divine 'otherness '; the -unhappy- representations of 
Christianity's alienated relation with the Unchangeable [der 
Unwandelbare] and Christian grounds for social theory. E.L. 
Fackenheim claims that Hegel is reworking a religious 
dimension; -Hegel holds the actual existence of religious life to 
be an indispensable condition of his philosophy as a whole-. 40 
This contrasts with A. Kojeve's denouncing of any religious 
element in the Phenomenology : -Hegel does not need a God who 
would reveal the truth to him .... The truth which he incarnates is 
the final result of the real or active dialectic of -universal 
History-. 41 Kojeve avails himself of Hegel's quasi-theological 
language to exemplify the problem of knowing. According to him, 
the analogy of 'otherness' was intended by Hegel primarily, if not 
only, as a dialectic of the social struggle in history. The one 
point is clear, however, that there is a correspondence between 
Hegel's review of alienation as a central characteristic of 
humanity in its social state and its relation to God. 
As I have shown, the concept of 'alienation' is used by Hegel of 
trying to replace the Christian religion with a system that utilizes its superficial 
forms but is in fact wholly secular" R. C. Solomon (1980) p. 230; 466. Also R. 
Norman (1976) who interprets §§ 207 - 230 as a remaking of Christianity, pp. 
60 - 64. 
40 E.L Fackenheim (1967) p. 9. 
41 A. Kojeve. (1969) p. 186. 
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God and self-conscious subjects in an analogous way, that is, in 
accordance with a certain order between them. A close 
relationship is established between the processes of human 
consciousness, social relationship and divine subjectivity. It 
cannot be stressed too strongly that, unlike Hegel, my grounds 
for deriving the message of salvation and of hope for social 
questions do not lie in the unifying power of reason; the 
-development of World-Spirit- (234). God's economy of salvation 
in Christ is not of the same order as the effective presence of 
the 'other' conceived by non-Christian social theorists and I have 
no intention of allowing theology to be accommodated to the 
particular concerns of Hegelian socio-philosophy. The question, 
therefore, is how to start from proximate experiences of 
alienation and open human understanding out to God. 
4. F. ANALOGY AND SAL VATION SIGNIFIED 
I am talking, therefore, about alienation and the 'other' not 
solely in terms of human relations, but in terms that extend 
discourse about human relation to soteriology proper. The 
intention is to show an equivalence between critique and 
meaning in both Christian and non-Christian social theory. 
Indeed, my reflections in Chapters 1-3 have shown an 
equivalence between Christian and non-Christian social theory 
in criticism of Hegel's drive for free self-consciousness. 
More than this, I have demonstrated a correspondence between 
Christian and certain non-Christian treatments of 'alienation' 
and 'otherness'. This is not the concept of correspondence 
employed in a formal truth theory; I am not asking: -In what does 
ANALOGY AND SALVATION SIGNIFIED 
152 
Ch.4 AUENATION AND "THE OTHER-
the truth of a belief consist?" or "How can we test the claim of a 
belief to be true?" For example, there is no intention to show 
that truth consists in agreement between judgements or 
propositions and God's independently existing reality in the 
inclusive sense that Hegel maintains. 42 What I do intend is to 
affirm truths of relation seen in Christ through the medium of 
socio-analytic analysis. 
A word of warning must be sounded here because, as Vernon 
White notes, no allusion to analogy can be allowed if it even 
hints at religious tyranny and imperialism. White's essay 
Atonement and Incarnation recounts certain attitude 
difficulties as regards attributing universal effect to the 
particularity of the Christian message, that is, the premise 
which underlies analogical reasoning: "Does not Christ's 
constitutive role", he asks, "imply Christian arrogance, opening 
up a Pandora's box of religious tyranny and imperialism?" 43 
The question that arises is as follows: If the universal effect of 
Christ's salvation is made the context for dialogue with non-
Christian social theory, might theology risk recourse to a non-
dialogical professing of Christian truth that can only be 
normative and definitive for thec:>logy, and perhaps not even 
there? 
This word of warning requires that we look more closely at 
42 - ... a belief is true when there isa corresponding faer to one's subjective 
belief: Bertrand Russell (1919) p 202. From the wide range of literature on the 
correspondence theory of truth see A.D. Woozley (1964) Ch. VI; Susan Haack 
(1978) pp. 11 - 17; 91 - 4. W.V. Quine (1986) pp. 1 - 14; 35 - 46. 
43 V. White (1991) pp. 111 - 112. 
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the required apologetic attitude. Suffice it to mention Aquinas's 
intention regarding the opening of the logic of human relations 
out to God when he wrote: 
Human philosophy examines creatures as elements of this world. 
Christian faith, however, does not stop short there; .. , Even when they look 
at the same thing their point of view is different. The philosopher starts from 
proximate causes, the theologian from the first cause as divinely revealed".44 
He speaks about the revealing of something declaring itself to 
us, the apologetic attitude always beginning with God's work of 
grace in Christ and also a feeling of deep esteem for the work of 
human philosophy. C. Boff explicates this passage as looking to 
interpret "the extent of the "incarnation" of divine salvation in 
human history". 45 It affirms a responsibility for the revealed 
truth and to act in full fidelity to it. But this same fidelity must 
be a constitutive quality of Christian theology in dialogue with 
non-Christian social theory in order to help them combine with 
each other in addressing social problems of alienation. 46 
4. G. INTERPRETATIVE CRITERIA FOR SALVATION 
The need for interpretative criteria in this interpenetration 
of social and soteriological questions is pressing. Careful not to 
confuse the relative autonomy of theology and socio-philosophy, 
44 T. Aquinas: 11 Contra Gentes, 4. 
45 C. 80ff (1987) p. 228. 
46 Compare this to D. Nicholls (1990) who says that Hegel makes illegitimate 
claims to politicize his interpretation of incarnation, using political concepts to 
imply literal truths about God. Uke Aristotle, Nicholls says, "Hegel realized that 
the kind of autarky which is appropriate for the state is possible only when a high 
degree of plurality and diversity is manifested". p. 183. See Hegel's P.R., para. 
288, pp. 189 f. on the state incorporating diversity amongst classes, estates, 
regional governments etc. 
INTERPR,ETATlVE CRITERIA FOR SALVATION 
154 
Ch.4 AUENATION AND "THE OTHER-
I use the traditional doctrine of analogy to describe the 
structures that allow parallels between Hegelian and theological 
treatments 'alienation' and 'otherness'. This is what Clodovis 
Boff calls "the leap of transignification .; the semantic 
operation of opening up an image to its theological dimension: ·It 
means the extreme maximalization of its ·evocative force·; 
identifying God's footprints in the world and opening human 
relation to the idea of God's presence. 47 The semantic content; 
meaning (L. res significata - thing signified) is different but if 
analogy can be seen to exist in critical modes of expression 
(modus significandl) space has been created for an articulation 
of faith. Now this articulation of faith must be made more 
specific, using analogical forms of reasoning to say what God's 
salvation is like in socio-philosophic terms. 
Taking 'incarnation' as an interpretative criterion for salvation 
and healing, the analogical task is to look for correspondence 
between Christian and non-Christian theory regarding the status 
and presence of the 'other '. How? The question is particularly 
pertinent in our reading of Hegel, especially §§ 394 - 437 on 
"Individuality Real in and For Itself, where he derives principles 
of free individuality from the incarnation event proper. The 
'incarnation' for Hegel is not peculiar to the Christ event but is 
used in principle of other things. It becomes a principle of 
relation, not only the personal presence of Christ and the Holy 
Spirit -in time. 48 How then is the critical truth of analogy to 
47 C. 80ft in L & C. 80ft (1984) pp. 80 - 1. 
48 This was one of the main complaints made by D. 8onhoefter against Hegel in his 
Hegel Seminar of 1933 in I. T6dt Hg. (1988). Bonhoefter consistently applies the 
concept of person to override Hegel'~ modalism. -Um var Modalismus zu 
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be different from this? If the incarnation is not to be made into 
a philosophical principle abstracted from the historical reality, 
what is the relation between Hegelian socio-philosophy and 
'incarnation' as an interpretative criteripn for salvation? 
In order to answer this question we must be clear about 
Hegel's understanding and use of the concept of incarnation. 
Interpretation of the incarnation is not explicit in these sections 
but questions about the theoretical foundations on which wThe 
Ethical Orderw (444 - 483) is based are uppermost. Hegel does 
not deal fully with the incarnation of God in Christ until wThe 
Revealed ReligionW (748 - 787). Throughout the Phenomenology, 
Hegel subsumes revelatory religion within the Absolute Spirit, 
supposing the divine nature to be the same as the human. W. 
Jaeschke writes: WHegel accordingly links the unfolding of the 
content of the revelatory religion to the shape of the incarnate 
Godw. 49 It is the word 'shape' that is important here, Jaeschke 
contrasting Hegel's interpretation of the incarnation in this 
period with Christian interpretations in which wGod became 
human in Jesus Christ in order to distinguish definitely between 
God and humanity for everw. 50 James Yerkes also claims that 
these later passages are an extension of the religious and 
Reformation language of Christ's death into the language of 
philosophy: wThis ... is the truth of the trinitarian principle of 
incarnational reconciliation whereby God is shown to b e 
reconciled with the worldw. 51 In other words, interpretation of 
schOtzen, ist der 8egriff der Person n<Jtig". p. 19. 
49 W . . Jaeschke (1990) pp. 204 - .5. 
50 W. Jaeschke (1990) contrasts Hegel's Christology of the Jena period with E. 
JOngel~ (1983) interpretation of the incarnation. pp. 94; 132. 
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the 'incarnation' principle is made primarily of the Christ event, 
any approximation to human experience being derivative from 
there. 
The idea of incarnation derives for Hegel from the Christ 
event. Yerkes stresses that Hegel's is a strongly incarnational 
view of God's relation to the world and that this pervades every 
form of relation that is instantiated in the development from 
"Observing Reason" to "Individuality Real In and For Itself". 52 
This is borne out in § 401 where, in order to abolish the 
antithesis between individual consciousness, the universal 'We' 
and the Unchangeable the reader must, Hegel says, let in a 
'spiritual' presence or colour; "the tinge [Tinktur] of Spirit" 
(401). 53 The "tinge" of Spirit idea is explained in terms that 
indicate an intrinsic connection between the incarnation proper 
and free 'individuality'; "action simply translates an initially 
implicit being into a being that is made explicit ... when the 
latter has made it into a reality". In other words, the principle 
here applies most fully to the incarnation proper. In §§ 231 -
437 it is used derivatively as a principle informing free 
individuality. The incarnation is a principle that has become an 
abstraction from the historical instance. 54 Later in the 
51 James Yerkes (1983) p. 138. 
52 Yerkes claims; -Hegel's con~ption of the Absolute as Spirit is compatible with 
... both a theistic and a Christian interpretation of the world-. (1983) p. 196. 
53 It is likely that Kant's distinction between speculative natural philosophy and 
practical moral philosop~y - natural intuition and appearance being subordinate 
to rationally discerned imperatives - is being repudiated here. See I. Kant. C. 
Prac. R. pp. 7~ - 83 on the two pathways in life. Also C.P.R. A 8051 B 833 f. 
54 On Hegel's abolishing the distinction between the conceptuality and reality see 
L Sie,p -Hegel's Idea of a Conceptual Scheme- in Inquiry, 34, pp. 63 - 76. It 
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Phenomenology this again becomes obvious when the 
incarnation more than anything else is made the particular 
instance of free individuality; ·the Son, is that which is simple 
and knows itself to be essential Being, while the other part 
(Spirit) is the ... externalized being-for-self· (§ 776). 
For Hegel, the principle of incarnation can be used of many 
instances and especially of 'universal consciousness· (405). 
Whilst we shall search in vain for the name of Jesus Christ in §§ 
231 - 437, as indeed in much of the Phenomenology, incarnation 
is shown to express a principle which, from the very outset, is 
used of God and human experience. The concept derived from the 
Christ event is implied of the experience of free self-
consciousness: ·Consciousness must act merely in order that 
what it is in itself may become explicit for it; in other 
words, action is simply the coming-to-be of Spirit as 
consciousness· (401). 55 My question then, is how the 
incarnation can and should be taken asinterpretative criteri<9f\ for 
saying what God's salvation is like in social terms without its 
becoming little more than an abstract principle. 
reviews R.B. Pippin's Hegel's Idealism in terms of how the Phenomenology 
demonstrates permanent properties of consciousness and extra-conceptual reality. 
55 It is not immediately clear from §§ 231 - 437 but the moments of free self-
consciousness; immediacy, negation and self-consciousness, denote later 
representation of -the revelatory religion-. Ct. L.P.R., Vol. 111, Ms. § 18 which 
defines God the Eternal Concept Ansich as tautologous. The Triune God as 
immediate is -non-mediated, ' indeed not even the living, far less the spiritual - is 
something dead, as though something could be without this mediation- i.e., the 
mediation of the incarnation. W. Jaeschke argues that the moments established 
here herald later articulation in L.P.R. (1990) pp. 204 - 7. Also D.M. Schlitt 
(1984) 95 -8. 
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The critical question is how to overcome Hegel's 'I'-other 
structure of relation without the incarnation being reduced to 
such an abstraction. 56 How is God's 'otherness' and presence 
in the incarnation tJfmade a criterion for critique? If the logic 
of God's otherness and presence is to inform our understanding 
of human 'otherness' and alienation, how is the presence of 
God's 'otherness' to be received and understood? Hegel, we 
have seen, reduces the alterity of the 'other', whether this be 
the otherness of a fellow subject or that of God, to a modality 
of the self-consciousness of the 'I'. It is the single 'I' which 
informs his understanding of both human and divine relation. 
How then are we to respond analogically to Hegel's challenge 
about Christianity's inadequate answer to problems of social 
alienation, without the incarnation being made a principle of 
universal consciousness? 
The question has, in part, been answered already but must be 
further explained. I have affirmed that creation is given a 
creaturely likeness by God; Inter creatorem et creaturam non 
potest tanta similitudo notari", . 57 and that this likeness 
56 E. L.evinas has struck perhaps the greatest blow to Hegel's self-other 
structuring of relation. Many themes in his work derive from the need to find 
alternative-language for relation to that of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Edith 
Wyschogrod (1974) writes: -[A]t the heart of Levinas' thought is the question: 
does thematizing consciousness exhaust the data of all experiencing?- p. 51. 
57 This confession of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 is used by P. E. 
Przywara (1935) pp. 29 - 34 in discussion of the analogies of proportion and 
attribution. Note similar principles in the Augsburg Confession 1530, Article 
XVIII Of the Freedom of the Will: -Man's will has some liberty for the attainment 
of civil righteousness, and for the choice of things subject to reason. Never-
theless, it has no power, without the Holy Ghost, to work the righteousness of God, 
that is, spiritual righteousness-. In C.L Manschrenck Ed. (1964) Vol. 2, p. 45. 
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forms the basis of the relation between theology and other 
disciplines analogically. This critical and sharing relation is 
possible in virtue of the healing presence of the Other in 
Christ, in whom is the human vocation to salvation. The capacity 
of analogy is thus taken to imply an analytical meaning and, more 
than this, to subvert and extend it through a transignification 
from the literal sense to a spiritual reality. 
The point is that the correspondence established between 
Christian and non-Christian social theory can become a 
transignification, showing God's salvation to be signified in the 
quality of human relation. The word transignification means 
the fact or property of perceiving and expressing one thing 
through another. It describes a theological attitude which, I 
believe, seems to fit the special needs of our times. It is 
critical, although never destructive, of non-Christian social 
theory, requlrmg an honest relationship with regard to the 
person of Christ as a condition for whole healing and liberation. 
It involves an attitude of respecting everything that leads to a 
better understanding of the most profound and important human 
problems of alienation. 58 It is what Mfguez Bonino calls the 
58 See E._JOngel (1983) p. 281. For an assessment of JOngel's protest against 
the emptiness of analogy when it is merely a human self-communication see W. 
Breunlng, ·Oberlegungen zu JOngel's interessantem Versuch der WeiterfOhrung 
des Analogieverstandnisses· In J. Brantschen, P. Selvatico, Ed.s (1980); ·wenn 
di9 Selbstmitteilung nicht eben doch einen ihr <eigenen> Inhalt har p. 382. 
According to Breuning, JOngel develops the dynamic features of analogical 
understanding in .Pryzwara (p. 384) on the strength of God's communication of the 
image (AhnlichkeifJ of himseH. in Christ: • Aber ihr eigentliches Wesen aJs NShe 
grilndet nicht in der dthnJichkeit>, sondern inn ihrer Kraft aJs Mitteilung ihrer 
seJbst·. p.385. 
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-double location- of theology, that is, the difference between a 
confession of faith and making God's saving presence identifiable 
where it is not confessed. 59 This so-called 'double location' of 
theology arises from its purpose in yielding knowledge about God 
but not exclusively in an ecclesial context. It is p,ossible 
because of the wider operation of God's saving work done in 
Christ: He is -the alpha and omega of all things, especially 
rational beings·. 60 
The idea of transignification is broader in scope than simply 
observation of certain linguistic usage, nor does it operate 
within a framework of closed systems. Instead, the idea of 
transignification functions in the formulating of the logical 
space wherein to relate the necessity to speak of salvation and 
the language of socio-philosophy in which it must be articulated. 
It focuses theological issues about the way in which God and the 
created order relate to each other. I am at pains to stress that 
discourse about salvation must be authentically human. In the 
context of social theory, this means making non-Christian socio-
philosophy part of theological discourse. It is what G. Steiner 
calls the naturalizing or bringing home of a mode of discourse 
within an interpretative process; a playing of ideas to ourselves 
within our own language. 61 The idea of transignification 
indicates an open form of analogy, demonstrating that it is the 
human context within ,which salvation is signified. Such 
discourse is only possible on the basis that the operation of the 
Holy Spirit is brought together with the work of Christ in 
59 J. Mfguez Bonino (1983) p. 42 - 44. 
60 T. Aquinas, S. Th. 1 a. ii & xliv. 
61 G. Steiner (1975) pp. 296-413. 
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disclosing God's saving purpose. 
Thus, there must be analysis and criticism of Hegel's reducing 
the relation between self and 'other' to knowledge of the 'other' 
by the self. As I have shown, alienation and 'otherness' are 
evocative categories in the Phenomenology - the evocation, that 
is, of the one excluded outside the totality of the single 'I'. E. 
Levinas, for example, gives a harsh warning that the 'other' 
cannot be so reduced by the, self to a neutral position or a 
position of service of the self. The 'other' must be "let be", his 
essay Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence being a 
sustained denouncing of the idea of a subjectivity reducible to 
'essence' or the mediated relation of self with self. 62 The 
'other', he says, ·figures as what is near in a proximity that 
counts as sociality, which ·excites· by its pure and simple 
proximity". Here is a correspondence between Christian and non-
Christian social theory which must be extended in order to allow 
God's salvation to be signified in the quality of human relation. 
In some ways this type of study is radical - that is, in 
relating a Christian commitment to a theology of sin and 
salvation to non-Christian social theory. This is seen 
particularly in the fact that Hegel, nor his interpreters 
Habermas, Fackenheim, Kojeve and others pose the question of 
alienation and the 'other ' in the same terms asa Christian 
social theorist. In other respects, the type of answer being 
given is less than radical, some form of analogical discourse in 
theology being characteristic of most words about God. 63 
62 E. Levinas (1981) p. 1£. 
63 T Aquinas says: 
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Sallie McFague captures this need for analogical discourse in her 
description of metaphor and analogy as the two spheres of 
thought that are most active in speaking about salvation. 64 
Aquinas spoke of the ·double truth about divine things ... on the 
side of our knowledge which variously responds to the truths of 
divinity·. 65 Theology, he says, issues from the light of faith, 
yet is not opposed to the best findings of philosophy. 66 
Without making a study of Aquinas, it is this principle that 
allows the familiar distinction between the thing signified (L. 
res significata ) and the mode of its Signification (m 0 d us 
significandi ) to be worked out through the medium of 
philosophy or, in our case, socio-philosophy. Even if Hegel's is an 
improper framing of divine 'Otherness' as an abstract principle, 
the key element is the common search amongst his interpreters 
for criticality regarding Hegel's ·Individuality In and · For Itself" 
amongst Christian and non-Christian theory. The analogical task 
A meaning expressed by words, which is the literal or historical sense, 
is discovered by getting the hang of the sentence. You find the Spiritual sense, 
by looking past the things signified by the literal sense to other realities 
behind them. 
Sunday Sermons, 20, quoted in St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts, Transl. T. 
Gilby (1955) pp. 18-19. 
64 For definition of symbol and metaphor as -basically a new or unconventional 
interpretation of reality- see S. McFague Metaphorical Theology (1983) pp. 40 f. 
65 T. Aquinas 1, Contra Gentes, 9. "There is a double canon for the theological 
truths we profess. Some surpass the ingenuity of the human reason, for instance 
the Trinity. But others can be attained by the human reason- 1, Contra Gentes,3. 
66 -From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely 
formed in the imagination, ... the stronger the intelligible light is in man-. T. 
Aquinas, ibid. 
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in interpreting Hegel is thus an apologetic one. It lies in 
preparing the ground for the gospel; a function concerned with 
salvation. 
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5. A. ALIENATION AND HUMAN SPIRITUALITY 
It may be helpful at this point to recall the criteria which 
have already been established in deriving a general 
interpretative framework for addressing the question of 
salvation in a social context. 
1. The task of soteriology includes illuminating analogies of the 
healing effect wrought in Christ in dialogue with non-Christian 
social theory. 
2. Soteriology is about the healing of what has been separated as 
a result of the Fall. This means the restoration of the Imago 
Dei in the self and humankind as inherently social. 
3. From 1. & 2. it follows that we might well learn from Hegel's 
critique of Kant's idea of the self as fixed and singular. He 
warns against an inherently non-relational view of the self. 
4. There is no idea of selfhood or relation in Hegel adequate for 
Christian understanding because he is tied to a logic of self-
determination not relation and communication. 
5. The need for recognition of the neighboring self or 'other' in 
its full historical identity. 
These criteria have been established as part of the task of 
discerning a more satisfactory understanding of human relation 
through dialogue with Hegel. Chapters 1-4 hav.e been about how 
to .break out of his 'I' - 'other' structure of relation which 
reduces the 'other' to a neutra'l position or a position of 
service of the self. If, from what we have already seen 
regarding the social nature of selfho.od, Hegel fails where he 
promised most, the question now is why develop further points 
ALIENATION .AND HUMAN SPIRITUALITY 
165 
Ch. 5 AUENATION AND ·SPIRITUAUTY" 
of contact with his notion of human potential? Why pursue the 
question of alienation and Hegelian spirituality? In this 
Chapter I raise the subject for two reasons. First, because it 
emerges as a matter of course as we proceed with the journey 
though the Phenomenology. §§ 438 - 671 of the 
Phenomenology, which are entitled Spirit, begin with the 
words: "Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality 
has been raised to truth". The actualization of rational self-
consciousness through its own activity takes on a spiritual 
character, the nature of which we shall discuss, in its relation 
to questions of the truth. Second, because there is a sense in 
which Hegel's quasi-theological use of language still functions 
pertinently as a focal metaphor in the resolution of problems 
concerning the overcoming of alienation through reason. 
Hegelian spirituality may be dead in the sense of providing a 
metaphysical key to the comprehension of all reality. His 
framing of the question of alienation and spirituality raises the 
issue of human relation and reasoning ability in an acute and 
relevant way. 
What then is to be done in introducing this Chapter? The first 
thing is to make clear again that it is in response to social 
problems of alienation that I have been arguing for an analogical 
model of theology that can say what God's salvation might be 
like in social terms. The second thing is that I am using Hegel 
only insofar as he helps us to explore the question of human 
potential as an issue of spirituality and community relation. 
The third thing is to point out that it is a mistake to talk about 
'the problem of alienation and human spirituality' as if there is 
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a single issue with which the Christian church has traditionally 
been concerned. One thing that Hegel teaches is that alienation 
is not so simple as to result in a single meaning but emerges as 
a whole network of meanings which cannot be presented in a 
single, homogeneous picture. Nevertheless, the question remains 
as to how to address the fact of alienation not only in the 
individual but also the social realm. For this reason, Hegel's 
treatment of spirituality in terms of the human capacity for 
community requires a framework within which to criticize his 
work effectively and to discern congeniality wherever possible. 
The whole corpus of Hegel's work bears upon human 
spirituality in the very limited sense of the conscious awareness 
of Reason. My special interest in this Chapter on human 
spirituality lies not in its being concerned, like Hegel, with the 
description of the stages of the Notion of Reason - the Ethical 
order, Culture, Morality and the rest - but, in the human capacity 
and potential for community given in reason. In Christian 
interpretation the very powerful paradox of human capacity and 
incapacity for community creates profound assessment problems 
regarding Hegel's description of spirituality. The question 
centers on the confidence in human reason, in particular, the 
ability of reason to represent the sum total of the social order 
and all human activity. It comes to a head in the 
Phenomenology's argument for a type of spirituality intrinsic 
to the nature of reason [was sie an sich is~ (489). Karl 
L6with interprets this passage in Christian overtones of the 
Logos as giving onto--Iogical- definition to humankind. 1 
There . is, he suggests, something inherent in each individual, by 
1 K. LOwith (1965) pp. 307·330. 
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the very fact that s/he is human, toward the potential for 
community. 2 If so, this human potential, as expressed in 
Hegel's terms of "spiritual essence ", requires careful 
assessment as the commingling of the human and divine natures. 
In Chapters 1-4 I have warned against Hegel's concept of God 
as a divine Being determined by the constraints of Kantian logic. 
In E. JOngel's words: "It would be correct to say of a God so 
understood that all things human were alien to him". 3 
Questions remain, however, regarding whether there is such a 
thing as natural human capacity for community Imago Dei-
what Hegel calls "spiritual essence "(439). If Hegel expresses 
the tendency in humankind for communal relation, albeit in a 
distorted fashion, the theological question is whether there are 
valuable aspects in his representation of the relation between 
human alienation and spirituality which must be stressed. 
5. B. HUMAN CAPACITY AND INCAPACITY4 
Non-Christian assessment of how Hegel relates spirituality 
to his notions of individual identity and community has 
commonly been broken down in two extreme ways. Critics have 
argued that Hegel displays a notion of spirituality that 
2 Aquinas talks about an innate bent in human nature towards reasonable living. 
Disputations, de Caritate 2, in T. Gilby (1955) p. 212 - 3. He quotes Aristotle's 
understanding of -virtue as a disposition to the best. Physics, vii. 3, 246b23. 
3 E. JOngel (1986) p. 297. 
4 I am indebted for this phrase to J.D. Zizioulas -Human Capacity and Human 
Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhoocf". Scot.Joum. of . TheoJ. Vol. 
28, pp. 401-448. 
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elevates the ideals of 'the Enlightenment' above an ethical point 
of view. Alternatively, the argument has been put that the ideals 
of ethical community are so inseparably linked in Hegel with 
totalizing ambitions of reason that the relation between 
spirituality and totality renders any reading of the 
Phenomenology legitimate only if used to criticize all forms of 
totalitarian thought. W. Kaufmann might represent the first 
view with his suggestion that spirituality in Hegel is a 
manifestation of God's revelation to the extent that happenings 
succeed because they are good: "Hegel's approach is not amoral. 
Although he finds the aim of history in its "result". 5 C. Taylor 
exemplifies the second option, suggesting that Hegel absorbs the 
Enlightenment drive towards freedom in an implicit affirmation 
of the destructive potential of modern society. 6 
Theological assessment is a complex matter. Insofar as the 
question concerns salvation in a social context as a cooperative 
endeavour between humankind and God, the question is a very old 
one indeed. Its history reaches back to the debate between the 
Alexandrian Fathers and Pelagius regarding the human capacity 
of free will, the incapacity brought by sin, and human relation to 
God. I do not intend to enter into the historical development of 
the question, except to note that Hegel's own protestant cultural 
context reflected this tension in the debate between orthodox 
Lutherans and the Aufklarer. L. Dickey takes the dispute 
between Augustine and Pelagius as illustrative of debate 
amongst the Aufklarer. They were philosophers, poets and 
5 Waher Kaufmann, -rhe Hegel Myth and Its Method- in A. Maclntyre, ed., 
(1972) p. 44. 
6 C. Taylor (1979) p. '130. 
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pastors immediately preceding Hegel, between 1748 - 1774, e.g., 
Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Spalding and Klopstock, who delineated 
their opposition to orthodox Lutheranism over this issue. 7 
Hegel, Dickey says, stands at the end of this tradition, tending in 
the 1790's to emphasize human capacity not incapacity. 
Orthodox Lutherans, he maintains, fell back on the dogmas of 
Augustinianism to counter the Aufklarer who set out to 
rehabilitate Pelagius. 8 He, like L6with, draws on recent 
commentators of Pelagius to illustrate Hegel's influences, the 
majority of whom conclude that Pelagius' theological views 
were partly contingent on grace but that to participate in 
salvation, humankind must bring itself into communication 
through thought with the divine logos. 9 
The above makes clear, and this is of vital and decisive 
importance to our theme, that in Hegel's designation of human 
spirituality as through the activity of reason we are to discern 
two aspects; human capacity and incapacity. On the one hand, we 
might talk with Aquinas about the building up of "human quality" 
through rational capacity. 10 On the other, human capacity 
having acquired sin as its content betrays the real depth of its 
alienation from God. With regard to human capacity, any 
propensity towards building up the community, Aquinas says, 
reflects the work of the Holy Spirit in implanting and sustaining 
7 L Dickey (1987) pp. 12 - 32. "[T]he Aufklllrer could be said to have been 
searching for what their detractors called "a compromise theology,' •.. voluntarist 
in a religious sense, activist In an ethical sense, civil in a human sense, and 
moderately synergist in a soteriological sense" (p. 26). 
8 L Dickey (1987) pp. 19 - 34. See also W. Jaeschke (1990) 2.1; 3.4; 3.5. 
9 L Dickey (1987) pp. 27 - 8 nn. 196 - 200. 
10 T. Aqulnas Summa Theologies, 2a - 2ae. xxiii. 2. 
HUMAN CAPACITY AND INCAPACITY 
170 
Ch. 5 AUENATION AND ·SPIRITUAUTY" 
of a potential for community: 
God, who moves all things to their due ends, implants in them dispositions to 
follow the purposes he assigns: wisdom disposes all things gracefully. 11 
He suggests a certain affinity with Hegel's affirmation that 
steps towards community are to be made through the activity of 
reason. In other words, there is a basis here for a positive and 
critical relation between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory in the human vocation to community regarding the 
rational capacity given to enable its possibility. 
With regard to the question of human incapacity, an inherent 
tendency against community requires that theology deals with 
another fundamental problem. For Christian theology, this is the 
problem of sin and its habitual charm for the human person. In 
drawing a connexion between alienation in Hegel and a Christian 
understanding of sin, I make no attempt to empty the cause and 
content of sin into philosophical theory. Warnings about 
'determinate' readings of sin which identify alienation with a 
particular state of consciousness instead of historical 
circumstances have rightly been sounded by many theologians of 
liberation. J. Sobrino writes: wEuropean theology approaches 
reality through the mediations of thought ... with a particular 
type of thinkingW, 12 Beware the historicist reductionism, he 
warns, which explains rather than changes the historical 
situation, The fact remains that for Christian theology there is 
something called sin which is like an obstacle interposed 
between individuals and between humankind and God, 13 
11 TA' · 'b'd . qUlnas, I I , 
12 Jon Sobrino (1985) pp, 15-16, 
13 -When I speak in any college about estrangement everybody knows what I 
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This theological problem of knowing how to respond to Hegel's 
emphasis on human rational capacity can be illustrated by brief 
comparison. Compare D. Solle's sympathetic reaction to Hegel's 
linkage between alienation and spirituality and the more 
cautious approach of W. Kasper. D. Solle, a proponent of 
liberation theology in western Europe and well known for her 
appropriation of Hegelian Christology writes: -For a rising 
European theology of liberation this criticism of human 
alienation, prompted by Hegel and carried through by Karl Marx, 
is automatically central, because Marx, turning Hegel upside 
down, noted alienation in the conditions of production in 
industrialism: 14 Taking over Hegel's idea of alienation at the 
heart of modern experience, she draws on the liberal concept of 
sin as cutting oneself off from God and neighbour, identified in 
the social effects of a society's industry, bureaucracy and 
consumer relations. A certain normative status is claimed for 
Hegelian influenced analysis to emphasize sin's social and 
structu ral natu re. 
By contrast, Kasper's feeling is that Hegelian social analysis 
is too much an expression of the modern desire for freedom from 
the problem of sin to be made normative in Christian 
interpretation He links Hegel's idea of alienation to the modern 
'autonDmistic' interpretation of humanity: -It is true that the 
problem of human alienation has been much discussed ever since 
Rousseau; but generally speaking the solutions offered have been 
mean, because they all feel estranged from their true being, from life, from 
themselves especially. But H I spoke of their all being sinners, they would not 
understand at all-. P. Tillich (1965) p. 98. 
14 Dorothee SOlle (1990) p. 61. 
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in purely immanent and autonomous term sw. 15 Without a 
substantively Christian perspective grounded in God's liberating 
activity in Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, he says, 
reading Hegel serves only as a humanist exercise in community 
ethics. 
S611e and Kasper illustrate the problem of divergent 
sympathies in reading Hegel theologically. On the one hand, is an 
emphasis on the human potential for liberating action (S6I1e). On 
the other, Hegelian spirituality cannot be reconciled with the 
intention of theology to relate an understanding of God to human 
experience (Kasper). They witness to the fact that in actual 
human experience the two categories, spirituality (in the sense 
of an innate longing for community) and sinfulness, are 
inseparably linked. If this is right, and humankind has potential 
(in sinfulness) for community, we are questioning the idea of 
community as intrinsic to the nature of the created gift of 
reason. This is an ontological question which asks about a 
destiny for community with God and one's fellows as an 
essential part of the Imago Dei. To let such a question guide my 
interpretation of Hegel is to recognize the spirituality in 
sinfulness paradox. It is not to suggest, as D. Cupitt might, an 
Hegelian influenced anthropocentric and voluntarist 
interpretation of spirituality: WAil meaning and truth and value 
are man-madew, he says, wand could not be otherwisew. 16 On the 
15 W. Kasper (1989) p. 88. . 
16 D. Cupitt (1984) p. 20. Note the similarity with J.A.T. Robinson's 1960 
interpretation of T1l1ich: -a statement is 'theological' not because it relates to a 
particular Being called 'God', but because it asks ultimate questions about the 
meaning of existence-. J. A. T. Robinson (1963) p. 51. 
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contrary, it is to understand soteriology as having two distinct 
but related aspects. The one is negative; being saved from fallen 
sinfulness. The other is positive; fulfilment of humanity's full 
communion with God and the reaching out to human destiny in 
creation. 17 
5. C. POSING THE PROBLEM OF SIN 
Given that defining a correspondence of meaning between 
Hegel's notion of alienation and a Christian interpretation of sin 
prepares us for a better understanding of salvation in a social 
context, how are we to understand and use the word 'sin'? I am 
reminded of Voltaire's despising of the Christian religion for 
making individuals aspire to escape their sinful condition: J e 
ne suis pas Chretien, mais c'est pour t'aimer mieux ["I am 
not a Christian, but it is in the interest of being able to love 
better"] 18 More recently, I think of J. Kahl condemnation of the 
doctrine of sin and salvation the "misery" of Christianity. 1 9 
Kahl quotes Karl Marx's Critique of Hege/'s Philosophy of Law: 
"For Germany, the critique of religion is essentially over." 20 It 
was the problem of sin, he says, from which humanist philosophy 
broke free. 
The question is not new with respect to Hegel scholarship. 
H.J. Paton commented in 1955 that -saints and philosophers alike 
17 See J.D. Zizioulas "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological 
Exploration of Person hood" . Scot.Joum. of . Theol. Vol. 28, p. 434. 
18 Voltaire, Epitre a Uranie, quoted in P. Gay (1970a) p. 387. 
19 See J. Kahl (1971). Also A. Perez-Esclarin (1980). 
20 J.Kahl, Ibid. 
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may be shocked at Hegel's undermining of Christian theism and 
its associated doctrines. 21 More recently, the question is a 
particularly pressing one in discussions about salvation in a 
social context. G. Gutierrez wrote in 1973: "Sin appears as the 
fundamental alienation, the root of a situation of injustice and 
exploitation. It cannot be encountered in itself, but only in 
concrete instances, in particular alienations." 22 Enrique 
Dussel, the contemporary Latin American theologian observes 
that "historical, social sin is transmitted by institutions - by 
cultural, political, economic, religious, erotic, and so on 
structures." 23 Sin, says Dussel, is part of the texture of 
society. But in what sense? One might well agree with Dussel 
about the social character of sin in the sense that one offence 
affects the lives of many. But this still ties us to a perspective 
from the individual and does not, I suggest, meet the challenge of 
attending to social matters. The issue is how to pose the 
problem of sin in a social context in such a way as to enable 
more adequate options for thinking about salvation. 
In particular, I suggest that we look at how Hegel denotes and 
demonstrates some of the deepest forms of alienation that a 
society can experience. Specifically in §§ 438 - 671 he is 
21 H.J. Paton (1955) p. 180. For links between Hegel's aim to reintegrate 
alienated consciousness back into humanity and L Feuerbach's radicalizing of this 
humanization of religion see Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity. -rhe 
consciousness of the infinite is nothing but the consciousness of the infinity of 
consciousness. To put it differently: in the consciousness of the infinite, the 
conscious subject has the infinity of his own essence as his objecr. Werlee, VI. 2 
- 3: 1. 36 - 7. 
22 G. Gutiltrrez (1974) p. 176. 
23 E. Dussel (1988) p. 22. 
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concerned with the form of social alienation that can be 
diagnosed as the 'spirit of individualism' [Geistes der 
Einzelheit] (§ 475) or Wgerm of destructionw (§ 476). He directs 
our attention especially to the one major form of social 
alienation that he calls atomicity [Punktualitat] (§ 482), that 
is, the non-existence of relation in either the individual self, 
family or nation state. From the outset of Ch. VI of the 
Phenomenology, Hegel attempts a uniting of the ideas of 
alienation and spirituality through human history's unfolding 
into supposedly yet more complete forms of unified 
consciousness. Alienation, especially that of atomicity, acts as 
an over-arching philosophical construct. It expresses a trans-
cultural experience, being used in §§ 438 - 671 of a range of 
historical and social situations including the Greek, Roman, 
Medieval and Enlightenment cultures, family relations, law and 
government, and events subsequent to the French Revolution. 
5. D. ATOMICITY AND THE PROBLEM OF SIN 
Nowhere in the Phenomenology does Hegel mention sin 
[Sunde} or original sin [Erbsunde]. Significantly, however, 
alienation is understood as an ultimate dimension of human 
nature 24 Lukacs writes: Wit is in Hegel we first encounter 
alienation as the fundamental problem of the place of man in the 
world and vis-a-vis the worldw• 25 Lukacs and A. Kojeve both 
claim Hegel to demonstrate alienation as the basic tenor of 
human existence for Hegel, commenting on his philosophic 
24 L.P.R. 3: 293 mentions a ·faU- but only whilst stressing the return of the 
world as the 'other' into the unity of the concept. On -Hegel's Philosophy as 
Anti-Christian or Christian?- see W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 381 - 387. 
25 G. LukAcs (1932) pp. xxiii - xxiv. 
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method as -purely -empirical- or -positivist- 26 In other words, 
Hegel demonstrates the fact of alienation not only as specific, 
partial relational failings which can be shown empirically, but 
also its deeper content and real tragedy in the human situation. 
Lukacs and Kojiwe remind us that for Hegel alienation is an 
objective social fact as well as being a subjective, personal 
trait. The noun form [Entfremdung] occurs twenty-nine times, 
the infinitive [Entfremden] three times, the present participle 
[Entfremdende] twice, and varying adjectival forms thirty 
times. The term alien [Fremd ] is a noun used as an adjective 
nearly torty times, often in association with the idea of 
externalization [Entausserung] which occurs nineteen times in 
the noun form, once as an infinitive [Entaussern] and five times 
adjectivally. It would not be too much to say that, in general, §§ 
438 - 671 are Hegel's plea for a recovery from the spiritual 
death or -loss of its essence- (§ 483) signified by what he calls 
atomicity and the 'spirit of individualism' [Geistes der 
Einzelheit] (475). 
Chapter VI of the Phenomenology usefully illustrates this 
type of alienation. It opens with a picture of ancient Greek 
society largely sterile in its relations and undergoing 
breakdown; 
a world which has completely lost the meaning for the self of something alien 
to it, just as the self has completely lost the meaning of a being-for-self 
separated from the world (439). 
Hegel's claim is that ancient Greece became a victim of 
26 A. Koj~ve (1969) p. 176. 
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'atomicity', implying the draining away of meaning with its 
failing social spirit. The 'spirit of individualism' is part of 
Hegel's language of alienation used to describe the passing of the 
Greek culture due to its failure, he would have us believe, to 
suppress increasing separatism: -the simple compactness of 
their individuality has been shattered into a multitude of 
separate atoms- (476). For example, the individual male youth 
who assumes an individualism in community affairs and war is 
said in §§ 471 - 474 to be atom-like, as is the warring state in 
isolation from its neighbors. (475 - 477). 
The experience is typical, he says, of the passing from the 
ancient Greek to Roman culture. §§ 444 - 483 on -The Ethical 
Order- trace an escalating sense of seriousness that begins with 
the mere inference of another's existence; -the existence of the 
children remains an alien [fremde] reality, a reality all its own-
(456). It extends to the fragmentation of a society and to the 
laying waste [b/o8es Verwusten] (482) of all social forms of 
organization. 27 This atomism or fragmentation is form of 
social alienation given in contrast to the ·Spirit of community-
(473). 28 The 'spirit of individualism' signifies a sickness in 
society, Hegel says, demonstrated by Antigone and the tensions 
she faces between social responsibilities and the new 'spirit' of 
-private end- (475) that would override them. Antigone, like all 
women in ancient Greece is distinguished by her presence and 
27 The phrase bla8ses VerwOsten will allow of stronger interpretation than A.V. 
Miller suggests - namely, naked devastation. 
28 Note the phrase -[dem hiJchssten Geiste des 8ewu8teins, der Gemeine] T. W.A. 
Vol. 3, p.351 and rendered in A.V. Miller as -the Spirifs highest form of 
consciousness, the Spirit of the community- ( 473). 
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role in the home; "her interest in centred on the universal and 
remains alien to the particularity of desire" (457). 
Traditionally, the brother or husband of the household is the one 
representing the alienation or split between family 
commitments and wider city-state concerns. In the male, "the 
self-contained life of the Family breaks up and goes beyond 
itself". (458) Creon in particular represents the new 'spirit of 
individualism' which alienates the family from the state and 
will extend the principle to inter-state relations: "He who 
wantonly attacked the Spirit's highest corm of consciousness, 
the Spirit of the community, must be stripped of his entire and 
finished being" (473). 
Consider the heart of the tension in the Antigone story -
namely, that there is no prospect for resolution from the 
conflict between her claims of 'otherness' and the progress of 
civic society except, that is , within an inclusive totality . 
N.either she nor Creon were wrong: Civic law and government are 
legitimate forms of reason but so are religion and tradition; 
"sticking steadfastly to what is right" (437). Hegel's diagnosis 
of the spiritual condition in this transition era suggests the 
'spirit of individualism' to be one of the deepest losses of 
meaning a society can experience. Regardless of the fact that 
we no longer live with the same conflict of priorities as those 
facing Antigone in her . choice between obedience to the old 
family-tribal laws and the new form of Greek civil society, 
Hegel identifies certain noncontemporaneous phenomena in 
social relations. I cannot but note in passing how this critique 
of Greek culture confirms a male dominated social hierarchy by 
interpreting the role of men as more 'spiritual' than that of 
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women. He somewhat curiously makes woman represent the 
spirit of individuality and man, in general, represent relation. 
29 Hegel's hindrances to an egalitarian anthropology is not, 
however, our main focus of attention. I must delimit discussion 
to what this 'spiritual' sickness means as the dispersal of 
society into "a sheer multiplicity of personal atoms ... alien to 
them and soulless as well" (481). 
The form this takes develops into a sickness or alienation. A 
most striking feature of §§ 477 - 483 is the near torrent of 
words to express alienation in the Roman state obsessed with 
individual civil rights, private citizenship and legal relations. In 
the space of a page we hear of what is abstract, arbitrary, 
capricious and without reality. He talks of soullessness, 
rigidity, empty singleness, essencelessness, solitude. H e 
speaks of being cut off, unreal and impotent, describing 
Roman relational content as a chaos that is frenzied and 
destructive, displaying atomicity and waste. There is 
almost a neurosis, he seems to say, about the drive to 
individuality in the Roman culture. It allows the individual to be 
thought of as 'Person', he says: "Personality. .. is the 
independence of consciousness, an independence which has 
actual validity" (479). His use of the word 'person', however, 
hints at a confusion in the principle of independence and the 
significance of personality: "Personal independence in the sphere 
of legal right ... is self-consciousness as the sheer empty unit of 
29 Genevieve Uoyd (1984) writes: "The pattern he (Hegel) introduces lends 
itself to the accommodation, containment and transcending of feminine 
consciousness, in relation to more mature 'male' consciousness- pp. 72 - 3. Also 
note R.C. Solomon (1983) -Hagel on Family and Feminism- pp. 538 - 546. 
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the person- (ibid.). 
Troubled by this problem of individualism which for . Hegel is 
institutionalized in Roman society, Hegel examines its causes 
and suggests that the Roman Empire so idolized power that a 
legal system capable of stabilizing relations was required; 
-legal right [is] ... mine '" as something whose validity is 
recognized and actuar (480). Problems ensue, he says, when 
power is made the basis of legality and relations consist in 
contracts concluded between free persons, causing the idea of 
the person to be defined in terms of legal rights and obligations 
and -to describe an individual as a 'person' is an expression of 
contempt- (ibid .. ). His hypothesis is built on the conception 
that Roman emperor worship is not worship of a person but the 
worship of power. The emperor has become -the titanic self-
consciousness that thinks of itself as being an actual living God-
because lower in society a legitimation of power manifests 
itself in orders that protect the self as non-relational and atom-
like (481). As J. Hyppolite writes: -The individual who (in vain) 
knows himself to be a person appears alone face to face with an 
alien domination which crushes him. ... The emperor's will .... 30 
No social framework conducive to the development of authentic 
personality can be based on a picture of society bound together 
by the law and the controlled deployment of power. 
These sections can plausibly be rejected as absurd in their 
claim that historical eras embody distinct but related shapes of 
alienation. Note, for example, how alienation is not a problem 
30 Jean Hyppolite (1974) p. 372. 
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that appears to threaten the movement of 'Spirit' in §§ 438 -
671 through the breakdown of the Greek city-states (objective 
'Spirit?, the Christian feudal world to its culmination in the 
French Revolution (self-alienated 'Spirit') and the Napoleonic 
period. To the contrary "Spirit ... must advance to the 
consciousness of what it is immediately... by passing through a 
series of shapes to attain to a knowledge of itself" (441). 31 
This is what he calls "the determinateness of alienation" 
[Bestimmtheit der Entfremdung] (529). 32 We might well be 
condemnatory of Hegel's goals for community being limited by 
the metaphysical constraints of absolute idealism and an 
epistemologically oriented grasp of the modes of consciousness. 
Clearly he wants to think that an estimation of traditional 
"ethical" value is possible as an arbitrary moment within the 
whole; "it is right because it is -what is right" (437). 
In terms of the development of a critical framework of 
thought. very real dangers lie in his accepting that there is no 
viewpoint from which to see if anything is wrong with a 
society's internal conviction or to express a negative judgement 
on a total social system. This explains the relative 
unimportance of Antigone's criticizing the cultural and societal 
rationale on which her society is based; "as soon as I start to 
31 See. Marx's general conclusion on Hegelian philosophy in "Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right - Introduction" (1844). C.W. 111. 
"The immediate task of philosophy. which is at the service of history ... is to 
unmask self estrangement (Selbst-entfremdung) in its unholy forms". p. 176. 
32 H.S. Hams says Hegers developing ideas of determination in The Jena 
System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics regarding the relation between totality 
& its parts preempts the Phenomenology's reconstruction of the Kantian poSition 
on judgement and syllogism. H.S. Harris in J.W. Burbidge and G. di Giovanni 
(1986) p. 98. 
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test them I have already begun to tread an unethical life" (437). 
33 "for what we are concerned with is not the point of view, 
but the object and content, which ought not to be self-
contradictory" (437). The positive point to be made, however, 
concerns the transcultural experience of the capacity for 
community that he perceives within the problematic character of 
human existence. 
5. E. ON THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT 
The reader is immediately wary at this point of Hegel's 
commitment to a metaphysics of totality. The concepts of 
alienation and totality cannot be separated as a brief word 
survey illustrates. The word totality [Totalitat] occurs only ten 
times in the Phenomenology and the word [Gesamtheit], also 
meaning totality, only once. Another interchangeable word for 
totality [VolIstandigkeit] occurs eleven times and the word for 
'the whole' [das Ganze] is found ninety-six times. Adjectival 
forms are more common, those from the root [gesamt] occurring 
three times, from [VolIstandig] eighteen times and from [ganz] 
over two hundred and twenty times. Hegel's spirituality is 
summarized, by Kojeve as follows: "Only philosophic Discourse 
can achieve Truth, for it alone is related to the concrete Real-
that is, to the totality of the reality of Being". 34 
33 For links between Hegel's acritical concept of ethical or communal life and the 
divinity of the state see J. Plamenatz (1963) Ch. 4, esp. pp. 234f. LW. Dickey 
(1987) describes Sittlichkeit as an elastic term which collapses all realms of 
experience; natural, social, political into one principle of action. pp. 181-5. 
34 A. Kojeve (1969) p. 178 n. 2. 
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The dangers are all too obvious. On the basis of the 
conclusion of Chapter 4 that the 'other' is a most important 
category for subverting the totality of Hegelian logic, we are 
deeply suspicious of Hegel's concept of totality and the trust he 
places in any determinate progress of reason. Totalizing reason 
is no longer enough because the 'other' comes to us from beyond 
its horizon. 35 As J. Derrida writes: "The "we" of the 
Phenomenology of the Mind ... encloses itself in the circle in 
order to know sense". 36 Derrida's condemnation is not far 
removed from Habermas's observations already noted as to 
Hegel's self-enclosed notion of spiritual totality. He decries 
Hegel's "infinite processing of the relation-to-self that 
swallows everything finite within itself". 37 Habermas does 
not cease to remind of the traceable descent from Hegel's 
philosophy of consciousness into Kautskyite reformism and 
Stalinist totalitarianism: "The totality of instrumental reason 
finds its expression in totalitarian society." 38 Thus we are 
reminded that postmodernity - insofar as it is a single 
35 E. Dussel (1985) calls this the analectical moment, contrasting ano-
(beyond) with dia-(through). pp. 158 - 160. 
36 J . Derrida (1978) p. 276. Ch. Six of Writing and Difference exemplifies 
Derrida's perceived need to subvert the idea of totality in Hegel through 
encountering distance and separation. In M.C. Taylor's words: 
Something always remains that resists the powerful thrust of Aufhebung. This 
remain(s) is an exteriorlty that can never be completely interiorized; 
it is ungraspable, Inassimilable, indigestible. This exteriority is the OTHER 
exteriority, -without correspondence with the Hegelian concept of exteriority.-
Such an exteriority ... the problem of the bastard: M.C. Taylor (1987) p. 270. 
37 J. Habermas (1987) p. 36. 
38 J. Habermas in R.J. Bemstein E d. (1986) p. 73. J. E. Grumley (1989) 
traces the -historicist stream- of totality thinking from Hagel to the present. 
ON THE PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT 
184 
Ch. 5 AUENATION AND ·SPIRITUAUTY" 
movement - condemns the totalizing drive of modernity, and of 
Hegelian philosophy in particular. 39 
Without doubt, Hegel's idea of the determinateness of 
alienation moves us onto slippery ground with respect to 
knowing what sort of determination is meant. Determinate 
alienation for whom? From what? In which political, economic, 
cultural, psychological context is alienation determinate? 40 
Analogy may be the meat as well as the spice of theological life 
but Hegel's concept of alienation and spirituality, no matter 
how much it is subjected to interpretative critique, may well be 
so fundamentally misleading that it impedes rather than enlivens 
soteriological understanding. There are important questions 
here, and thus I distinguish Hegel's denoting alienation as an 
inherent force in humanity from his interpretative commitment 
to a philosophical metaphysics of totality. 41 By Hegel's 
denotative treatment of alienation and spirituality I mean that 
which describes or demonstrates cogently. Connotative 
reasoning is taken to mean the seeking to persuade and the giving 
of insight in addition to that drawn from denotative arguments 
based on observation and probability. We need to distinguish 
39 "Postmodemists distrust metanarratives; there is a deep suspicion of Hegel, 
Marx and any form of universal philosophy". M. Sarup (1989) p. 132. This is a 
generalization drawn from attacks by Lyotard and Foucauh on Hegelian Marxism. 
40 For the breadth of definitions of 'alienation' derived from Hegel in Marx see J. 
Plamenatz (1975) pp. 139 - 42. Also N. Lash (1981) who looks at the four 
main aspects of alienation in Marx's Paris Manuscripts; alienation from nature, 
the individual as worker, his species-being or human essence and from fellow 
human beings. Ch. 14 • esp. pp. 170 - 191. 
41 G. R. G. Mure (1940) is a still useful summary of Hegel's notion of truth 
oonsisting in totality. pp. 165 - 175 
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Hegel's denotative treatment of alienation from his quasi-
theological portrayal of the notion of spirituality. This being 
the case, it is possible to incorporate lessons learned from Hegel 
of the general pointlessness, meaninglessness and irrationality 
of social atomicity. 
5. F. THE CONTENT OF SPIRITUALITY 
On the basis of this distinction, the next step in assessing 
Hegel's treatment of alienation and spirituality is to look at 
how he sets goals for community. The most penetrating 
description of spirituality offered by Hegel in Chapter VI of the 
Phenomenology is in its closing words: 
it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the 
form of pure knowledge (671). 
Spirituality is not just about a religious yearning for God. It is 
about how knowledge of God is realized concretely - (in Hegel's 
sense of 'concrete' from L. concrescere; to grow together). 42 
Two problems emerge when speaking about the content of 
spirituality. 
1. The first concerns the atheistic implications of Hegel's very 
use of the words alienation and spirituality. The second is 
about Hegel's own failure to realize the spirituality of which he 
speaks concretely. With regard to the first problem, the obvious 
danger for a Christian interpretation is that Hegel's very use of 
the words alienation and spirituality risks their becoming 
arbitrary and in the end meaningless. H.S. Harris says that Hegel 
42 On the meaning of 'qoncrete' in H~el see E. Jiingel (1976) p. 32 For Hegel's 
own definition see his Aesthetik (new ed., Berlin, 1955) p. 108 f. 
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is influenced in this by the Platonic idea of the -truly beautiful 
bond- of reason between the one and the many, the divine and the 
human. 43 Hegel's general project, he thinks, is a reemployment 
of Greek ontology in the search for a unification of experimental 
and formal sciences, with religious and speculative reason. 44 
J.N. Findlay contextualizes the concept of spirituality in Hegel 
within the goal of understanding its -final causation- after the 
manner of Plato and Aristotle. 45 
2. The second danger, as R. Engels observed, not long after Hegel 
wrote, is that Hegel's overall sense of alienation and 
spirituality fails to be mediated 'concretely'. It is treated, he 
says, merely as a principle of thought transcending and prior to 
society and politics. 46 This danger is seen particularly plainly 
in §§ 521 f. where the relation between noble, ignoble 
consciousness and the -actuality- of wealth is summarized by 
anticipating the resolution of these historical conflicts in the 
more 'real' history of thought: 
What we have here, then, is that all the moments execute a universal justice 
on one another, each just as much alienates its own self, as it forms itself 
43 H.S. Harris (1983) p. 109. He draws on Plato's Timaeus, 31 c - 32a. 
44 H.S. Harris, Introduction to The Jena System in J.W. Burbidge and G. di 
Giovanni (1986) pp. xiii - xxiii. Since Parmenides the unity between being and 
thought was the ultimate concern for Greek classical thought. Cf. The Sophist 
237 E 1. where Plato wants to show that non-being has a relative reality of its own 
within a movement in which being and non-being qualify each other. In the text, 
the problem centres around the idiom ov with its derivatives to ov (that which 
is), 'to ~v (that which is one), J11l oV'ta (that which is not one). J11l ov (that which 
has no being). 
45 J.N. Findlay (1958) p. 46. ( ,\ 
I"~J 
46 R. Engels, ~he Revolution against Hegel" in L.S. Feuer Ed.tpp. 237 - 256. 
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into its opposite and in this way inverts it. True Spirit. however, is just 
this unity of the absolutely separate moments .... (521). 
"Spirit" may be mediated in the social world but, in this instance 
at least, alienation is not overcome there. 
More recently, Raymond Plant is suspicious of Hegel's 
spirituality for the same reasons; it removes alienation from 
immediate social and political life. It becomes, he thinks, a 
philosophic appropriation of immediate conditions. 47 For 
example, some parts of §§ 488 - 537 on "Culture and its Realm 
of Actuality" attempt to deal with specific conditions of 
alienation in Medieval European society and with culture 
[Bi/dung] as essentially a social phenomenon. Hegel especially 
mentions state power, wealth, the position of the nobility, the 
common people or 'ignoble consciousness' and general pressures 
leading up to the French Revolution. Alienation occurs in the 
loss of individuality over against both state-power and wealth: 
"Dominion and wealth therefore confront the individual as 
objects" (§ 495). Hegel's main intention, however, is to show 
that state-power represents universal consciousness over 
against independent consciousness. He is imposing the 
philosophical construct of the stages of consciousness onto the 
very real issues of power and wealth: 
It pg noble consciousness] ... sees in the sovereign power a fetter and a 
suppression of its own being-for-self, and therefore hates the ruler ... 
and is always on the point of revolt. It sees, too, in wealth, by which it attains 
to the enjoyment of its own self-centred existence, only the disparity 
with its permanent essence; since through wealth it becomes conscious of itself 
merely as an isolated individual (501). 
47 R. Plant (1973) pp. 25 1. 
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Alienation in thought is merely reflected by alienation in the 
social world, embedded in social conditions. 48 
What possibility then is there, for the Christian theologian to 
reflect on whatever good exists among the fruits of Hegel's 
critique of social atomism? In this Chapter, I have been 
attempting to take a positive attitude towards Hegel wherever 
possible because he grasps the socially destructive effects of 
atomicity. If, however, Greek monism not Christian soteriology 
lies behind his notion of spirit as the expression of a natural 
potential, it seems that we are tied to an underlying non-
Christian image of spirit as embodying a form of rational 
freedom. 49 Similarly, if Hegel's ambiguous use of the term 
spirituality fails concretely to express fundamental human 
reactions in the face of the fear of alienation, Christian 
soteriology loses little in not exploring what might be liberating 
in his human spirituality. 50 
I suggest two answers in response to these points. The first 
is by example, and the second by way of constructive argument. 
48 R. Norman (1976) makes this point, p. 95. 
49 A yet worse scenario would be that interpretation of Hegel could not escape his 
establishing the sort of continuity claimed in his Philosophy of History: -The 
German world took up the Roman culture and religion in their completed form-. 
P.H., p. 342. On this vision of spirit and historical domination see T. 
Schroyer, The Critique of Domination (1973); E. Dussel (1985) Ch.s 1 & 2 . 
. Also M. Horkheimer and T. Adomo (1956) Ch. XII ·Ideology· for Mussolinrs being 
influenced by Pareto's reading of Hegel (p. 196). In contrast, S. Averini argues 
against Hegel's being a nascent German nationalist (1972) esp. pp. 240 - 1. 
50 Note J. Derrk:la's comment on Hegel's treatment of the shared need to overcome 
alienation: ·1 have wanted to show that Hegel's reaction is the fundamental human 
behaviour-. (1978) p. 258. Quoted from G. 8ataille's Hegel, la mort. 
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1. The first response is to refer to those Christian theologians 
who, reading Hegel, have attempted to reappropriate aspects of 
his thought. Earlier this century, E. Przywara, like Hegel, 
directed individual identity towards a teleological spirituality 
or "unity of completeness" to which the self is objectively 
related. He refers to a transcendentality or a striving 
outwards from the self having, like Hegel, identified the three 
main activities of human consciousness as immanence or 
immediacy, transcendence of consciousness and a unity in 
thought. 51 More recently, Hans Kung's The Incarnation of God 
is a prime example of someone using the fruits of Hegel's 
Christological thought to develop directions for Christian 
spirituality. Kung allows Hegel's vision of the incarnation to act 
as a corrective emphasis on the humanity of God. 52 D. M. 
Schlitt takes the triadic movement of Hegelian logic between the 
spheres of individuality, universality and particularity as a 
reformulation of Trinitarian theology. 53 Schlitt maintains a 
dichotomy between Hegelian spirituality and the Christian 
confession. 54 He recognizes, however, that there is value in 
Hegel's conviction that spirituality remains but an empty word 
if the human capacity for community is not grasped. 
51 P. E. przywara (1935) pp. 119 - 127. 
52 H. KOng (1987) Ch. 8. "Hagel ... appeals to the fact that this unity of God and 
man has been revealed in Christ. How can we then dispute the possibility of such a 
unity in the case of Hegel's philosophy, whilst at the same time presupposing it in 
that of our own Christology?" p. 431. 
53 D.M. Schlitt (1984) "The movement of Spirit ... is for Hegel the movement of 
the consciousness of God ... Trinity, absolute subjectivity" p. 228. 
54 D.M. Schlitt (1984) 'Hagel's intended immanent and consistent deductive 
argument always presupposes a movement from finite to infinite" p. 273. 
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2. Merely to refer to what others have done is inadequate, 
however, if that which makes humanity capax infiniti or capax 
Dei, according to Hegel, is theologically inadequate. Here we 
face the full consequences of Hegel's motif of totality or 'true' 
infinity; the subsuming of Enlightenment philosophy, religion, 
faith and social conditions within the idea of spirituality 
ideally present in every human consciousness: ·Consciousness 
experiences both sides (particularity and totality) as equally 
essential moments· (418). 55 As presented in the text, the 
character of spirituality in §§ 438 - 671 is decidedly post (or 
sub-Christian), offering an autonomous spirituality apart from 
the presence and person of the Holy Spirit. Hence the need to 
distinguish between denotative and connotative argument 
when incorporating Hegel's insights into a Christian soteriology. 
This, I have suggested, is not to use Hegel's spirituality as a 
model for theology in terms of a literal description of human 
potential in overcoming social forms of alienation. Nor is it to 
say that what Hegel calls spirituality is an arbitrary use of a 
category which bears no significance whatever in terms of 
creation Imago Dei. These are not the only two alternatives 
before us. Rather, it is to propose reasons why analogical 
reasoning helps us to articulate theologically what God's 
salvation is like in social terms. Hegel speaks of human reason 
as having a certain potential inherent in its nature. This 
55 For Hegel's distinction between faith and religion see the -Berne Plan- of 
1794 which distinguishes religion and theology by suggesting that the latter 
maximize t~e rationality of the Idea of God. H.S. Harris (1972) pp. 508 - 510. 
Also, ~he Frankfurt Sketch- (1798) in which faith is a mode of union with the 
object of belief and religion is a form of power set up to confine human activity. 
Ibid. pp. 512 - 515. 
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potential or capacity, I have suggested, reflects the created 
human orientation towards community which requires rational 
activity and its proper direction. Hence, it is possible to use 
Hegel's own goal setting exercise to identify trans-cultural 
forms of social alienation that reflect the loss of meaning 
associated with atomicity, and other forms of social 
deformation. 
The passages we have considered have been disturbing ones, 
focussing again on the fragmentation of consciousness caused by 
the need to escape alienation in the real world. They are meant 
to disturb us, Judith Shklar believes, Hegel's intention being to 
expose the vanity of modern forms of ethical society life by 
showing how critical ethical theory can only be interior to 
totality or the "essence of self-consciousness" (437). 56 
Hegel, better than most, expresses the fact that atomism and 
individualism is an obstacle to individuality and community in 
any age. Merely to posit community as a goal of human potential 
is not, however, to be able to overcome fear and domination 
historically. The goals that Hegel sets for community may yield 
only indecency and waste, it being a short step from his 
explanation of alienation within an overall vision of spirituality 
to the assumption that alienation can, and perhaps must, be 
controlled in order to facilitate that vision. 57 
56 J. Shklar (1976) p. 85. 
57 .See Wyschogrod's (1985) Spirit in Ashes on links between alienation in 
Hegel and "the man-made mass death of the twentieth century. "In making the fear 
of violent death ... the foundation of self-consciousness .•. consciousness must 
experience 1he vicissitudes of concrete existence, as well as epistemological doubt, 
if Spirit is to mature". p. 120. 
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Complete rejection of the Hegelian enterprise, however, 
including its attempt to reconstruct a non-alienating 
intersubjectivity, is to risk denying the rational capacity for 
community given to humankind as integral to selfhood. 58 A 
spirit of discernment :~ must be practised in liberating 
whatever is of value in his work. Since humankind is made in 
God's image, each person has the ability to set and to assess the 
content of human relation and community. 59 To this end, my 
aim has been to incorporate ideas learned from Hegel and his 
interpreters of the human problem of sin and alienation, utilizing 
his insights to show how salvation is signified concretely in 
signs and acts of healing across the social spectrum. 
58 Note the parallel with Habermas's warning against a complete rejection of 
cultural modernity, including that which points towards liberation in the Hegelian 
heritage. He does not want '0 throw out the baby with the bathwater-. J. 
Habermas-Neoconservative Cultural Criticism- in R.J. Bernstein (1985) p. 93. 
59 T. Aquinas Summa Theologica. 2a - 2ae. xxiii. 7. He quotes from Ps. Ixxii. 
28. 
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6. A. HEGEL'S HOPES FOR COMMUNITY 
I move now to Chapters VII and VIII of the Phenomenology. In 
Chapter VII, Hegel makes his first major exposition of the 
relation between theology and socio-philosophy on the basis of 
the speculative concept of religion. (By speculative understand 
Hegel's total comprehension of all the various forms of 
consciousness). Chapter VIII reaches a vantage point in the 
sections on -Absolute Knowing-, bringing together the defining 
features of his idea of relation in -the reconciliation 
[Versohnung] of consciousness- (794). As ever, it is difficult to 
dig Hegel's meaning out from the obscure text. However, from 
this vantage-point in the unfolding the drama of consciousness 
towards -the totality of its moments- (788) we can see the 
emergence of what he calls a new shape of Spirit. In short, it is 
about the unity of universal self-consciousness and the ultimate 
object of respect; -it unites the objective form of Truth and of 
the knowing Self in an immediate unity- (805). His concern is 
with the reconciling of alienated consciousness. 
The central issue facing us has been well set by Habermas 
when he writes: -Hegel cannot obtain the aspect of reconciliation 
... from self-consciousness or the reflective relationship of the 
knowing self-. 1 Hegel's, he says, is a bad 'dialectic' of 
1 J. Habermas (1987) p. 29. Cf. S.B. Smith (1989) who also locates Hegel's 
project in problems of the divided self. He quotes Hegel: "The need for philosophy 
arises when the power of unifICation disappears from the life of man- p. 17. 
Werlce 2: 22. Unlike Habermas, Smith refuses to find in Hagel even limited 
inspiration for the communal spirit: -Hegel resisted the appeal of 
communtarianism as profoundly at odds with the deepest aspirations of modernity"' 
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unresolved division between subject and object. It speculatively 
subsumes all community questions under the concept of the 
Absolute and the idea of totality. Speculative thinking describes 
Hegel's theoretical framework for pure philosophical activity, 
and there can be no balking at the fact that for Hegel knowledge 
of the Absolute involves some sense of the unity of all historical 
processes. Recall the Introduction to the Phenomenology wh ich 
made this plain; "cognition ... excluded from the Absolute, is 
surely outside of the truth" (74). 
Of interest here is relation between Hegel's speculative hopes 
for community and Habermas's substantive use of teleological 
reasoning . Habermas writes: "Reaching understanding is the 
inherent telos of human speech". 2 This is the object of his 
paradigm shift from Hegelian self-determined to communicative 
reason. In the study so far, I have shown points of connaturality 
between spirituality in Hegel and Habermas's giving content to 
community through the idea of communicative intent. 3 
Habermas makes language not reason per se the substance of 
sociality. It is still the reasoned speech act itself, however, 
which provides communicative effects when directed towards 
understanding. T. McCarthy writes: "Habermas wants ... to 
conceive of action theory as a reconstructive science concerned 
with the rational reconstruction of universal competences". 4 
He is described by R.J. Berstein as a guardian of reason, standing 
against the mood of the times to eschew critical and 
pp. xi; 158 - 64;. 230. 
2 J. Habermas (1987 a) p. 287. 
3 See especially Ch. 3. 
4 T. McCarthy (1978) p. 335. 
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reconstructive reason. 5 In other words, there is some 
similarity between Habermas's setting community as a goal and 
Hegel's giving content to community through rational capacity. 
The reason for my interest in this relation is the challenge to 
the Christian theologian from both Hegel and Habermas to speak 
more adequately of community. Hegel, for example, wants to 
provide for the historical realization of a rational unity in a 
post-Christian context; to "actualize this unity". The Christian 
religion, he says, must be superseded by the new speculative 
logic, his language of spirituality describing a higher unity for 
the individual with the infinity of objective relation or Absolute 
Knowing. 6 W. Jaeschke elaborates this theme by noting that 
Ch. VIII of the Phenomenology, entitled "Absolute Knowing", 
draws upon metaphysical aspects of Christianity. 7 He affirms 
the rational content of Christian dogma expounded by Hegel in 
"The Revealed Religion" as "the self-certainty of the community", 
pointing out how Ch. VIII builds upon the "relationship-of-
consciousness" between the divine and human. 8 
The need to make a closer definition of possible hopes for 
community has already been illustrated. As I have shown, there 
is certainly no shortage of discussion on the subject. However, 
the striking feature of the study so far is the extent to which 
clear theological grounding is often lacking in this task. 
S R.J. Bemstein (1985) p. 25. 
6 See Hagel, The Difference Essay, p. 20 - 2. for an earlier treatment of 
speculation as raising individual identity to consciousness in a move to unity with 
othemess. 
7 W. Jaeschke (1990) pp. 186 - 207. 
8 W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 192. 
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Obviously this is a large question to try to address in a single 
study and to a large extent my arguments have been and continue 
to be rather skeletal. I hope, however, that they are not 
insubstantial and provide a reasonable indication of the type of 
analogical thought which, I believe, provides ways of attempting 
answers. The nub of the matter is threefold: 
1. Why do Chapters VII and VIII of the Phenomenology move to a 
position beyond the idea of community known in wThe Revealed 
ReligionW (748 - 787)? Should anything still be learned from his 
belief that Christianity provides merely a provisional answer to 
social needs? wFor it (consciousness) steps out of its actual 
world into pure consciousness, yet is itself generally still in the 
sphere of the actual world and its determinatenessw (527). The 
experience of faith, we have been reminded, is exposed by 'the 
Enlightenment' as an attempted escape from the objective world: 
"Pure consciousness, namely, is reflection out of the world of 
culture .... coming under the determinateness of alienation" 
[Bestimmtheit der Entfremdung] (§ 529). The Christianity he 
experienced did not fully meet his basic insight that human 
experience in its inner life and public spheres is divided, 
frustrated and fearfu I. 
2. What is inadequate in Hegel's own superseding of the Christian 
understanding of community? His notion of the reconciling 
power of reason rests in the teleological hope of conscious 
knowledge of the pure 'idea'; "its fulfilment consists in perfectly 
knowing what it is, in knowing its substancew (808). 9 
9 Compare Kant's stipulation that conscious knowledge of the Absolute is 
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Speculative reason is the link between 'spirituaf strength and 
social reformation; the power whereby humankind finds its own 
divinity: ·superseded individuality... through determination, to 
the universal· (789). Why have his hopes for reason permeating 
all reality been so discredited in recent years? 
3. What kind of thought is able to sublate Hegel's own inadequate 
understanding of community? Not least is the question of how 
there can be universal hopes for community in a fragmented and 
atomistic society. 10 This is an especially acute question for 
theology when seeking to understand salvation in a social 
context since, in addressing this question, we are concerned 
with the communal life of the society in which we are placed. 
Each society is highly specific, with particular needs, 
characteristics and sense of history. How are the universal 
claims lying at the heart of a Christian soteriology to have 
bearing upon an infinite number of different social contexts 
without postulating Hegel's or another idea of totality? The 
following sections of this Chapter, that is, 6. B, 6. C and 6. D 
address the questions raised above in 1-3 respectively. 
Jmpossible because, ·AII philosophy is either knowledge arising out of pure reason, 
or knowledge obtained by reason from empirical principles· (I. Kant, C.P.R. A 841 
I B 869) and both pure and empirical philosophy reach an impasse before the 
concept of God. 
10 In Raymond Plant's words: 
The intellectual problem for ... theology is how this general and universal vision 
lying at the heart of Christian faith and thought can be brought to bear upon 
societies. with different histories, identities and sense of tradition. 
In ·Pluralism and Political Theology· in Vision and Prophecy. The Tasks of Social 
Theology Today, Centre for Theology and Public Issues, Occasional Paper No. 23, 
p.6. 
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6. B. HEGEL'S CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY 
It is not an insignificant hazard when reading Hegel that he 
raises more questions than he answers. This is particularly true 
regarding his somewhat obscure references to the Christian 
community. In the Phenomenology the passages explicitly 
about community [Gemeinschaft] usually refer to the -Revealed 
Religion- (748-787) which is, says Hegel, an extended form of 
Christ-consciousness that intuitively unites the divine and the 
human. It does not, he says, grasp the significance of this unity 
rationally: -Its reconciliation ... is in its heart, but its 
consciousness is still divided against itself- (787). He wants 
his science of consciousness to mirror the more dynamic 
movement of the Absolute: -The implicitly available unity of 
consciousness and self-consciousness does not, therefore, yet 
exist for the community, although it is the community's concept 
to actualize this unity-. 11 
The Christian community is explained as a sequel to natural 
and ancient Greek religions because of its conscious sense of the 
divine Spirit being present in humanity: wGod is sensuously and 
directly beheld as a Self, as an actual individual man- (754). 12 
Recall J. N. Findlay's rooting of Hegel's concept of the Absolute in 
a variant of Platonism 
which human life can 
function of thought. 13 
11 w. Jaeschke (1990) p. 206. 
which says that the highest thing to 
attain is knowledge of the unifying 
Findlay's 'revisionary metaphysical' 
12 See Q. Lauer (1976) pp. 244-255. 
13 J.N. Findlay (1970) chs. VII; VIII; XV, esp. pp262f. Hegel is understood as 
modifying Aristotle's categories of scientific and metaphysical knowledge in 
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reading of Hegel, as we have seen, suggests that a classical 
rooting of Hegelian speculation is necessary in order to 
understand the unifying principle of thought that transcends and 
is prior to nature, knowledge and human relation. Complete or 
absolute hopes for community are integral to Hegel's idea of "the 
whole" [das Ganze] (801). 
Not until the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
(1821 - 31) does Hegel more fully expound the 'spiritual' unity of 
philosophy and Christianity that he thinks is possible in the 
Christian community and beyond. 14 It becomes more obvious in 
the Lectures that his passionate desire is a wanting to heal the 
rift between the "so-called [pure] thinking of the Enlightenment" 
and what he deemed a doctrinal or positivist theology. 15 
Here in the philosophy of religion it is more precisely God, or reason in 
principle, that is the object. God is essentially rational; is rationality that is 
alive, and as Spirit is in and for itself. 16 
Here, the community is supposedly less than essentially rational, 
less than self-conscious of its union with the Absolute; 
it has the character of a content produced from consciousness for which Spirit 
yearns •.. it is not yet in itseff its own content- (768). 
important ways that can be seen via his critique of the Kantian categories. He 
retains much from Plato's theory of forms, notably his retaining of what Plato 
calls anamnesis in the concept of Erinnerung. 
14 L.P.R., Vol. 1, Intro 1824, § 38 f. 
1 5 L.P.R., Vol. 1, Intro. 1824, § 38. 
16 L.P.R., Vol. 1, Intro. 1824, § 53. See P. Gay (1970a) Ch. 3 on the 
Enlighten ment thought of Galileo, Boyle and Newton as having changed intellectual 
outlook more drastically than Reformed doctrine. For Hegel against the 
'Enlightenment theology of reason' see L.P.R., ibid., W1, W2 (Mise. P.), p. 122 
n.26. 
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As Gillian Rose observes, when understood speculatively, the 
Revealed Religion is opposed to what Hegel presents as orthodox 
Christianity: "The speculative reading of religious presentation 
explicates the contradiction between consciousness' definition 
of the absolute and its real existence. It is thus a 
phenomenology" . 17 According to Hegel's interpretation of 
knowable reality, the Christian community must progress to a 
post-Christian state of Absolute Knowing. 
This tells us why Hegel moves to a position beyond the idea of 
community known in "The Revealed Religion". It is because of its 
incorporation within the inclusive totality of Absolute Knowing. 
The further question was whether anything should still be 
learned from his criticism that Christianity provides merely a 
provisional answer to social needs. Over general questions lead 
to over exploited assertions about 'the social' as a locus of 
salvation. Hegel's challenge does come in the form of an over 
general question. Yet, something is to be gained from it, I 
believe, if it serves as a call to commitment and action. What do 
I mean by this? 
i) First, it means that in answering the question: How are we to 
understand salvation in a social context? we must be prepared to 
enlarge our vision of what salvation is about. The orthodox, 
Protestant community known to Hegel's experience was reminded 
that the revelation of God's purpose was inadequately understood 
if restricted to their own private fellowships. For Hegel this 
17 G. Rose (1971) p. 94. It is debatable whether the "Revealed Religion" in the 
Phenomenology is orthodox Christianity. See J. ~rkes (1983) who suggests the 
Hegel's notion of the "ever-prese~nt" redemptive possibility of Divine Spirit may 
be a viable theological position after the demise of Neo-Orthodoxy. 
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meant incorporating socio-economic ideas learned from the 
Scottish economists A. Smith, J. Steuart and A. Ferguson into the 
doctrines of Lutheran piety. In the words of L. Dickey: -Hegel's 
problem was how to turn the arguments of the Scottish 
Enlightenment to the advantage of the religiopolitical ideal of 
Protestant civil piety-. 18 In our own time, I suggest it means 
that it is not enough merely to say that the transforming energy 
of the cross has social implications. We must increasingly find 
forms of analogical thinking which stimulate reassessment of 
the soteriological content of the Christian faith. 19 
ii) Second, it means that in answering the question: How are we 
to understand salvation in a social context? we must be prepared 
to enlarge our understanding of what salvation is about. As 
we have seen, it is hard even to say what one is talking about 
when one speaks of the social. Salvation, I have emphasized, is 
the fulfilment and final perfection of what is proper to created 
being, in Christ, through the Holy Spirit. In K. Barth's words; 
-salvation is its eschaton .... being which has a share in the 
being of God ... an eternal being which is hidden in God-. 20 
The major question of this thesis has been about breaking with 
our philosophic heritage that is caught between the single 'I' and 
18 L. Dickey (1987) p. xi. Note how the concept of folk-religion [Volksreligion] 
functions in the "TObingen EssayW of 1793 in an ethico-political sense: wHow must 
folk-religion be constituted? .•.. It must be so constituted that all the needs of life 
- the public affairs of the State are tied in with itw. In H.S. Harris (1972) p. 
499. 
19 Paul Fiddes' Past Event and Present Salvation draws on Abelard's primarily 
subjective locus for salvation and extends it to the social context. (1989) pp. 
141 f. "We must then try to understand the cross as having some effect upon the 
whole structure of human life and society-. p. 152. 
20 K. Barth C.D. IV 11 p. 8. 
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the universal 'We'. I have argued that Christian social theory 
need neither dissolve into a perspective from the 'I'nor accept 
some notion of society as a collective subject. 21 Neither 
alternative is acceptable because neither offers more adequate 
options that avoid both a restricted subjectivism and a notion of 
society as a single, static entity. Thus, enlarging our 
understanding of the fulness of salvation includes the question: 
-What will it mean for our understanding of the social?-
Hi) Addressing this question involves enlarging movement 
between Christian and non-Christian social theory. Using 
Aquinas's idea of theology as a second order, reflective activity, 
I have argued that there is no abyss that separates the ana/ogia 
fidei realm of 'first' theology and confessional doctrine from 
'second' theology dialogue with non-Christian social theory. 
have shown that it is neither good for 'first' theolo"gy to be 
without the theoretical logic of socio-philosophy nor to empty 
the content of salvation into human social relations. The one 
reaches out to the other. 22 This being so, the kind of agenda 
21 Consider Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's failure to recognize groups within 
society, of not society itseH, as processes with an active subject: -Feuerbach .•. 
does not understand human activity itself as objective (gegenstSndlich) 
activity-. In T .B. Bottomore and M. Rubel (ed.s) (1961, reprinted 1990), p. 82. 
On the idea of society as -A History with a Subject" see J. P. Miranda (1978). On 
-Consciousness and :the Idea of Society- as a theme within Marxism see L 
Kolakowski (1978) Vol. 1, Ch. V §§ 1 - 2; Vol. 2, Ch. 11, §§ 2 - 3. 
22 E. Dussel (1985) finds correspondence between the Christian content of 
incarnation and E. Levinas's talking about the revelation of the 'other' in terms of 
-Proximity- or an originative presence prior to the seH-conscious initiation of 
relation. L:evinas recasts Hegel's philosophy of social relations in ethical not 
soteriological terms, using the idea of God's presence in the stranger, the widow 
and the orphan to expose the violences of his totalizing reason. Dussel identifies 
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set for the study has been how engage in the type of dialogue 
required. This question is difficult, but the analogical task of 
theology has been developed as a reflective, second order 
exercise which looks for harmony between the meaning of 
salvation in Christ and liberative, edifying features in non-
Christian socio-philosophy. I have used tools derived from 
Aquinas's classic texts about analogical reason as interpreted by 
contemporary liberation theologians. It is a similarity-in-
difference way of thought, providing an interpretative 
framework through which to assess how salvation is signified 
socially. 23 
6. C. RECONSIDERING COMMUNITY 
Practically speaking, this means understanding what is 
inadequate in Hegel's own superseding of the Christian 
understanding of community. Using analogical language, it is 
possible as E Jungel suggests, for theology both to learn from 
Hegel and to criticize him. Jungel uses Hegel as a support to 
theological reflection in rethinking his atheistic response to the 
"bad old God of the metaphysicians". This does not mean that he 
thinks God's essence [Wesen) should be expressed through the 
claims of reason; the exclusively Christological grounds of 
Jungel's account are not compromised. 24 Rather, as he 
explains, it is important that we not only negate Hegel's 
excluded 'otherness' with the peoples of Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia. E. 
Dussel (1985) p. 50; 244. Compare Levinas (1981) pp. 176 - 7. 
23 I am indebted for this phrase to D. Tracy (1981) pp. 408 f. 
24 J. B. Webster (1986) stresses how JOngel understands the 'image of God like 
Barth from within the horizon of the history of Jesus. Ch. 9, pp. 104 - 5. 
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misguided hopes for community but transform them into new and 
more adequate articulations. 
The problems of analogous talk about God are well documented 
by E. Jungel. He mentions especially the appearance of always 
humanizing talk about God under the title analogy of the name 
(analogia nominum) , whereby one thing - here the simplicity of 
the subject - is the hermeneutical reason for the same concept 
being applied to God. 25 We have seen already that Hegel wants 
to take Christian influences and understand them with a 
different philosophical content. In Chapters VII and VIII of the 
Phenomenology, illustration of this is given in the type of 
usage given to the word community in relation to his sense of 
universal absoluteness. 
Some form of the root word Gemein occurs over eighty times 
in the Phenomenology. In noun form [Gemeinschaft ] it means 
those with a mutuality of interests (364), the moral society 
[Gemeinde ] (656), an international alliance [Gemeinschaft-
lichkeit ] (727), the Christian community (781-787), and a 
collective or unity of minds [Gemeinsamkeit der BewuBtf3in(ej ] 
at the conclusion of the Preface (69). In adjectival form 
[gemein, gemeinsam, gemeinsamkeit ] means that which is held 
in common with another thing (543), with the form 
gemeinschaftliche sometimes having a peculiarly nationalist 
reference (727). There is a problem of definition in knowing how 
broad a sense in which to speak of society, compounded by the 
related use o-f Gesamtheit to mean a social form of the totality 
or whole (730), das Gemeinwesen an international community 
25 E. JOngel (1983) § 17 pp. 261 - 2. 
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or polity, although it is probably best translated by A.V. Miller as 
"commonwealth". This is in addition to the philosophical 
category Allgemeinheiten (729; 730; 745), which is used by 
Hegel to mean universality but can refer in common parlance to 
the general public. 
It is important to note in this respect how the notion of the 
Christian community features in relation to words derivative 
from the verb, to speculate. The noun 'speculation' [spekulation] 
occurs only once in the Phenomenology as a derogatory term 
used of "abstract thought" (580). Here it means an aspect of 'the 
Enlightenment' that Hegel attacked because of its unreflective, 
'in itself [an sich] form of consciousness. It refers to Kanfs 
principle of complete determination which says to know a thing 
we must know every possible predicate and must determine it 
thereby as a sum total in itself, or object that is only implicitly 
'for us'. 26 Adjectival forms occur far more commonly; eighteen 
time in fact, for example, in "The Revealed Religion" (§§ 761 f.) 
where speculative thinking tries to understand the Revealed 
Religion within an idea of totality or the whole. This notion of 
totality or the whole is the process of development through 
which, Hegel says, everything can be comprehended by reason: 
"Speculative knowledge knows God as Thought or pure Essence, 
and knows this Thought as simple Being and as Existence" 
(ibid.). 
Hegel's intention is to establish "the object", that is, all that 
26 I. Kant C.P.R. A 572 I B 600. For Hegel, a thing 'in itself must be comple-
mented by its being 'for us' i.e., transformed Into a moment within conscious 
development. 
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can be objectified in thought, ultimately 
an implicitly spiritual being" (788). 
establish the link between the 'spiritual ' 
a" human history, "as, 
~"'..:s ,~ 
In other words, /.. to 
(in the sense of the 
speculative harmonization of consciousness with itself) and 
historical social processes. The point cannot be made too 
strongly that Hegel's notion of this 'spiritual', speculative 
relation has a technical sense in his claim for unity between an 
objective observation of reality and idealist associations with 
Platonism. G. Lukacs's The Destruction of Reason captures this 
in the tension between Hegel's search for objectivity and his 
idealist tendency by referring repeatedly to his 'objective 
idealism' and the thin dividing line between rationality and 
irrationality, 27 
In this, he is much inspired by Jakob Bohme and others of 
German Romantic philosophy. His letters boasted at times of 
having been a follower of Bohme from his youth. 28 Particularly 
evident in these passages are reminiscences of Bohme's 
conceiving of the world progressing towards unity with the self-
manifestation of the Divine being; "Spirit emptied out into 
Time" (808). 29 Of particular interest here is how this unity is 
27 G. Luk~cs (1980) Ch. V, "Neo-Hagelianism". 
28 On receiving the complete works of BOhme from P. G. van Ghert in 1811 Hagel 
wrote to Ghert enthusing about his unsystematic attempts to to think abstractly 
and to bring the elements of speculative conception under some control: "Bei ... 
seiner eigenen wenigen Bildung, abstTakt zu denken ist sein BestTeben der 
harteste Kampf, dastiefe Spekulative, das er in seiner Anschauung hat, in die 
Vorstellung zu bringen ...• See Emst Benz (1983) pp. 13; 108 - 110. 
29 "For God has not brought forth the creation, that he should be theit>y perfect, 
but for his own manifestation ... for the great joy and glory." J. BOhme, "The 
Signature of all Things" Ch. XVI in Works,C. J. Barber Ed. (1909) London. 
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manifest in community. W. Jaeschke suggests: 
For it belongs to the concept of religion to be the self-consciousness of spirit 
in the fonn of consciousness (of an object] .•. in philosophy of religion 
seH-conscious spirit itself - and not a representation - becomes the object 
of its consciousness-. 30 
Knowledge of the divine is woven into the texture of discourse 
about human consciousness and relation. The threat, however, is 
that the Christian God either disappears into the distant realm 
of the unconditioned or loses his objective distinctiveness from 
human experience 
Any hopes for community would, on this view, take place 
within a metanarrative or metaphysic of totality that reveals 
some kind of absolute truth of reason in a non contextual sense. 
The clearest picture of this in the Philosophy of History which 
looks at society within the ancient Oriental and Greek worlds, 
the 'reflective' period of Roman history and the 'philosophical' 
history of the German world. 31 Reason has been given some 
kind of metaphysical foundation. However, this kind of 
foundation has been thoroughly criticized in recent years. The 
accusations of Horkheimer and Adorno that Hegel ·played a 
bloody role in the true history of the human race· have made us 
30 W. Jaeschke (1990) p. 193. An underlying question here is whether the 
Phenomenology is an integral unity including the last chapter on 'Absolute 
Knowing-. On the time lapse between the -Introduction-, -Preface- and Ch. VIII see 
W. Marx (1975) who argues for an overall structural unity. On the controversy 
between T. Haering and O. POggeler over the status of Ch. VIII see R. Pippin (1989) 
pp. 109 f. 
31 On this threefold structure as a modem myth see P. Springborg, 'Politics, 
Primordialism and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle and the myth of the 
Gemeinschafr in American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, no. 1, March 
1986, .pp. 185f. 
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all too wary of the totalizing tendency of his speculative reason; 
the singularity of the 'I' taken up in the totality or -movement of 
the universal- (789) 32 In relation to this, Chapter 4 showed 
that Hegel's ontology of singleness suggests a perverted notion 
of totality that leaves the 'other' outside. 33 
Thus, there is no place for any speculative hope for 
community in which universal presuppositions are supposedly 
derived from Hegel's overall metaphysical framework and its 
pattern of self-consciousness; -self-consciousness gains the 
form of universality and what remains to it is .. . the Notion that 
has attained its realization- (795). Bonhoeffer, in his 1933 
Hegel-Seminar, referred to Hegel's admiration of the ancient 
Greek religion (treated in the Phenomenology as a discussion of 
aesthetics (699 - 748)) as the 'fairer' [heitere] religion because 
of its comprising reconciliation by nature. 34 He reminds us 
that the Phenomenology argues for a type of reconciliation 
inherent in the nature of reason that is reminiscent of the age-
long tendency of philosophy towards the idea of Absolute unity. 
Instead, we must consider what kind of thought is able to 
sublate Hegel's own inadequate understanding of spirituality 
and community. 
32 M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno (1972) p. 224. 
33 "The Hegelian Aufhebung ... is included within the circle of absolute 
knowledge, never exceeds its closure ... belongs to restricted economy·, describing 
Hegelian spirituality as the circulation of prohibitions, unable to break out of 
the drive from negation to counter negation. J. Derrida (1978) p. 275. 
34 ·[E]nhaJt Versohntsein von Haus aus·. IIse TOdt (Hg.) (1988) p. 15. 
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6. D. INCREASED COLLABORATION 
I have argued for the increasingly collaborative character of 
the theological task, pursuing Aquinas's analogical model for 
theology as a reflective word after faith. Hegel, we have seen, 
threatens to diminish the radical 'otherness' of Christ's divinity, 
penetrating beyond the plane of analogy to rise above God. 35 
"Science contains within itself ... the passage of the Notion into 
consciousness" (806). In R. Pippin's words; "all human activity 
should be explained, accounted for and evaluated only in terms 
appropriate to rational, in his terms, spiritual or non-natural 
beings." 36 Does this mean, however, that we must retreat into 
a kind of isolationism in which non-Christian social theory is 
treated as an area of human autonomy; "a distorted and distant 
echo" of Christianity? 37 
The legitimacy of analogical thinking in theology is an issue 
over which many battles have been thought. Recall Karl Barth's 
now infamous judgement in the Introduction to Ch u rc h 
Dogmatics which stated that analogia entis is the invention 
of the Antichrist. 38 For him there can be no philosophical 
35 See E. Heintel's (1958) Hegel und die Analogia Entis which understands the 
relation between a legitmate logic of analogy and Hegel's speculative sense in terms 
of the ontic difference between knowledge of the Absolute and absolute knowledge. 
36 R. Pippin, "The Rose and. the Owl: Some remarks on the Theory - Practice 
Problem in HagelW, The Independent Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 111 (1979) pp. 7 
- 8. 
37.J Milbank (1990) p. 390. 
38 W[HJalte die analogia entis fOr die .Erfindung des Antichrist und denke, daB 
man ihretwegen nicht katholisch werden kanrf'. C.D. 1/1, § VIII. E. Mechels 
traces the development of Barth's treatment of this question in his (1974) 
Analogie bei Erich przywara und Karl Barth. He contrasts Barth with przywara 
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substitute for theology's presenting of the Word of God, making 
the analogia fidei a primal meaning for interpreting all reality. 
The implied suggestion in this thesis is that we can move beyond 
the conflict about discussions of analogy (analogia entis) being 
said to be 'from below' vis-a-vis the analogy of faith (analogia 
fidei) which is from above. The two are not alternatives. In 
order to understand their relation, I have been arguing 
consistently that theology must meet with non-Christian social 
theory. This is necessary if we are to distinguish practically 
between alienation and liberation, capacity and incapacity, 
creativeness and destructiveness in the world. As Aquinas 
writes: "Our intellect, which knows God from creatures, in order 
to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the 
perfections flowing from God to creatures". 39 The doctrine of 
salvation takes its metaphors I understanding concerning God 
out of the world of human beings. Simultaneously, the eyes of 
faith are required if the meaning of salvation is to be understood 
as coming 'from above'. 
This leads us fairly naturally back to the work of Jurgen 
Habermas and his recovering the idea of community for 
for who~ the analogia entis entailed no postulate of natural theology but was about 
the structure of relation -Wesensstruktut' of the revealed God and humankind. 
See esp. pp. 122 - 124. Note Barth's comment on the independent nature of 
philosophy; ·phllosophy cannot go beyond ... the Word of God itself, if it is to be 
true to its own task, if it is not to become theology·. Ethics p. 44. 
39 T. Aquinas S. Th. 1, Qu. 13, art. 4, p, 156. Also 1, Qu. 13, art. 1 p. 149. 
The analogy of proportion is to be distinguished from the analogy of attribution in 
which non-comparable relations of different things are held with the one thing 
they have in common; -according to the proportion of many things to one-. S Th. 
1, Qu. 13, art. 5, p. 159. 
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philosophy. Habermas, since his doctoral dissertation in 1954 
(Univ. of Bonn), Das Absolute und die Geschichte. Vonder 
Zwiespaltigkeit in Schelling's Denken, has refused to postulate 
an objectifiable idea of society distinct from empirically, 
naturally and socially generated subjects, specifically in order 
to avoid any association with Hegel's idea of totality. 40 The 
crux issue is Habermas's search for a non-Absolute concept of 
reason that will provide a basis for the testing of truth and 
legitimacy in social relations. "Validity claims are internally 
connected", he says, "with reasons and grounds". 41 Making 
communicative rationality the basis for liberative social action, 
he tests the legitimacy of the criteria by which to evaluate any 
notion of community by its findings: "The universal pragmatic 
conditions of possibility of rationally justifying norms of action 
or evaluation have themselves a normative character". 42 
In turning to Habermas, I have attempted to give practical 
content to an understanding of the social in terms that find 
critical correspondence between Christian and non-Christian 
social theory. If salvation has a wider than ecclesial reference, 
God's revelation in Christ yields a sociality not only to be 
worked out in the Christian community, but collaboratively with 
40 Ct. R. Engels, "The Revolution against Hegel- in L.S. Feuer (Ed.), pp. 237 -
256. Also Lukacs (1980) p. 547 on the progressive elements in Hegel's dialectic 
with which Marx could and could not associate himself when critically re-worked 
in a materialist dialectic. 
41 J . Habermas (1987 a) p. 301. On the logic of legitimation problems see J. 
Habermas (1973) Pt. 111, esp. Ch. 2 "The Relation of Practical Questions to 
Truth- for his discursive theory of truth. 
42 These words are T. McCarthy's (1978) p. 325 but quoted by Habermas as 
outlining the intent of his universalization thesis in J.B. Thompson & D. Held Ed.s 
(19'82) p. 256. 
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non-Christian social theory. 43 Hence the need to resituate 
Hegel's starting point for consideration of the self from 
particularity to sociality, and the need to call on examples of 
socio-philosophy for what they might disclose of the social form 
of God's salvation. Chapters VII and VIII of the Phenomenology 
thus remind us of both the totalitarian dangers of Hegelian-
influenced speculative thinking but also lend urgency to 
consideration of alternative notions of communicative 
rationality as bases for testing liberative social action. 
43 Note the points of contact here with theology after the manner of Bonhoeffer 
which, W.W. Floyd suggests; -must be able to articulate meaningfully its own ... 
ethics of difference-. W.W. Floyd (1988) p. 11. See D. Bonhoeffer (1962) -In 
prinCiple, the Idea of a contingent revelation of God in Christ denies the possibility 
of the I's self-comprehension ... revelation must therefore yield an epistemology of 
its own-. p. 15. 
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7. A. RENEWAL FOR ACTION 
The argument of this thesis has occurred in four 'moves' or 
stages. In a first move (the Introduction) the background of the 
problem was sketched. I outlined the need to avoid this dualism 
which is the hazard of the salvation in a social context debate. 
This corresponds to the attitude of openness to debate with non-
Christian social theory which, I said, was imperative for 
analogical theology. 1 Chapters 1 and 2 outlined the 'I' - 'We' 
dilemma in relation to deconstructive and constructive 
interpretations of Hegel, noting parallels between Hegel's notion of 
the 'I' and his understanding of the concept God. This corresponds 
to the task of investigation which is the second 'move' or stage in 
the analogical task. In Chapter 3, the foreground stage of the 
argument was developed and the problem of Hegel's individualism 
was related to Habermas's communicative paradigm shift. By 
understanding theology as a fundamentally interpretative and 
critical exercise the issue of communicative not instrumental 
rationality was taken as a parable, enabling theological 
articulation of what God's salvation is like in socio-philosophic 
terms. This comprised the third 'move' or task of making specific 
points of contact between theology and socio-philosophy. There 
followed the need to develop the second and third of these 'moves' 
in an integrated fashion and Chapters 4 and 5 risked presenting 
liberation from alienation and human spirituality as themes 
shared by Hegel and Christian understanding. Chapter 6 considered 
§§ 672 - 808 of the Phenomenology, looking at Hegel's universal 
theses about the nature of community. 
1 See Introduction, pp. 30 f. 
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Thus, between doctrinal confession of the gospel of salvation 
and the actions that have to be decided upon in particular 
situations, I have argued the need for a mediation through non-
Christian social theory. The Christian theologian, seeing the 
context of surrounding social life damaged by different forms of 
alienation, becomes conscious of the trans-historical nature of 
this tragic state. S/he might ask, is the idea of salvation in a 
social context one of those articles of faith which, like the 
doctrine of the Trinity, all Christians are wsupposedw to accept 
although, in Kant's words, it wprovides nothing, absolutely nothing, 
of practical value W? 2 The Christian doctrine of salvation will 
indeed be of little practical value unless specific, provisional 
definitions of the type of action required of Christians can be 
given in a particular time and place. For this reason, over against 
any separatist claims for theology's heterogeneity and otherness, 
have felt compelled to analogical inquiry. 
The question with which I began was: How are we to understand 
salvation in a social context? I have tried throughout to 
emphasize as hard as I can the sceptical case about the possibility 
of speaking about 'the social'. I do not share this scepticism, and 
have argued that there are ways of answering the various charges 
laid against the possibility of renewed Christian social theory. 
The deep dilemma between talking of 'the social' either in terms of 
the functions of collected individuals or of 'society' as a single, 
static entity has been traced to some of its roots in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century German socio-philosophy. Having done this, the 
challenge was not just to attack the resulting individualism of 
2 Shirley C. Guthrie takes this quote from Kant. See Theology Tod~y, VoL 46, 
1989-90, p. 205. 
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much modern socio-philosophy but to show that the aforesaid 
dilemma can, to some extent, be resolved in the activity of 
communication. In this, Habermas's communicative action theory 
acted like a parable, enabling theological articulation of the 
openness of the future to human liberation and community, and 
what that signifies of God's salvation. Now, in the final Chapter, I 
attend to the fourth 'move' or stage of the analogical task which is 
to refocus on the substantive theological issues, summarizing the 
findings of the study. 
7. B. ACTION IN THE WORLD 
The motive force in the study has been the idea that God's 
operation in Christ exemplifies a form of relation, instances of 
which can be adduced in dialogue with non-Christian social theory. 
With properly derived analogical tools, the task has been to talk 
about 'the social' and to assess social and political values. The 
task of social theology has been twofold, that of deriving 
doctrinal, theoretical understanding of salvation ('first' theology) 
and that of going through socio-analytic mediation ('second' 
theology). In the words of Gottlieb S6hngen, a one time influence 
on E. Jungel; "the divine metaphor I parable (Gleichnisrede) camps 
in the middle of our earthly-human world of metaphors I parables 
(Gleichniswelt)". 3 
I refer to S6hngen because he illustrates the crux of the matter 
3 G. SOhngen (1952) "die gottliche Gleichnisrede zeltet metten in unserer 
irdisch-menschlichen Gleichniswelt" p. 241. The ana/ogia entis, he says, 
derives from the human world of being (Seinswelf} and the ana/ogia fidei from the 
world of faith. pp. 236-7. For E. JOngel's reference to SOhngen see (1983) pp. 
262; 289. 
ACTION IN THE WORLD 
216 
Ch. 7 COMMUNITY RENEWAL 
which is that 'first' theology, or the analogia fidei, would not 
yield itself to analogy in any relevant sense without its humanly 
rooted yet God inspired power of picture and metaphor. Similarly, 
'second' theology would not be theology without its reading the 
social nature of humanity 'from above', with a point of departure in 
God's revelation of himself in Christ through his offer of salvation. 
The two senses are in interaction, the one energizing a new and 
evocative meaning in the other. It is helpful, perhaps, to compare 
this position with the "two cities" approach of, for example, J. 
Milbank which draws substantially on Augustine's distinction 
between civitas terrena and civitas Dei. Milbank's Theology 
and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason probes the concept of 
the 'secular' in relation to the Christian tradition. Reacting 
against the "let the world set the agenda" mood that was popular in 
the 1960's and 1970's, Milbank shakes off the confinements that 
theology suffers when adapting itself to secular notions of reason. 
He wants "to restore in postmodern terms, the possibility of 
theology as a meta discourse", 4 that is, to rediscover the 
Christological-ecclesial narrative of the Christian tradition as an 
exemplary form of human community independent of other 
disciplines. 
For Milbank, the question when reading Hegel in particular is: 
Who sets the agenda? The question is a legitimate one and his 
answer is that Christian social theory must recover itself as a 
"metanarrative" or ultimate way of thinking: "It is theology itself 
that will have to provide its own account of the final causes at 
work in history". 5 His concern is that Christian social theory 
4 J. Milbank (1990) pp. 1; 380-88. 
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does not become a province or reserve within secular reason. (For 
example, using the Hegelian language of Sittlichkeit in talking of 
the Christian community, he subsumes Hegel within the 
"metanarrative" or Christian account of history.) My concern in 
response is that this fails to come to terms with the human 
capacify I incapacity issue dealt with previously. 6 A "two 
cities" approach fails to recognise ~;.~ what is good and of value in 
human reason per se, and consequently is unable to establish a 
framework for dialogue. The alternative is to resign oneself 
instead to an Augustinian flight from the 'secular' because of its 
domination by power struggles. 7 
Little is to be hoped, Milbank feels, for Christian I non-
Christian dialogue because force and the control of force is at the 
root of any secular social theory. This is clear even from the 
structure of the book which centers around four variants of secular 
reason selected to demonstrate 'secular' reason's domination by 
the issue of power. 8 Secular government is said to be 
"committed by its very nature only to the formal goals of 
dominium ". 9 The implication is that the social responsibility 
5 J. Milbank (1990) p. 380. 
6SeeCh.5C. 
7 A useful overview of power struggle and the overcoming of alienation as 
formative ideas for German sociology, especially in the Weimar Republic is D. 
Frisby (1983) The Alienated Mind. 
8 Milbank (1990) pp. 9-23 on the different roots of the secular. Four variants 
of secular reason are identified as Uberalism (a fusion of scientific and theological 
discourse), Positivism (the presupposition of a social organism preceding virtue or 
politics), Dialectics (an explaining of human inter-action through the power of the 
negative). and Difference (a relativism suggesting randomness and particularity at 
the 'level of 'ultimate reality'). 
9 Milbank (1990) p. 422. 
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of the Christian community must lie elsewhere than in striving for 
a better 'secular' social theory; -What theology has forgotten-, he 
writes, -is that it cannot contest or learn from this understanding 
as such, but has either to accept or deny its object-. 10 No 
compromise can be allowed to dilute the distinctiveness of 
Christian social theory; -if Christianity seeks to 'find a place for' 
secular reason, it may be perversely compromising with what, on 
its own terms, is either deviancy or falsehood-. 11 Note his brief 
dismissal of Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to postulate liberative 
content in the activity of communicative reason as naive in 
assessing the assemblage of claims to rational justification for 
action. 12 The matter does not end here, however, if we are not to 
risk the church and the world becoming detached regions with 
different modes of knowledge and non-related interests. 13 
I should note that Milbank criticizes spatial designations of the 
Christian community as Civitas Dei. 14 There is no question but 
10 Milbank (1990) p. 10. 
11 Milbank (1990) p. 23. Compare N. Pittenger (1982) who speaks of the man 
Jesus as 'imaging' the responsive love that reconciles the world to God an an analogy 
of human salvation. pp. 103-8. 
12 Milbank (1990) p. 272. See K.O. Ape I (1973) pp. 252-267. also -The 
Problem of Philosophical Fundamental Grounding in light of a Transcendental 
Pragmatic of Language-. in Man and World. 8; -I conclude that the life-elemenr of 
philosophical arguments is a transcendental language game in which .•. the 
transcendental-pragmatic rules or narms of ideal comunication is presupposed-. 
pp. 239-275. Note that S.K. White (1988). like Milbank. criticizes Habermas for 
not accounting adequately for human motivation. pp. 4 f. 
13 On distortions in applications of Augustine and Luther's "Two Kingdoms doctrine-
see U. Duchrow. "The Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms as Resource for Our Time: Help 
or Hindrance- in Luther et la Reforme allemande dans une perspective oecumenique, 
Geneva (1983) pp. 249-262. 
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that the Christian and secular meet on the same plane; "the 
inhabitants of the altera civitas ", he says, are "on pilgrimage 
through this temporary world". 15 However, little provision is 
made for Christian engagement in social theory alongside secular 
theorists because power cycles dominate the latter. Civitas Dei 
and the altera civitas tend to be separated due to the little 
perceived commonality in their procedures and interests. There 
are genuine difficulties that Milbank identifies. In particular, is 
his reminder that only God-centred humanity can be said by 
Christians to provide for the fulfilment of true society, 
emphasizing the need for radical negation of Hegel's recasting of 
Christian doctrine in terms of a self-determining rationality. This 
might be expressed in terms of what David Tracy calls "negative 
dialectics", meaning the judgement brought on analogical thought 
in Jesus Christ as Word-Event. 16 
Two things remain to be said in response to his approach, 
however. First, the Christian community is not free of the power 
cycles which, Milbank says, dominate 'secular' relations. 1 7 
Second, the "two cities" approach risks making sin the primary 
point of reference rather than salvation and the mystery of the 
Holy Spirit's work in maintaining an openness in the human order to 
liberative human relations. 18 When the former is emphasized 
14 Milbank (1990) pp. 422-3 
15 Milbank (1990) p. 380. 
16 D. Tracy (1981) pp. 41St. 
17 See R.H. Roberts, -Lord, Bondsman and Churchman- in C.E. Gunton and D.W. 
Hardy, Eds., (1989) for parallels between the Hegelian parable and relations 
between clergy and laity in contemporary church structures. 
18 On openness in the human order as a mark of the world's inseparability from the 
Holy Spirit see J. Zizioulas, -Preserving God's Creation- in King's Theological 
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rather than the latter, the result, as have suggested, is the 
familiar "two cities' dualism which risks undermining the mystery 
of God's abiding presence in creation. 
7. C. TIME FOR ANALOGICAL THEOLOGY 
The argument which I have been proposing is that Christian 
discourse about salvation can, and perhaps must, be mediated 
through non-Christian social theory if we are to effect an adequate 
articulation of salvation socially. Primarily I have been arguing 
for an attitude, a manner of doing theology, rather than a formal 
means of procedure although the 'moves' or stages specified are 
intended as an elucidation of the possibilities for analogical 
theology. By way of summary, let me turn to the familiar model of 
analogical practice that Aquinas has helped us to consider. I refer 
to the content in human relations that is common to Christian and 
non-Christian social theory [L. ratio communis] which, if taken to 
signify salvation socially, can be said to be analogous. Aquinas 
wrote that analogy signifies a middle [L. medius] between two 
types of discourse, the univocal and the equivocal. 19 The 
character of this "middle" has occupied our minds throughout this 
study and I have argued that the content of salvation will mediate, 
participate in and include something of the modes of both realms 
of discourse. 
Journal, Spring 1990, pp. 1-5. 
19 T. Aquinas S. Th. 1a, q. 13, a. 5. "A term may be predicated of various subjects 
in three ways, univocally, equivocally and analogically. Univocally, if the same term 
and meaning is used in exactly the same sense, ... equivocally, if the term is the same 
but the meaning and definition different, ... analogically, if various objects, though 
diverse by meaning and definition, bear on some one common meaning". Opusc. 11, 
de Principiis Naturae ad fratrem Silvestrum. Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 93. 
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To conclude let me express this using Aquinas's distinction 
between univocal and equivocal discourse. 20 Aquinas says that 
univocal discourse is that when there is a commonness of meaning 
shared in a particular context of usage as, for instance; "when the 
generic nature is predicated of the species with exactly the same 
force and meaning". 21 If univocation is that use of a common 
name to signify the same notion in each realm of discourse, much 
of this study has been about social concerns shared between 
theological discourse and socio-philosophy. 22 The human need 
for identity, the fear of death and alienation, and the hope of 
liberative social action in community fall under a common intent 
where some affinity between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory can be ascertained. This is what Clodovis Boff calls a 
"correspondence of relationships" between doctrinal matters and 
social analysis. It does not, he says, imply a univocal predication 
of God and humankind; it does not "designate an equality between 
terms of the hermeneutic equation, but precisely between the 
respective relationships between pairs of terms". 23 The issue 
is our recognition of the relationship between theological 
discourse and its social context. 
This relationship cannot properly be conceived, however, if we 
only extract its common notes. We need Aquinas's sense of things 
which are named equivocally, having a common name but signifying 
20 D. Burrell (1973) warns against too marked a division into univocal and 
equivocal discourse on the basis of Wittgenstein's denial that we can ever construe an 
adequate formulation of the meanings or the kinds of contexts involved. pp. 218 f. 
21 T. Aquinas S. Th. 2a-2ae. cxx. 2, c. 
22 For further definition of Aquinas's sense of univocation see R. Mclnerny (1968) 
Ch. 1, pp. 1-12; D. Burrell (1973) pp. 70-1. 129. 144. 218. 
23 C. Boft (1987) p. 148. 
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diverse things. For instance, when speaking of the relation 
between philosophical and theological discourse, Aquinas writes: 
"Merely rational inquiry can lead to the first, but the second lies 
beyond the unaided reason". 24 Theology signifies different 
notions about the relation of God to the world from the intentions 
of philosophical discourse. So, when the notions of liberation and 
healing are used of society from a theological perspective they 
exhibit an inner tension which gives rise to an extended meaning. 
To speak of liberation and healing theologically has an additional 
bearing on divine truth. There is no complete equivocation between 
Christian and non-Christian social theory. 
While pursuing this line of thought, I referred to what happens 
in such a use of language as a 'transignification', Clodovis Boff's 
word for the operation of opening up an image to its theological 
dimension. 25 It is the use of a word to allow a sense that is 
more than syntactical and which takes us beyond human 
arrangements to convey the divine presence and power by which 
the individual and society can be transformed. 26 I mention this 
idea of 'transignification' again because my perception of its 
meaning is a sense in which the raising of the aforesaid issues 
about salvation in a social context is a channel whereby the 
distinction yet affinity between Christian and non-Christian social 
theory conveys divine presence and power. As Aquinas writes: "The 
24 T. Aquinas 1 Conta Gentes,9. Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 5. 
25 See Ch. 4.G. 
26 For a brief summary of the use of the idea of 'signification' in Catholic 
eucharistic theology see W. ~asper (1989) pp. Ch. X -Aspects of the Eucharist in 
Their Unity and Variety-. 
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truths of philosophy are more restricted; they cannot be contrary 
to the truths of faith, but instead offer likenesses and 
anticipations of them-. 27 Christian faith does not stop at 
discourse about human relation but looks to be renewed continually 
in its understanding of God as Trinity in order to reflect this in its 
discourse about salvation socially. Hence the central theological 
claim being made in this study that true individual identity, 
release from alienation and community are found in the human 
vocation to grow in the likeness of God. 28 
7. D. THE RENEWAL OF VISION FOR SERVICE 
The intellectual problems in this study have thus been attached 
to the idea that God's salvation in Christ is confessed as having 
some a world-wide, universal effect, some sense of all human 
vocation being found in Christ the true likeness of God. have 
addressed the question as to how a contemporary soteriology is to 
give content and quality to God's extra-ecclesial saving purposes 
in particular situations, without making the type of absolute 
explanations of social processes that Hegel propounds. Unlike the 
-two cities- approach to secular reason that makes little provision 
for Christian engagement in social theory alongside secular 
theorists, I have argued the theological responsibility of 
discerning with non-Christian social theory what, in social, 
27 T. Aquinas, Exposition, de Trinitate, ii. 3. Quoted from T. Gilby (1953) p. 8. 
28 Aquinas writes: -No agent acts unless aimed at a goal-. God is the ultimate goal 
of humankind. S. rh. 1a1. 3-7 in T. McDermott (1989) pp. 167f. Compare this 
with D. Cupitt's translating of Hegel's immanent critique of Christianity into a form 
of human spirituality that breaks free of supposedly tired beliefs in the 
transcendent. -ro speak of God is to speak about the moral and spiritual goals we 
ought to be aiming ar. (1984) p. 270. 
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economic, political terms etc. is derived either by a co-operative 
calculation. Let me finish by quoting from the Book of Proverbs: 
"Where there is no vision the people perish". 29 For too long we 
have had no vision for how to speak of salvation in social context. 
Fresh, contemporary interest in analogical thinking, I believe, 
helps renew our vision. 
29 Proy. 29:18. 
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